Washington and Lee University School of Law

Washington and Lee University School of Law Scholarly Commons
Supreme Court Case Files

Lewis F. Powell Jr. Papers

10-1976

Milliken v. Bradley
Lewis F. Powell Jr.

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/casefiles
Part of the Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons, Constitutional Law Commons, and the
Education Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Milliken v. Bradley. Supreme Court Case Files Collection. Box 43. Powell Papers. Lewis F. Powell Jr.
Archives, Washington & Lee University School of Law, Virginia.

This Manuscript Collection is brought to you for free and open access by the Lewis F. Powell Jr. Papers at
Washington and Lee University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Supreme
Court Case Files by an authorized administrator of Washington and Lee University School of Law Scholarly
Commons. For more information, please contact christensena@wlu.edu.

C.

..
'

t

found guilty of de jure segregation, (l) is the DC' s power in remedying said segregation
limited silnply to reassignn1ent of pupils to acMeve a desegregated environment, or may
the DC also impose additional

progran~s

which it thinks necessary to combat the effects

of earlier segregation and to assure success of the desegregation plan; and (2) may the
DC order the state to share equally with the school district the costs of such additional
programs?
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2.

r

'

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND AND HOLDING BELOW:

____

This case is

___, In the original DC action, the court found the State
befqre the Court for the third time.
of Michigan and the Detroit Board of Education guilty of de jure racial discrimination.
It directed the pr e paration of a school desegregation plan which included 53 school
districts in addition to Detroit.
484 F. 2d 215 (6th Cir. 1973).

338 F. Supp. 582 (E. D. Mich. 1971).

CA 6 affirmed,

This Court reversed and remanded, holding that a school

desegreation plan could not include the districts surrounding Detroit, absent a showing

.
that they had individually or in concert with Detroit been guilty of segregation.
v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974).

Miliken

The Court remanded the case for further proceedings

directed toward development of a remedy for racial discrimination within the Detroit
City school system.
to
On remand the DC ordered the school district/acquire 150 additional school
buses, as an interim measure.

The buses were to be used in impleme nting such plan

as the DC might later approve.

CA 6 affirmed, but modified the order by directing that

the state bear 75o/o of the cost of those buses.
423

u.s.

519 F. 2d 679.

This Court denied cert.

930 (1975 ).
Starting August 15, 1975 and continuing through May 11, 1976, the DC entered

orders approving and rejecting various
implementation of a desegregation plan.

l....tbn~issions

by the parties with respect to the

---

The plan, as finally shaped, involved reas s i g n~
ment of pupils wit hin 5 of the 8 regions within the Detroit district, the acquisition of
100 additional bus e s, and the bussing of 21, 853 stu_Q.ents.
.......

.............

...

....

That portion of the o r der was

u

affirmed by the CA, Appendix at 16 7a, but is not now before the Court as none of th e
parties petitioned cert.

._,.

The DC also ordered the implementation of a number of

"educational components" which are "comprehe nsive programs which were found to b e
essential to the success of the d ese gregation effort." Appx. at 168a.

As to four of th e se

-3-

G

programs, it held that the state would be required to pay one half of the cost.
four programs are:
"'--

-

These

(1) Reading and communication skills; (2) inservice training of

faculty; (3) non-discriminatory testing; and (4) counseling and career guidance.

The DC

ordered that the Detroit school board disclose the highest budget allocated in any previous
year for these programs and determired that and additionally $ll, 645, 000 would be
required to implement the court- ordered programs.

The state 1 s share of that am.ount

is $5. 8 million.
The State appealed and CA 6 AFFIRMED.

As to the necessity for these

programs, the CA held that:
The Distrm Court found that these Educational ~mponents
are necessart"fo remedy effects of
t segre atio~o assure
) a successful esegregation e fort a
o minimize the possibility
of resegregation." [citation]. This finding of fact is not clearly
erroneous, but to the contrary is supported by ample evidence.
Appx. at l70a.

More specifically, the CA found that:

[educational training] is needed to insure that the teachers and
administrators will be able to work effectively in a desegregated
environment. [Non- discriminatory testing] is needed to insure
that students are not evaluated unequally because of built-in bias
in the tests administered in formerly segregated schools.

-.vithout reading and counseling components, black students might
be deprived of the motivation and achievement levels which the
desegregation remedy is designed to accomplish.

'l

Id. at 170a-7la.

1,

The CA also rejected the state 1 s argument that the Eleventh Amendment
barred the DC 1 s order compelling the state to pay one half of the cost of the educational
components.
'--'

,

The CA held that this case was not controlled by Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S.

651 (1974) because the money here to be paid by the state was not compensation for a
past wrong, but rather an adjunct to prospective declaratory and injunctive reli e f, fallin g

-4-

within the Rule of Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 150 (1908), see Edelman, 415 U.S. at
667-68.

The CA concluded:
The eleventh amendment contention of the state defendant
is without merit.
We hold that it is within the equitable powers of the court
to require the State of Michigan to pay a reasonable part of the
cost of correcting the effects of de jure segregation which State
officials, including the Legislature, have helped to create. We
reemphasize that it is the law of this case that the State of
Michigan has been guilty of act.s which have a causa 1 relation to
the de jure segregation that exists in Detroit. ~ 484 F. 2d at
238-41.

Appx. at 178a.

In justifying the DC's holding that the State was required to pay $5. 8

million in addition to funds it would otherwise pay for education in Detroit, the CA stated:
Since Michigan State officers and agencies were guilty of acts
which contributed substantially to the unlawful de jure segregation
that exists in Detroit, the State has an obligation not only to
eliminate the unlawful segregation but also to insure that there is no
diminution in the quality of education. This principle was stated
in Hart v. Community School of Brooklyn, 383 F. Supp. 699 (E. D.
N.Y. 1974), aff'd, 512 F. 2d 37 (2d Cir. 1975) . . . .
Appx. at 179a.

In affirming the DC, the CA noted the poor financial shape of the school

district, stating that:
it will be difficult for the Detroit Board 1o pay its share of the costs
. . . . Our affirmance of the District Court on this issue is not
intended as a mandate for a cutback in essential educationc '. progra1ns
in order to meet the expenses of implementing the desegregation plan.
We affirrn that part of the judgment relating to the costs of the plan,
but without prejudice to the right of the District Court to require a
larger proportionate payment by the State of Michigan if found to be
required by future developments.
Appx. at 180a.
3.
"-- )

CONTENTIONS:

(1) In the absence of a showing of a constitutional

v~t~ with respect to educational programs,

t

the DC exceeded its authority in ordering

the implementation of educational components as part of the desegregation plan.

(2) The

-!>-

(

tenth and eleventh amendments bar the DC' s order requiring the state to pay $5. 8 million
to finance the said education c01nponents.

4.

DISCUSSION:

(1) Petr relies on the following statement from this

Court's prior opinion in the case, Miliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 744 (1974):
The controlling principle consistently expounded in our
holdings is that the scope of the remedy is determined by the
nature and extent of the constitutional violation. Swann, 402
U.S., at 16.
Petr would therefore argue that since no segregation has been shown with respect to the
.........,.

.._....

awa

:w-,..-, "~

.....,..

educational programs in the district, the DC' s power to fashion a remedy for past
segregation cannot include the addition of education programs.

However, the Court in

Miliken was discussing the question of what individuals may be included within the scope
of the remedy provided by the DC, and held that "[b]efore the boundaries of separate
and autonomous school districts may be set aside by consolidating the separate units
for remedial purposes or by imposing a cross-district remedy, it must first be shown
that there has been a constitutional violation within one district that produces a
significant segregative effect in another district."

Id. at 744-745.

I am not p er suaded

that the same reasoning would apply in fashioning a remedy within a single district.
It seems to 1ne that within broad limits, the DC should be able to

ord ~ r/such

'

educational programs within the district as are necessary to assure the success of the
desegregation plan.

At least two of the programs -- racially unbaised testing of student s ,

and training of faculty to adjust to a desegregated environment -- would appear to be
directly related to the desegregation task.

I have more difficulty with reading e nhance-

ment and career planning programs for they are not specifically designed to deal with
the problem of desegregation; but seem rather designed to generally enhance the quality
of education in the district.

-6However, the DC found, and the CA affirmed the finding that all of the
components were necessary to remedy the effects of past segregation.

And, as quoted

earlier, the CA concluded that the reading and counseling components are necessary
to secure to black students, the motivation and achievement levels with the desegregation
remedy is designed to accomplish.

Appx. at 170a-17la.

While it is difficult, on the

facts presented and without a record, to determine the precise connection between these
two educational components and the success of the desegregation plan, the problem is a fa<
specific one and the CA and DC did not seem to be applying the wrong legal standard.

As

the Court noted in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U.S. 1, 16
(1971)

11

a district court has [equity] power to fashion a remedy that will assure a unitary

school system.

t" . . ____

11

Unless this court wants to fashion a rule that the only remedy for

segregation in a district involves reassignment of students and/ or teachers, this aspect
1I
of the case is probably not cert-worthy.
(2) Petr 1 s second contention seems more troublesome.

I find the CA 1 s

distinguishing of Edelman v. Jordan, and its reliance on Ex parte Young unpersuasive.

"'
In dealing with the Ex parte Young precedent, the Court in Edelman rejected the fU6tion

'---

1I
-An alleged conflict of this case with Keyes v. School District No. 1, 521 F. 2d 465 (lOth
Cir. 1975), cert denied, 44 U.S. L. W. 3399 (U.S. Jan. 12, 1976) appears to turn on the
facts of the two cases. In Keyes, the DC ordered the implementation of a plan overhauling 11 the [school] system 1 s entire approach to education of minorities; its proposals
extend[ed] to matters of educational philosophy, governance, instructional scope and
seque.o.ce, curriculum, student evaluation, staffing, non-instructional service and
community involvement. 11 Id. at 480-81. The CA fully recognized the broad power of the
DC 1 s 11 to effectuate their rP.medial orders by removing all obstacles to meaningful
desegregation, [but 1hi.s orrer lrrr,x:>sed] upon school authorities a pervasive and detailed
system for the o:hcation of rninority children. 11 The CA concluded: 11 We believe thi. s goes
too far. 11 Id. at 482. CA 6 distinguished Keyes, simply noting that the DC in this case
had not gone too far.

-7that "any form of relief may be awarded against a state officer, no matter how closely
it may in practice resemble a money judgment payable out of the state treasury, so
long as the relief may be labeled 1 equitable' in nature." 415 U.S. at 666.

The Court

then stated that "the difference between the type of relief barred by the Eleventh
Amendment and that permitted under Ex parte Young will not in many
between day and night."

The Court noted that the "injunction issued in Ex parte Young

was not totally without effect on the State' 9 revenues . . . .
incurred by

11

instances be that

11

Such effect, however, was

state officials in order to shape their official conduct to the mandate of the

Court's decess, [and thereby becoming] more likely to spend 1noney from the state
treasury than if they had been left free to pursue their previous course of conduct.

11

Such permissible "ancillary effect upon the state treasury" was contrasted with impermissible "payment of state funds, not as a necessary consequence of complianc e in the
future with a substantive federal-question determination, but as a form of comp e ns<:•tion

. . . . " Id. at 668.
While I suppose in this case it could be argued that the State is not being
required to shell out $5. 8 million as compensation for past action, but rather in order
to comply with prospective orders of the DC in exercise of its equity power, that would
.,, /
appear to stretch Edelman quite a bit. The theory is undercut by the <...,A 1 s own justificatio
elsewhere in its opinion to the effect that the reason the State is called upon to pay for one
half the cost of the programs is because it had been, in fue past, guilty of promoting de
jure segregation.

Moreover, the CA left open the possibility that the DC charge the

state for more than one half of the cost of the educational programs, should the school
board be unable to pay.

See p.4 supra.

This all seems very difficult to fit into the

mold of .l:!.:delman as simply the incidental e ffects upon the state treasury of compliance

-B-

2/
with a prospective injunction.
Petr raised a tenth amendment argument for the first time in his petn.

In

light of the fact that neither the CA. nor the DC had an opportunity to consider the is sue,
petr cannot now raise it for the Court's consideration.

351, 352 (1973).

Tacon v. Arizona, 410 U.S.

His argument, in any case, does not seem to have merit.

He relies

on this Court's recent decision in National League of Cities v. Usery, 96 S. Ct. 2465

(1976) which seems inapposite since it dea.ls with the powers of Congress under the
commerce clause, and not with the power of courts to order redress for constitutional
wrongs.
There are two responses.

11/2/76
SJG

Kozinski

All opns in
Appendix

2/
-Another aspect of the CA' s op1111011 causes difficulty with the notion that this is m e rely
relief ancillary to an injunction, rath e r than a money judgm.ent. This is the provi s ion,
page 4 , supra that the State may not reduce the amount of mone y it pays for othe r
education s e rvices, but has to pay the $5. 8 million (or mor e ) in addition to funds it would
otherwise provide to the district. It seems to me that if this were truly an incid e ntal
expense connected with the injunction, the state should be permitt e d to adjust its own
budget in whatever way it s e es fit to compen s ate for this ex pense. The fact that it is not
permitted to sacrifice other educational services to comply with the judg m .e nt n1akes the
$5. 8 million look more and more like imposition of dama ge s against the stat e for pa s t
wrongs.

Court
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Milliken v. Bradley

This is the latest round in the long-running Detroit
school desegregation case.

As it reaches us this time, there

are a few important "givens" no longer at issue:

Both the

State officials and the Detroit Board were found to have
in the constitutional violation
fostered de jure segregation. The State participated/b~
•
d ecLsLons
• •
(•t
A~
its roLe~~+tJh
Ln sc ~SJl
oo sLte
L h a d a ve t o
1962 over every such decision) and construction; by its
failure to fund certain aetroit programs, particularly
transportation, while it funded equivalent programs in all
other parts of the state; and by Act 48, passed in 1970 to
voluntary
thwart the Board's own initial/efforts to desegregate. It
both the Board and
must be accepted for our purposes here that/the state xax were
• constitutional wrongdoers.
The only questions here have to do with remedy.
r in light

The DC's

-lA task is clear in light of our past cases:

"the task is to

correct by a balancing of the individual and collective
interests, 'the condition that offends the Constitution.'
A federal remedial power may be exercised bnly on the basis
of a constitutional violation,' and' [a]s with any equit1
case, the nature of the violation determines the scope of
the remedy."'
~wann.

Milliken I, 418

u.s.,

at 738, quoting from
or • b purposes to be servErl
There are two specific sub-takksAthat are also

clear from our past cases:

._ (1) to eliminate the dual

school system "root and branch" arrl assure the implementation
of a unitary system, and (2) to "restore the victims of
discriminatory conduct to the position they would have
occupied in the absence of such conduct,"

Milliken I, at

746, or, as you put i1l it in Austin this term, "to eliminate

effect~£ any [segregative] official acts or omissions."
Brown II, 349 u.s. 294, at 300, made it clear that a DC
the

SAL qJ~ ~is

··~

w..U..Y.._ •
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1/,

.S~J ~·sri~J '"/c)z.. <), ~. 1~ 1 1?

~ ,U.s~e~·~ f'AAA. ;r ;f.s
e.~;-ee-I.·J~~~. ") ..

p.f

is to remain flexible and sensitive, to the end that any
obstanles to desegregation may be re oved "in a systematic
and effective manner."

(Emphasis added.)

~~~
A

iC

was certainly

reasonable that both constitutional tortfeasors--the State
and the Board--should take part in remedying the violations.
The DC undertook tms task--a very difficult one in
w-{...c...-a..

light of the realities of the Detroit situation, ~ almost
~
-rt.-..a. 'be:
,A
80% of the schoolchildren htiR8 /'-black. W. Ashowed, in my
view, admirable

restraint, especially with respect to busing

The pup61 .. a••••~ reassignment part of the remedy

as a remedy.

concentrated on realigning attendance zones to achieve maximum
results, even

I

thought those

f~··""'
eight~boundaries

if this meant crossing "region" boundaries.

It

had to yield in the interest of

helping assure that children would attend schools near their
homes.

There was some transportation, but it is minimized

by the DC's decision ..-.to concentrate . . its attention on
unchanged the population of
those schools that were identifiably white, leaving/~ several
overwhelmingly black schools in the core city.HR«kaRgea
This failure to make changes in the core city was troubling
to the

CA~and

is somewhat troubling for

m~~

it probably was a wise decision a in light
of Detroit demographics.

f

but I am think
¥hi

,lt"tg

The DC was right that added busing

in and out of th~ore city would mean a heavy burden on the
people involved for a relatively small gain in statistical
desegregation at each school affected; there simply are not
that many white students available in Detroit. In any event,
issue
there is no «kaiiaRge~here now concerning the pupil reassignment decision.
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The other part of the DC's order concerned various "educational components" that the DC considered essential if the
remedy were to be effective.

Many of those components akft

have not been challenged by any party, but four are at issue
I

in-service training for teachers and staff,
4W£

£S

expanded

.....--....

counseling ~ guidance

~altered te: ting prog: : :,

an~medial

program, an

reading efforts.

(I might digress to say that the DC, in many respects,

acted very "Powellian" in crafting the remedy.

It worked

hard to minimize transportation as a cmmponent of

xkexxamea~

its order, displaying keen awareness of the toll that busing
takes of the innocent individuals involved.

At the same time

it showed sensitivity to the importance of assuring that
a school undergoing desegregation is m not made to suffer
educationally--hmce the educational components.

Cf.

~e~

(your opinion), 413 U.S. , at 250, 253 (emphasizing "the
with respect to
paramount goal of quality in education"). Moreover,/the
education components,axaexeaxamaHRXxxax "the major burden
of remedial action falls on offending state officials" not
on "children and parents who did not participate in any
constitutional violation."

A

tds@l 5

id at 249-250.)

The state challenges the four listed education components,
arguing first that the DC exceeded its powers under the
Constitution or at least abused its discretion when it included
them in the remedy.

The state seems to contend that the

remedy must be limited
~ ) redrawing

xaxx~

simply to pupil reassignment--

attendance zones and busing.

State argues that ixXHaxxexxaRaaHx even if

Second,the
~~~~

the A compo~ents

were

proper, the DC had no authority to order the State to shoulder

-450% of the added cost.

The first

argume~tl

is by far the

more important. aRaxlxwiiixaexaxexmasxxsfxmJxaxkKRki«R

.. .

-

The qustion
presented by the State's first contention
..
is essentially whether the educational components were reasonably
necessary to accomplishment of the accepted purposes of
a school desegregation remedy--the two goals listed on
p. 1, supra. I will consider them separately.
(1) Accomplishing desegregation (eliminating the dual

school system).

The educational components clearly are not

needed for moving bodies around.

If that is all that is

contemplated by "desegregation," then the DC's educational
components are superfhous and HRReeaea should not have been
ordered.

But even if desegregation means little more than
~~

moving bodies around, Brown II still commande that that
A

process be made effective. No one could say that the process
is
~Has effective if, once the children arrivef at their new
school, that school's educational mission is • I tlwtzly
obscured by tensions and difficulties associated with the
change.

It's not just

am a matter of desegregating, but

of desegregating schools, and it is important that those
institutionS remain schools of at least equal quality after
desegregation.

Inevitably this means that some preparation

of the students, staff, teachers and parents is HR&fHi reasonably
necessary to make the desegregation process effective.
I might approach it from another angle.

The great strength

of your opinions in the school desegregation cases, especially
Keyes and Austin perhaps, has been sensitivity to the human
dynamics at work in the course of any remedy process.

-5It is this sensitivity which has caused you to emphasize
that busing be kept to a reasoned minimmm.

Obviously

another part of the human dymamics concerns what will
happen at the schools wkaxax£kaRgax being desegregated.
There will be students who have never attended classes with
students of another race--or from another part of town or
perhaps
another socjo-economic group. There will/be teachers who
have never taught whites before, or placks, or who have
never taught in a mixed classroom.

Usually all this will

take place in a setting of some community controversy and
tension.

Strains are inevitable even when all involved are

working with the best of

intention~

aAy campar'QQlQ iAeti:tattunal

ehart~e

as ekere would be t rref aay lfH eyJ.'e.

It xi

seems to me eminently reasonable for a district court to
be sensitive to these strains and to plan for modest measures
that can help alleviate them.
derelict if it acted

w~

Indeed, the court would be

as though such factors did not

exist.
The problem, of course, is that any number of desirable
programs could conceivably be linked in some fashion to
~~. .•

attractive.

strains and making desegregation more

Stretching too far to make this connection

would of course be an abuse.
case befae us.

But I do not think that i~the

xxaxamiRaxaa£kxafxxkax£a~as&Rkx

The court's

approach here did not stretch this justification beyond
G:l

recognition. 1/ I eaamine each of the
service training.
jxH justifiable.

se.rw~~y ~

components~

A.

In-

This seems to me the most readily
Some modest effort to prepare faculty and

-6-

staff for the new situations they will face is almost
indispensable.
linked also.

B.

Counseling.

I find this closely

Where in-service training may help deal with

some of the teacher's strains, counseling can contribute
to relieving some of those what will be generated on the
part of students.
8:1!1& tesanainB:tli

c.

a 1 1. Testing . nad we4sa g

not too closely related to task

(1)~

. ) '

,"t'"

I (

J

assuring effective desegregation,although tl g ure Anot
significance.
totally without/~axxKR£2¥ It is doubtless important
to assure that students in newly integrated schools are
treated equally.

The changes in the testing program may

-:o.

~~·

be seen as serving that end. AThe new reading program ta
can claim a connection only to the extent that an improved
educational program helps keep students and parents within
the Detroit public education system. ( Fostering commitment
to the Detroit public school system on the part of whites

-

is especially important here, since there are so few remaining.
xxx£aHiaxkaxai~x~ex£aHxiaexeaxeffe£xixexaexegxegaxiaRx

It

wou~d/

be difficult to regard the result as effective desegregation
if the DC's plan were to accentuate the current exit of
whites to the point where Detroit schools became almost
totally black. Cf. Keyes, 413 U.S., at 250,

and~ Pasaden~

City Board v. SRangler, slip op. at 9 (manifesting some
sensitivity to "white flight").)

But having said this,

I would have to concludefYthat the reading program cannot
be justified under

r1/Wr' O
\-1- v-.o.
Pa•••••
a ~itr (!)--promoting
A

effective

~~o.v~
~n is by

desegregation--because the only way to tie ·

a chain of reasoning so broad as to validate nearly any

~

-7conceivable DC order.
Raxiaxaiex(2) Restoring the victtms of discriminatory
conduct.

Obviously the problem with segregation is not

simply that it offenasl our aesthetic sense to separate
white - skinned people from black-skinned people.

'I'lE problem

is the human toll on the victims of discrimination.

!kis

RaHx One of this Court's finest moments came when it
announced its full awareness of that fact in Brown I,
347 U. S. 483.

Following axxxkexkeeisxaf Sweatt v. Painter,

339 U.S. 629, the Court emphasized certain intangible fa«xaxs
BXHBH

burdens generated by a segregated system.

two factors:

It emphasized

a "sense of inferiority [that] affects the

motivation of the child to learn," and some tendency to
retard educational aevelopment.

347

u.s.,

at 494, quoting

from the lower court findings in the Kansas case.

Restoring

the victims of discrimination means dealing with lingering
problems of motivition and development.
components

Some of the educational

are closely related to serving this purpose.

-

_., /

Counseling probably has the closest relationship.

A'

-

counselor can help the ....._StUdent find the right pxagxamxfax course
of studies, suggest necessary remedial programs, and help
HH£BHxage discourage drcpping-out.

Depending on how the iHR
,,

in-service training is carried out, it too could serve this
goal well.

The DC's testing order required the Board to

assure that its tests accurately measured students from
all backgrounds.

Having accurate information obviously

serves the goal of restoration.
Reading again has the weakest tie to the goal.

Or perhaps

I should say that the connection is strong, but it is a connec-

-8-

tion shared by hundreds of other desirable programs.

But

the DC did seem to take care to select what it regarded as
the simgle most important program for purposes of restoring
N.s
those whose education#i &tLJ · aRb& 1 ac~ l\ suffered badly
in aetroit's schools. iiK£&XHiHgx£&XX&iRX8Xkax

And there

was record testimony strongly supporting this finding.

In sum, I think it possible to say that the four
educational components were reasonably necessary to achieving
the two established goals of._. desegregation.

The ...-

X&RHSHK only component, in my view, with a questionable
claim is the reading component.

But we do have two courts

that have expressly found, based on the record made in the
DC, that these components were R "necessary" or "essential."
I regard this as far short of an outrageous attempt by
a court to impose its own educational goals on a school district,
and so ixxkiHk I would lexxxka not regard this as an appropriate
occasion to depart from the "two court rule" on fact findings. __."'
,
Even an opinion affirming could contain strong language emphasizing
that courts are not to impose their own educational desires
on systems undergoing desegregation.
. tha#I could well acce t xkax whic
There is a secon opt~on you may ~n more attractive.
the reading component has the shakiest claim, the

~~Hxx

could reverse as to it but approve the other three.

Since

Court

This course

would adequately convey that this Court is serious about
performing
considerable
DC's axxHMiRg/ex&x£iKiRg their difficult remedial role with I
restraint, but still leave room for DC's

ba +~~.c•~Jie. '"' e
~nes

to

xx~

i

xsxxx~

at the front

non-transpo•tation options toward the end of

-9making desegregation effective.

There is a further question concerning why the DC's order
has to be so specific when it is obvious that the Detroit
Board is fully committed to making desegregation work.

That is,

detailed orders generally make therost sense only when a
defendant drags his feet and does his best to avoid full
compliance.

The

~ja

Board is not such a defendant.

The answer,liaxxiRxxka in my view, lies in the fact that
the Board is not the only wrongdoer here.
contribu~ed

The state X33

to the segregation, and ix although it has

cooperated in most of the steps ordered by the DC, it
help
obviously is not willing to/fund all of them. Detroit cannot
a

fKRa meet the full cost because of ixxx3MR/financial plight
not entirely of its own making (Detroit citizens have the
state's highest tax rate,

~1-es.r

but ~41

low per-student funding).

A detailed order is one way to assure that both wrongdoers
contribute to a reasonable remedy.

The DC's course

£BHiBxXRaxxkaxxagaxaaaxaxxaRxahHX&X3f does not strike me as
an abuse of discretion.

It is familiar doctrine to require

contribution from joint tortfeasors.

Moreover, the funding

required by the DC closely parallels the usual sharing of
costs betwean state and Board.
pays 47%.)

(I think the state usually

A detailed order also permits the DC to ride

herd on some of the more extreme 2HXRHxiaxmx ideas of the Board
(like many x&£.1!11k 11 converts," occasicnally its enthusiasms
V'-0

. . know~boundstr-especially when the State might foot the bill).
A more important reason for a detailed order despite the

-10-

Board's xilliRgRaxx attitude arisesfrom last terms decision
in Spangler.
CCa@25Fti~

R:va!.x't?w:;.:

I ::

a

l eeara

t!:heF

8

'iu2 s

re] aei

0

e~

Because violations of court orders may carry
~-t-

heavy penalttes, the CourtAstressed

~S'~e.~n. o't'd.Avs
1
that ~~·~• e~eere ~ust

in compliance with Rule 65 be specific and reasonably detailed."
Slip op. at 13.

What I have done in this memo is to state the kaxk strongest
--the course I favor
arguments on behalf of at least a part1a
That's
not what I usually do in a bench memo, but here I think it
appropriate since I know you are closely familiar with
the arguments

&R

pointing toward reversal.

--Dave

7'-'1'1-7
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Milliken v. Bradley
If I write in this case I should make use of Rodriguez,
especially 411 U.S., at p. 42.
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June 1, 1977

....
~~·

"
,.
''

· No. 76-447
Dear Chief:
.:1;'

~

Milliken v.

1 •

"

A first reading of your opinion in this case prompts
me to write at once because of the importance, as I view
it, of clearly preserving the sba;pness and force of the
central holding in Bill Rebnquist's opinion in Dayton.
We took Dayton, as you will recall, to give us the
opportunity to afford specific guidance to tne lower courts
on the "scope of the remedy" issue. Swann Milliken I and
Gatreaux have repeated the familiar generai rule. BUt, as
you bave often commented, some of our District and Court of
Appeals courts have given the rule lip-service only in
ordering system-wide remedies and massive busing.

'i,.

...
,

•

Bill Rehnquist's opinion in Dalton articulated specifically
for the first time a standard that s appropriate. See
specifically pp. 12-14. The key sentence in Bill's opinion
is to the effect that a District Court in the first instance
"must determine bow much incremental segregative effect" "-:the
A/
specific constitutional violations have bad "on the make up
----~·
• • • of the school population as presently constituted, when
that population is compared to what it would have been in
the absence of such constitutional violation." (pp. 13, 14)
Although your opinion recognizes the general principal
17), it may be read • I am afraid - as undercutting
wnat Bi 1 has written. I am disturbed by the paragraph
the first few sentences of which read as follows:

Ul•&••

.

i•

,
"The 'condition' offensive to the Constitution
is a de iure segregated school system. This condition
which the District Court was obliged to eliminate,

.·

- 2 -

Green v. Coun~ School Board (citation) is not,
under the hold ngs of the COurt, necessarily or
invariably cured completely by simply establishing
schools on a nonracial basis, although that is the
key step in the remedial process. Our cases
recognize that the evil is, more broadly, a dual
school system infected with long-standing inequities."
(pp. 17 t 18).
The finding simply of a "de jure segregated school system~•
without more, does not justify in every case a system-wide
remedy involving, as in the Dayton case, some degree of racial
balance in every school plus system-wide busing. As Bill's
opinion indicates, the District Court must ask whether the
segregative conduct causedthe degree of racial segregation
in the schoo~or whether a significant part of it resulted
from demographic conditions over which the school board bad
not the slightest influence or control.
We can be totally certain, for example, that the full
extent of segregation in the Detroit school system was not
occasioned by governmental action. To be sure, some of it
was and rather sweeping generalizations (claimed to be
findings) have been made to this effect. But to a large
extent, Detroit is similar to Washington, D. c. Because of
employment opportunities there, it has attracted hundreds
of thousands of black citizens who more or less inevitably
settled in predominantly black neighborhoods, with consequent
and obvious results in the schools. The local board of education bad no more to do with this than you or I.

>.

Your opinion cites Green v. County School Board, 391
430. As:7ou will recall, however! this is an inapposite
case. I know New Kent County intimate y, having hunted in
it for years. There are only two school buiadings in the

u.s.

::!i~:st~~~!~kr,o~~~a~~! ~~:; ~~~~".an~!tr!::d~i~d~~egri:n

Green was appropriate, but its language is wholly inappropriate
to the city of Detroit as it would be to Chicago, New York,
Washington, Newark, St. Louis and a host of other cities.
Believing - based on our several conversations over
the years - that you and I are in accord on this issue, I
hope you will consider favorably the conforming of your
language to that of Bill Rehnquist's. This can be done without weakening your analysis or the conclusion you reach. I
am afraid that if the paragraphs mentioned above (co11111encing

.

,.

- 3 -

at the bottom of page 17) remains unchanged, tbe lower courts
will feel free • in spite of Bill's opinion - to continue to
impose system-wide remedies (with the accompanyiag busing)
just as they bave in the past, without regard to the scope
of the constitutional viblation and to the detriment of
children of both races.
Perhaps I lack "standing•• to write you, as I voted
"the other way." I will write something separately but, in

view of the approval by the Detroit Schoo.l Board itself of
the remedial action at issue, I may well end up joiniag the
result.
Sincerely,

The Chief Justice

'lfp/as
cc:

Mr.

Justice Rehnquist

,,

1,

June 2, 1977
No. 76-447 Milliken v. Bradley
Dear Chief:
In due time I will circulate something
in this case.
It may concur in the results, but for
quite different reasons from those expressed in
" your opinion.

~·

Sincerely,
~··

The Chief Justice

LFP/lab

..•'·'' .
)j.
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C HAMBERS OF

.JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, .JR .

No. 76-447

~· 2llgt'1~

June 2, 1977

Milliken v. Bradley

Dear Chief:
After spending several hours last night on this case,
I now see it in a different perspective from the way the case
was argued and discussed at the Conference. I had not previously read the several meandering decisions of the District
Court in which it virtually assumes the role of School
Superintendent of the Detroit school system.
In the context of conventional desegregation litigation,
this is a noncase. The School Board, rather than opposing
the extensive desegregation orders of the District Court, is
enthusiastic about them. Indeed, the District Court's opinion
of August 15, 1975, notes:
"The Defendant Board of Education Plan. The
Detroit Board of Education, unlike the boards in
other school desegregation cases, is willing to
assume its constitutional duty to desegregate the
Detroit School System. The President of the Board
and ·the members of the bi-racial administrative
staff have convinced the court they will willingly
implement any desegregation order the court may
issue." (App. 49a)
There were differences of opinion below between the
School Board and original plaintiffs, as the former wanted
more busing and a somewhat more sweeping racial balance decree.
But the real contest before us is between the School Board
and the State of Michigan over funding certain aspects of
the wide-ranging programs ordered by the District Court.
Not unexpectedly, the School Board is delighted to improve
the quality of education provided it can do so at State
expense.

- 2 -

Thus, it is the State- not the~h~ Board- that makes
the argument with respect to the "scope of the remedy". I
am not even sure the State has standing beyond arguing that
whatever constitutional violations may have been committed
by the School Board, a district court cannot order the State
to pay for enhanced educational programs. In addition, it
has the 11th Amendment issue.
But whatever may be said as to the standing point (which
I merely mention in passing), this is indeed a unique case
and could be written as such. I am therefore concerned that
the Court should write a rather sweeping desegregation decision
(similar to Swann) that will be applied by the lower courts in
different circumstances when school boards are resisting the
assumption by federal courts of the duties and authority vested
by law in elected school boards and professional educators.
It would be extraordinary for the average school board to be
willing - if not eager - to surrender its educational
responsibilities to the extreme degree that is evidenced
by the wide-ranging opinions of the District Judge in this
case.
I realize that my new perception of the case comes rather
late in the day. In any event, I now let you know, with
apologies for not having done my homework carefully at a more
appropriate time.
Sincerely,

The Chief Justice
lfp/ss
cc:

P.S.

Mr. Justice Stewart
Mr. Justice Rehnquist
Potter and Bill Rehnquist discussed this case when
we happened to be at lunch today. I expressed these
views to them. I do not know to what extent, if any,
that they share them.

.Snvrtnu <lf~url ~f tlrt ~tt~ ~hdts
~ulfingfon. ~. Of. 2.0.;t'l~
CHAMI!IERS 0,-

..JUSTICE .JOHN PAUL STEVENS

June 2, 1977

Re:

76-447 - Milliken v. Bradley

Dear Chief:
Please join me.
Respectfully,

The Chief Justice
Copies to the Conference

/
~~qrrtmt

<!Jtrttrt of t4t 'J§tniteb' ~!:atts
~aslrt:nghrn:. ~. <!J. 2LT~.J.1.2

CHAMBERS 0 F

JUSTICE BYRON R. WHITE

June 2, 1977

Re:

No. 76-447 - Milliken v. Bradley

Dear Chief:
Ple ase join me.
Sincerely,

The Chief Justice
Copies to Conference

..

..§u:prttttt

<!fcmi qf t4t ~b- ~htttg

'Jliludpn:gtott. ~. <.!f. 2llp'l-~
'·'
CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN

June 3, 1977

,.

•·

Re:

No. 76-447

-

Milliken v. Bradley

Dear Chief:

If you can see your way clear to omit the citation of
Rizzo v. Goode on page 28 of the typed copy circulated June l,
I shall be glad to join your opinion. If you feel that it is necessary to include that citation, please note me as concurring in
the result.
I do not wish to be "picky" about this, but I do not agree
with the characterization of the Rizzo decision, and it is for
this reason that I make the request.
Sincerely,

The Chief Justice
cc:

The Conference

j)u:vutttt <!fcn.rt cf tltt 'J~Ittittb .;§taft a

'IJaglfhtgtcn,liJ. Qt.

2l.T~Jt.;,t

CHAMBERS OF"

June 7, 1977

JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL

Re: No. 76-447, Milliken v. Bradley

Dear Chief:
Please join me.
Sincerely,

?!:(
T. M.
The Chief Justice
cc: The Conference

..

lfp/ss

6/~177

,.

~ ~·-f-U ~
/vv~.
.
Milliken

-: ~t.c,__,

.-/ _

~·~-"'-L.
4~

.I.Ac--:;__J

Dear Chief:

Although I voted the other way at Conference, I am prepared

at least to concur in the result in your

cas~d~~fficient

inducement could perhaps even be persuaded to join youropinion.
The inducement would

co~sist

primarily of changes that

would clearly distinguish this case from the Dayton case in
which I now have a Court.

Unless so distinguished, the confused

situation that prompted us to take these two cases could even
be confounded.

We have been concerned by the tendency of

District Courts to make a general finding of de jure segregation,
and then perceive no limitation on the scope of the remedy.
The cases that have anguished so many people in our country
(and often been seriously detrimental to public education itself)
have been those in which extensive, long-distance busing - even
of elementary

childre~

tion ofwhether such a

- has been decreed without any considera-

~emedy

exceeds the scope of the particular

constitutional violations.
Our Dayton decision should clarify the law in that type
of situation.

Your Milliken opinion deals, however, with a

different aspect of the same general problem.

Apparently

desegregation in Detroit was pervasive, and no one is now

2.
challenging the conventional desegregation remedies - including
reassignment and busing.

The only challenge (and this by the

state rather than the school board) is to four of about a dozen
so-called "educational components".

I am frank to say that

the record is by no means clear to me that there was discrimination with respect to these components, but your opinion reaches
a different conclusion and you may well be more familiar with
the record than I am.
But there does seem to be a gap or hiatus in the opinion
that could be confusing to the District Court, and indeed could
be viewed as confining Dayton to rather narrow limits.

Beginning
•,

on page 12 (printed draft No. 1) you properly identify the three
principal factors to be considered in. determining appropriate
remedies.

One of these is that the extent of the remedy must

be determined by the "nature and scope of the constitutional
violation".

Another is that the remedy must be designed "to

restore the victims of discriminatory conduct to the position
they would have occupied in the absence of such conduct."
(p. 12).

The

opin~on

then moves to the educational components, and

the second paragraph beginning on page 14 commences as follows:
"The 'condition' offending the Constitution
is Detroit's de jure segregated school system. This
condition, which the District Court was obliged to
correct, is not, under our holdings, necessarily or
invariably cured completely by simply establishing
schools on a nonracial basis, although that is the

3.
key step in the remedial process. Our cases
recognize that the evil is,more broadly, a dual
school system with all its attending inequities."
It seems to me that further elaboration of these three
sentences is necessary to clarify the opinion, by tying the
violations more specifically to the remedy.

If the only

"condition" or "evil" found to exist is a de jure segregated
system, it is entirely possible that there was no constitutional
violation with respect to any one of these educational components.

For example, testing - universally used - is done

on the basis of standard tests prescribed by a national testing
agency that are designed to be non-discriminatory.

But your

opinion views the record as containing findings of discrimination with respect to these components,, and I will accept this.
But it is essential, in my view, to tie these to the remedy.
Accordingly, I suggest something along the following lines
as a substitute for the first three sentences of this
paragraph:
"The 'condition' offending the Constitution
is Detroit's de jure segregated school system, one
so pervasively and persistently segregated that the
District Court found that the need for the educational components flowed directly from constitutional
violations. Thus, these educational remedies - although
normally and properly left to the discretion of the
elected school board and professional educators were deemed necessary to restore the victims of the
discriminatory conduct to the position educ~tionally
they would have enjoyed with respect to testing,
reading, counseling and in-service staff training
had these components been provided or administered
in a non-discriminatory manner."

4.
Absent such a clarification, I would be concerned that
whenever a District Court finds a segregated school system
it will feel free - without any specific findings - to move
in and run the system, as the District Judge in Detroit has
done to a .large extent

with consent of the school board.

****
As to the general finding of systemwide discrimination,
my clerk has checked the record and found some rather serious
examples of segregative action.

My clerk will be glad to

talk to your clerk about these with the view, if you think
it worthwhile, to including these in a note.
Finally, with respect to participation by a state in
the maintaining of a segregated system, it may prevent abuse
by other District Judges if you were disposed to add a sentence
to this effect:
"When the Detroit school board attempted
to voluntarily initiate an intra-district
remedy to ameliorate the effect of the past
segregative practices, the Michigan Legislature
enacted a law forbidding the carrying out of
this remedy." 338 F. Supp. at 589.
Potter and Lewis, at my request have reviewed this letter
and have authorized me to say that they agree generally with
my suggestionS, Lewis, however, is writing separately although
he presently would be willing to join in the judgment if changes
along the foregoing lines are made.

$iltllt"tmt (!J{tttrlllf t4t ~th $itw.a

jtcwJrittghm.lB. <!J. Zll&iJ-12
CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST

Re:

No. 76-447 - Milliken v. Bradley

Dear Chief:
Although I voted the other way at Conference, I am
prepared at least to concur in the result in your case and
with sufficient inducement could perhaps even be persuaded
to join your opinion.
·'

..

....:..-£,":.., .
~

The inducement would consist primarily of changes
that would clearly distinguish this case from the Dayton
case in which I now have a Court. Unless so distinguished,
the confused situation that prompted us to take these two
cases could even be confonnded. We have been concerned by
the tendency of District Courts to make a general finding
of de jure segregation, and then perceive no limitation on
the scope of the remedy. The cases that have anguished so
many people in our country (and often been seriously
detrimental to public education itself) ha~e been those in
which extensive, long-distance busing -- even of elementary
children -- has been decreed without any consideration of
whether such a remedy exceeds the scope of the particular
constitutional violations.
Our Dayton decision should clarify the law in that
type of situation. Your Milliken opinion deals, however, with
a different aspect of the same general problem. Apparently
&segregation in Detroit was pervasive, and no one is now
challengini the conventional desegregation remedies --
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- 2 including reassignment and busing. The only challenge (and
this by the state rather than the school board) is to four
of about a dozen so-called "educational components". I am
frank to say that the record is by no means clear to me that
there was discrimination with respect to these components, but
your opinion reaches a different conclusion and you may well
be more familiar with the record than I am.
But there does seem to be a gap or hiatus in the
opinion that could be confusing to the District Court, and
indeed could be viewed as confining Dayton to rather narrow
limits. Beginning on page 12 (printed draft No. 1) you
properly identify the three principal factors to be considered
in determining appropriate remedies. One of these is that
the extent of the remedy must be determined by the "nature
and scope of the constitutional violation". Another is that
the remedy must be designed "to restore the victims of
discriminatory conduct to the position they would have
occupied in the absence of such conduct."
(p. 12.)
The opinion then moves to the educational components,
and the second paragraph beginning on page 14 commences as
follows:
"The 'condition' offending the Constitution is Detroit's de jure segregated school
system.
This condition, which the District
Court was obliged to correct, i~ not, under
our holdings, necessarily or invariably cured
completely by simply establishing schools on
a nonracial basis, although that is the
key step in the remedial process. Our cases
recognize that the evil is, more broadly,
a dual school system with all its attending
inequities."
It ~eems to me that further elaboration of these three
sentences is necessary to clarify the opinion, by tying the
violations more specifically to the remedy.
If the only
"condition" or "evil" found to exist is a de jure segregated

·.

-
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system, it is entirely possible that there was no rnnstitutional
violation with respect to any one of these educatio~al
components. For example, testing -- universally used- -..,.
is done on the basis of standard tests prescribed by a
--,
national testing agency that are designed to be non-discrimina-v
mry. But your opinion views the record as containing
findings of discrimination with respect to these components,
and I will accept this. But it is essential, in my view,
to tie these to the remedy. Accordingly, I suggest something
along the following lines as a substitute for the first
three sentences of this paragraph:
"The 'condition' offending the Constitution is Detroit's de jure segregated school
system, one so pervasively and persistently
segregated that the District Court found that
the need for the educational components
flowed directly from constitutional violations.
Thus, these educational remedies -- although
normally and properly left to the discretion
of the elected school board and professional
educators -- were deemed necessary to restore
the victims of the discriminatory conduct
to the position educationally they would have
enjoyed with respect to testing, reading,
counseling and in-service staff training had
these components been provided pr administered in
a non-discriminatory manner."
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Absent such a clarification, I would be concerned
that whenever a District Court finds a segregated school
system it will feel free -- without any specific findings
to move in and run the system, as the District Judge in
Detroit has done to a large extent with consent of the
school board.
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- 4 As to the general finding of systemwide discrimination,
my clerk has checked the record and found some rather serious
examples of segregative action. My clerk will be glad to
talk to your clerk about these with the view, if you think
it worthwhile, to including these in a note.

,.·

Finally, with respect to participation by a state in
the maintaining of a segregated system, it may prevent abuse
by other District Judges if you were disposed to add a
sentence to this effect:
"When the Detroit school board attempted
to voluntarily initiate an intra-district
remedy to ameliorate the effect of the past
segregative practices, the Michigan legislature
enacted a law forbidding the carrying out of
this remedy." 338 F. Supp., at 589.

··-'
·.

Potter and Lewis, at my request, have reviewed this
letter and have authorized me to say that they agree generally
with my suggestions. Lewis-, however, }-s writing separately
although he presently would be willing to join in the judgment if changes along the foregoing lines are made.
Sincerely,

The Chief Justice
Copies to:

Mr. Justice Stewart
Mr. Justice Powell

•'

lfp/ss

6/8/77

Milliken

.~

Dear Chief:
Although I voted the other way at Conference, I am prepared ·
at least to concur in the result in your case and with sufficient
inducement could perhaps even be persuaded to join youropinion.
The inducement would

co~sist

primarily of changes that

would clearly distinguish this· case from the Dayton case in
which I now have a Court.

Unless so distinguished, the confused

situation that prompted us to take these two cases could even

7

be confounded.

We have been concerned by the tendency of

f

'

District Courts to make a general finding of de jure segregation,
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and then perceive no limitation on the scope of the remedy.

.....

The cases that have anguished so many people in our country
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;· •'
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(and often been seriously detrimental to public education itself)
have been those in which extensive, long-distance busing - even

'.
~""...
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of elementary children - has been decreed without any consideration ofwhether such a

~emedy

exceeds the scope of the particular

,'
\'·

'

,-,
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constitutional violations.
Our Dayton decision should clarify the law in that type

~
~

of situation. ·Your Milliken opinion deals, however, with a
different aspect of the same general problem.

Apparently

,_

..'·
'\,.~

desegregation in Detroit was pervasive, and no one is now

'·

2.
challenging the conventional desegregation remedies - including
reassignment and busing.

The only challenge (and this by the

state rather than the school board) is to four of about a dozen
so-called "educational components".

..,...,,
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I am frank to say that

the record is by no means clear to me that there was discrimina-

•'.

tion with respect to these components, but your opinion reaches
a different conclusion and you may well be more familiar with

..

the record than I am.
But there does seem to be a gap or hiatus in the opinion

,...

.. ,

,,

that could be confusing to the District Court," and indeed could
be viewed as confining Dayton to rather narrow limits.

Beginning

..

I

on page 12 (printed draft No. 1) you properly identify the three
principal factors to be · considered in, determining appropriate
remedies.

··.

One of these is that the extent of the remedy must

be determined by the "nature and scope of the constitutional
violation".

Another is that the remedy must be designed "to

restore the victims of discriminatory conduct to the position
they would have occupied in the absence of such conduct."
(p. 12).
The opini_o n then moves to the educational components, and
the second paragraph beginning on page 14 commences as follows:
"The 'condition' offending the Constitution
is Detroit's de jure segregated school system. This
condition, which the District Court was obliged to
correct, is not, under our holdings, necessarily or
invariably cured completely by simply establishing
schools on a nonracial basis, although that is the

..

-

4.
Absent such a clarification, I would be concerned that
whenever a District Court finds a segregated school system
it will feel free - without any specific findings - to move
in and run the system, as the District Judge in Detroit has
done to a _large extent

with consent of the school board.

****
As to the general finding of systemwide discrimination,
my clerk has checked the record and found some rather serious
examples of segregative action.

My clerk will be glad to

talk to your clerk about these with the view, if you think
it worthwhile, to including these in a note.
Finally, with respect to participation by a state in
the maintaining of a segregated system, it may prevent abuse
by other District Judges if you were disposed to add a sentence
to this effect:
"When the Detroit school board attempted
to voluntarily initiate an intra-district
remedy to ameliorate the effect of the past
segregative practices, the Michigan Legislature
enacted a law forbidding the carrying out of
this remedy." 338 F. Supp. at 589.
Potter and Lewis, at my request have reviewed this letter
and have authorized me to say that they agree generally with
my suggestion$. Lewis, however, is writing separately although
he presently would be willing to join in the judgment if changes
along the foregoing lines are made.
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CHAM BE R S OF

.JUSTICE WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST

....

<

June 8, 1977
...

!

Re:

No. 76-447 - Milliken v. Bradley

>-,

Dear Potter:
Herewith is a revised proposed letter to the Chief,
which includes some suggestions by Lewis.
Sincerely,. ~"' /

t).f I v..,

..•''·'
,,

Mr. Justice Stewart

....

Copy to Mr. Justice Powell

• .,t

.•.

WHR:DRAFT:6/8/77

Re:

No. 76-447 - Milliken v. Bradley

Dear Chief:
Although I voted the other way at Conference, I am
prepared at least to concur in the result in your case and
with sufficient inducement could perhaps even be persuaded
to join your opinion.
The inducement would consist primarily of changes
that would clearly distinguish this case from the Dayton
case in which I now have a Court.

Unless so distinguished,

the confused situation that prompted us to take these two
cases could even be confounded.

We have been concerned by

the tendency of District Courts to make a general finding
of de jure segregation, and then perceive no limitation on
the scope of the remedy.

The cases that have anguished so

many people in our country (and often been seriously
detrimental to public education itself) have been those in
which

exten~ive,

long-distance busing -- even of elementary

children -- has been decreed without any consideration of

- 2 whether such a remedy exceeds the scope of the particular
constitutional violations.
Our Dayton decision should clarify the law in that
type of situation. Your Milliken opinion deals, however, with
a different aspect of the same general problem.

Apparently

desegregation in Detroit was pervasive, and no one is now
challenging the conventional desegregation remedies -including reassignment and busing.

The only challenge (and

this by the state rather than the school board) is to four
of about a dozen so-called "educational components".

I am

frank to say that the record is by no means clear to me that
there was discrimination with respect to these components, but
your opinion reaches a different conclusion and you may well be
more familiar with the record than I am.
But there does seem to be a gap or hiatus in the

s

opinion that could be confusing to i=fte District Court,:and
indeed could be viewed as confining Dayton to rather narrow
limits.

Beginning on page 12 (printed draft No. l) you

properly identify the three principal factors to be considered
in determining appropriate remedies.

One of these is that

·.

- 3 the extent of the remedy

must be determined by the "nature

and scope of the constitutional violation".

Another is that

the remedy must be designed "to restore the victims of
discriminatory conduct to the position they would have
occupied in the absence of such conduct."

(p.

12.)

The opinion then moves to the educational components,
and the second paragraph beginning on page 14 commences as
follows:
"The 'condition' offending the Constitution is Detroit's de jure segregated school
system. This condition, which the District
Court was obliged to correct, is not, under
our holdings, ~ecessarily or invariably cured
completely by simply estaolishing schools on
a nonracial basis, although that is the
key step in the remedial process.
Our cases
recognize that the evil is, more broadly,
a dual school system with all its attending
inequities."
It seems to me that further elaboration of these three
sentences is necessary to clarify the opinion, by tying the
violations more specifically to the remedy.

If the only

"condition" or "evil" found to exist is a de jure segregated
system, it is entirely possible that there was no constitutional
violation with respect to any one of these educational

·'·

..

- 4 components.

For example, testing -- universally used --

is done on the basis of standard tests prescribed by a
national testing agency that are designed to be non-discriminatory.

~

'~'

our opinion views the record as containing

"

~44.J.~~

findings of discrimination with respect
and I will accept this.

to~\~~~e

components,

But it is essential, in my view,

to tie these to the remedy.

Accordingly, I suggest something
>.'

along the following lines as a substitute for the first
three sentences of this paragraph:
"The 'condition' offending the Constitution is Detroit's de jure segregated school
system, one so pervasively and persistently
segregated that the District Court found that
the need for the educational components
flowed directly from constitutional violations.
Thus, these educational remedies -- although
normally and properly left to the discretion
of the elected school board anQ professional
educators -- were deemed necessary to restore
the victims of the discriminatory conduct
to the position educationally they would have
enjoyed with respect to testing, reading, counseling and in-service staff training had these
components been provided or administered in
a non-discriminatory manner."
Abs~nt

such a clarification, I would be concerned

that whenever a District Court finds a segregated school

.

•
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system it will feel free -- without any specific findings
to move in and run the system, as the District Judge in
Detroit has done to a large extent with cons ent of the
school board.

*

*

*

As to the general finding of systemwide discrimination,
my clerk has checked the record and found some rather serious
examples of segregative action.

My clerk will be glad to

talk to your clerk about these with the view, if you think
it worthwhile, to including these in a note.
Finally, with

resp~ct

to participation by a state in

the maintaining of a segregated system, it may prevent abuse
by other District Judges if you were disposed to add a
sentence to this effect:
"When the Detroit school board attempted
to voluntarily initiate an intra-district
remedy to ameliorate the effect of the past
segregative practices, the Michigan legislature
enacted a law forbidding the carrying out of
this remedy." 338 F. Supp., at 589.
Potter and Lewis, at my request have reviewed this
letter and have authorized me to say that they agree generally

.

'

6 -

with my suggestions.

Lewis, however,

~s

writing separately

although he presently would be willing to join in the judgment if changes along the foregoing lines are made.
Sincerely,

•I'
f'..':(.

The Chief Justice
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CHAMBERS Of"

THE CHIEF .JUSTICE

June 9, 1977

Re:

76-447 - Milliken v. Bradley

Dear Bill:
Thank you for your memorandum of June 8 on this
case. As you know, I urged Lewis to let me have comments particularly as to his stance as "detached" from
both Milliken and Dayton.
I am glad to have your
collective observations. As I have a focus on Milliken,
you have it on Dayton, and I agree on the need to
harmonize to avoid more confusion to other courts.
I believe most, if not all your positions can be
accommodated, but you will be the judge of that when I
get back to you.
As with predecessor cases in this area, it is
important we make every effort to present the "maximum
front" possible, without, of course, sacrifice to
substantive views.
More to follow.
Regards ~;

Mr. Justice Rehnquist
cc:

Mr. Justice Stewart
Mr. Justice Powell

June 11, 1977

..
No. 76-447

'··

Milliken v. Bradley

Dear Chief:
Your letter to Bill Rehnquist refers to your having
requested me "to let [you] have conments particularly" as
to the tension between Milliken and Dayton.
I had thought that Bill's letter served this purpose.
But I am happy to supplement it.
My profound concern about your first draft (that you
commented to me was quite preliminary) is that it can be
read far more broadly than necessary. It is likely to be
read as holding that whenever a District Court makes a
generalized finding of a de jure segregated school system,
it then would have authority - without further specific
findings - to order any "remedial educational" programs that
it may think have educational merit. There would be no
necessity to find a constitutional violation with respect
to the particular programs.

You and I agree,· I think, that before a court should
assume the educational functions of the school board it
must have found a constitutional violation with respect to
the manner in whicht.Mdle particular function had been d.onducted
in the past. Bill's letter mentioned "testing". The same
can be said for many other educational pomponents.
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The District Court in this case required that five new
vocational centers pe oprdvdided, and prescribed the curriculum
for such. This extraordinary action was not challenged before
us. Yet, unless the court had found discrimination in the
way vocational education had been taught ~·&·, depriving
black students of the same quality and amount of vocational
education as white students), there would be no justification
•>;!
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for usurping the legislative function of deciding how many
vocational schools were needed and prescribing the cirriculum
therefor.

·.

If this is made clear, I will concur in the judgment.
If you adopt the language Bill suggests (or its substance)
this will harmonize the two cases.
I also will write in support of my view that we should
DIG this case, as it is not a segregation case in the normal
sense. It is simply a "row" over money between Detroit and
the state.
I appreciate your willingness to consider suggestions.
At this season of the year, I hesitate to make them even to
the most tolerant of my Brothers.
Sincerely,

The Chief Justice
lfp/ss

"
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Qfllttrl !tf tlrt ~tb ~ta±fg

jjftut!p:ttgtcn.lS. <!f. 2ll&f~~
CHAM BE R S OF

JUSTICE WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST

June 15, 1977

,. '

-·
Re:

No. 76-447 - Milliken v. Bradley

.

'•

Dear Chief:
Please join me in your second draft opinion, which
was circulated on June 14th.

' "

Sincerely,

•

-·

._1

,

The Chief Justice
Copies to the Conference

·'

·.
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CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE POTTER STEWART

;

June 17, 1977

76-447, Milliken v. Bradley
Dear Chief,

.. ..

I am glad to join your opinion for
the Court in this case.

~:

Sincerely yours,

.,

.

The Chief Justice

..

Copies to the Conference
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June 18, 1977
"'"' '

No. 76-447

Milliken v.

MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE:

This is a note that I intended sending with the circulation yesterday of my opinion concurring in the judgment.
In the last paragraph, I refer to not being able to
r.ersuade my Brothers to DIG this case. There is a bit of
'poetic license" in the statement, as I did not urge this
result at our Conference. Although I was not entirely at
rest, I was then inclined to agree with the state.
Further study persuaded me that I had not understood
the case, which seems to me to be a "sport" in every respect.
As all of the votes were in except Harry's, I assume
there is no great likelihood of a "Court" agreeing with me.
Converts would, however, be doubly welcome at this time.
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CHAMBERS OF"

''

JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST

PERSONAL

June 17, 1977
·'

Re:

No. 76-447

Milliken v. Bradley

'·

'

·'

''

..

Dear Lewis:

,'•

I am writing you this in letter form since I plan to
leave early this afternoon, and might not be able to see
you before leaving.
I think your concurring opinion is
excellent, and properly serves to focus the attention of
those who read the court•s opinion on how unusual a case
this is.
Indeed, with only the most minor changes, I
think you could conclude the opinion by actually JO~n~ng
the Chief•s opinion, though I realize you do not wish
to do that.
If you want to talk about this, I will be at home
later this afternoon.

.. !:

•''

,".t

Sincerelyp

~oi

.·

.,

'

CHAM6ERS OF"

THE CHIEF .JUSTICE

Re:

76-447 - Milliken v. Bradley

MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE:
In an abundance
attention to changes
attached.

aution I call your
pages 19 and 20, as

Absent dissent, these changes will be made
in the hope that this case, Dayton and Hazelwood
will all be ready ten Lolhorrow.
If Hazelwood is
not ready, I would opt to let the other two come
down.
I see no nexus.
Regards,

~u:p-rtmt

OJaurt af tfrt 'J!ittitt~ ~tafts ,
';Wasfringftm. 15. OJ. 2!lgtJI..;t

CHAMBERS OF

THE CHIEF JUSTICE

June 20, 1977

----

/

Re:

MEMORANDUM TO

In an abundance of caution I call your
attention to changes on pages 19 and 20, as
attached.
Absent dissent, these changes will be made
in the hope that this case, Dayton ' and Hazelwood
will all be ready for tomorrow.
If Hazelwood is
not ready, I would opt to let the other two come
down. I see no nexus.
Regards,

<!fttttrl of tltt ~tt:ilib j)fattg
'J,t~tSJrhtghm. l9. <!f. 2llpJ!..;l

.:§u:prtutt

•·~

CHAMBE:RS OF

JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN

June 20, 1977

MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE
Re:

No. 76-447

-

Milliken v. Bradley

There is, I believe, a misunderstanding in Lewis 1
memorandum of June 18 about my vote being still "out. 11 On
June 3 I advised the Chief (with copies to the Conference) that
I would join his opinion if he would remove the citation to
Rizzo v. Goode. He immediately did so, and so my joinder
became effective and my vote is not still outstanding.
I write this note to straighten out any confusion that
might exist as to this.

..

~u:p-rtm.t ~ourl

of tlrt ~ttittb ~hdtg

2.taslrittgtcn,

ta. ~·

Z!l.;t'-1~

CHAMBE:RS OF

JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR .

June 20, 1977

No. 76-447

Milliken v. Bradley

Dear Chief:
In view of your comment this morning that some
minor changes were being made in the language of this
troublesome case, I hope you will forgive me for making a
suggestion.
One of the aspects of your opinion that troubles me
particularly is the extensive citation of lower court
decisions in desegregation cases, including some rather
broad and sweeping excerpts from several .of their opinions.
I refer particularly to part C, page 15, et ~·
Would it not be prudent to add a footnote, keyed to
the first sentence in the second paragraph on page 19,
along the following lines:
"The citation above of numerous cases in which
remedial education remedies have been decreed,
including quotations from some of these, is not to
be viewed as necessarily approving any of these cases.
The facts and circumstances in desegregation cases
tend to vary widely, and of-course we have had no
occasion to consider whether the remedies ordered
in any one of these cases were in fact justified by
the constitutional violations. We do think these
cases are relevant, however, as demonstrating that-where the evidence supports the requisite findings-educational remedies are entirely appropriate."
Unless we include such a caveat, I am afraid the lower
courts will assume that we approve the holdings in the
various decisions cited and relied upon. We can be
reasonably certain that in many of these cases there were

2.

no specific findings of violations other than a general
conclusion that a unitary system did not exist. Also,
it is likely that none of these cases involved such a massive
intrusion into the legislative and administrative functions
of a school board as was ordered in Detroit.
For the r e asons stated in your opinion, this degree
of intrusion may have been justified in Detroit, especially
where the School Board requested it. Even so, the Board
emphasized that without additional state funding the remedies
ordered by the District Court could "destroy" public education in Detroit. This possibility suggests the wisdom
of not giving the lower courts a broad invitation to take
charge.
This really is my last word in this case. You have
been tolerant and patient. But my understanding--from
what you have said both recently and in the past--is
that you share my view that lower courts often have been
too eager to impose remedies beyond any proven specific
violation.
The Detroit situation was unique, and your
opinion reaches the correct result. My concern goes only
to the way it may be read by our brothers in the lower
f e deral courts.
In view of the relationship of Dayton to Bradley,
I am sending a copy to Bill Rehnquist.
Sincerely,

June 20, 1977
'··
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No. 76-447

Milliken v. Bradley

MEMORANDUMTTO THE CONFERENCE:

•

•

This refers to the Chief's memorandum to the effect that
the above case is ready, so far as. he is concerned, for
tomorrow • ·?'< • '
.•
A:

'

As I mentioned at the Conference, I am considering making
some changes in my concurring opinion. Indeed, I have not
yet had available a printed ·copy of my opinion.
1t

y,

•

-(:;

Also, ·I may circulate this afternoon a brief concurring
statement in Hazelwood. · • , .>
i1

In these circumstances, I would appreciate the cases
being carried over. I will do my best to be finally "at rest"
by tomorrow.
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We grantedE certi rari in this;!ase t~~:~two

/();,:;~7;~~

~44'11'•««~ -~

-

,

~~ ~

questi~n ~c rning the remedial powers of federal district
courts in school desegregation cases, namely,

.

whethe~ I
-;t;

District Court can, as a part of a desegregation decree,

~ order

compensatory or remedial educational and administrative

' ~segregation,

~ programs for school children subjected to past acts of de jure

and whether, consistent with the Eleventh

~~ Amendment, federal courts can require state officials found
!

l

responsible for constitutional violations to bear part

~ costs

of

thos~

o~ he

programs.

Jto .ur.· ~~ ~ ~-l,r
This case is before the Court for the second time
following our remand, 418 U.S. 717(1974); it marks the
culmination of seven years of litigation over de jure school
segregation in the Detroit Public School System.

For almost

six years, the litigation has focused exclusively on the
appropriate remedy to correct official acts of racial

- 2 -

discrimination committed by both the Detroit School Board
1/
and the State of Michigan.A

In the first stage of the remedy proceedings, the
District Court, after reviewing several "Detroit-only"
desegregation plans, concluded that "'relief of segregation
in the Detroit public schools cannot be accomplished within
the corporate geographical limits of the city' .... " 345
F.Supp. 914, 916 (E.D. Mien. 1972).

Based on that conclusion,

the District Court ordered the parties to submit plans for
"metropolitan desegregation" and appointed a nine-member panel
to formulate a desegregation plan, which would encompass a
"desegregation area" consisting of 54 school districts.
In June 1973, a divided Court of Appeals, sitting en
bane, upheld the District Court's determination that a
metropolitan-wideplan was essential to bring about what the
District Court had described as "the greatest degree of actual

1/
- The violations of the Detroit Board of Education, which
included ~ use of optional attendance zones, raciallybased transportation of school children,
improper creation and
alteration of attendance zones, grade structures, and feeder
school patterns, are described in the District Court's initial
"Ruling on Issue of Segregation." 338 F.Supp. 582, 587-588 (ED
Mich. 1971). The District Court further found that "[t]he State
and its agencies •.. have acted directly to control and maintain
the patternof segregation in the Detroit schools." Id., at 589.
Those conclusions as to liability were affirmed on appeal, 484
F.2d 215, 221-241 (CA6 1973), and were not challenged in this
Court.
418 U.S. 717 (1974) (Milliken I).

-

3 -

desegregation to the end that, upon implementation, no school,
grade or classroom [will be] substantially disproportionate to
overall pupil racial composition."

345 F.Supp., at 918.

This Court reversed, holding that the order exceeded appropriate limits of federal equitable authority by concluding that
"as a matter of substantive constitutional right,

[a]

particular degree of racial balance" is required, and by
subjecting other school districts, uninvolved with and unaffected by constitutional violations, to the Court's remedial
powers.

418 U.S. 717 (1974).

Relying upon the principle

enunciated in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Educ.,
402

I

u.s.

1, 16 (1971), that the scope of the remedy is deter-

mined by the nature and extent of the constitutional violation,
we held that, on the record before us, there was no interdistrict violation calling for an interdistrict remedy.
Because the District Court's "metropolitan remedy" went beyond
the constitutional violation, we remanded the case for further
proceedings "leading to prompt formulation of a decree directed
to eliminating the segregation found to exist in the Detroit
city schools, a remedy which has been delayed since 1970."
2/
Id., at 753.-

••

2/
-Five separate opinions were filed in Milliken I. Mr.
Justice Stewart, in concurring, stated that the metropolitanwide remedy contemplated by the District Court was "in error
for the simple reason that the remedy ... was not commensurate
with the constitutional violation found." Id., at 754.
Dissenting opinions were filed by Mr. Justice Douglas, Mr.
Justice White, and Mr. Justice Marshall. The dissenting
opinions took the position, in brief, that the remedy was
appropriate, given the State's undisputed constitutional
violations, the control of local education by state authorities,
and the manageability of any necessary administrative modifications to effectuate a metropolitan-wide remedy.

- 4 B

On remand, due to the intervening death of Judge Stephen
J. Roth, who had presided over the litigation from the outset,
the case was reassigned to Judge Robert E. DeMascio.

Judge

DeMascio promptly ordered respondent Bradley and the Detroit
Board to submit desegregation plans limited to the Detroit
school system.
proposed plans.

On April, 1975, both parties submitted their
Respondent Bradley's plan was limited solely

to pupil reassignment; the · proposal called for extensive
transportation of students to achieve the plans ultimate goal
of assuring that every school within the district reflected,
within 15 percentage points, the racial ratio of the school

3/

district as a whole.- In contrast to respondent Bradl:E:~.y' s
proposal, the Detroit Board's plan provided for sufficient
pupil reassignment to eliminate "racially identifiable white
schools," while ensuring th,at; "every child will spend at least
a portion of his education in either a neighborhood
elementary
_,.
~/

'

school or a neighborhood junior and senior high school." Id., at '

tYJ .-r f'l ?

T?;·.

1116.

I

contempf:t~~ tra~;;~~;:i:n>of

f: w: r

the Board's plan

s~~~~ shorter distances

I. :;_
/ _ _ _ __

yr~~
~~

By eschewing racial ratios for each school

3/

- According to the then-most recent statistical data,
as of Sept. 27, 1974, 257,396 students were enrolled in the
Detroit public schools, a figure which reflected a decrease of
28,116 students in the system since the 1960-1961 school year.
402 F.Supp. 1096, 1106-1107. Of this total student population,
71.5% were Negro and 26.4% were white. The remaining 2.1%
was comprised of students of other ethnic groups.
Id., at 1106.

- 5 -

4/
than respondent Bradley's proposal.In addition to student reassignments, the Board's
plan called for implementation of 13 remedial or compensatory
programs,
referred to in the record as "educational components."
...___
-.
These compensatory programs, which were proposed in addition
to the plan's provisions for magnet schools and vocational
high schools, included three of the four components at issue
in this case -- in-service training for teachers and administrators, guidance and counseling , programs, and revised testing

5/
procedures.- Pursuant to the District Court's direction, ' the

6/
State Department of Education- on April 21, 1975 submitted a

!/

Under respondent Bradley's proposed plan, 71,349
students would require transportation; the Detroit Board's plan,
however, provided for transportation of 51,000 students, 20,000
less than the Bradley plan.
The Board's ~an, which th~ District
Court found infirm because of an "arb1trary" use of racial quotas,
con temP'lcrted achieving a 4'0' - · % repr entation of Negro s uaents
in the identifiably white schools, while leaving untouched,in
terms of pupil reassignmen4 schools in three of the Detroit system's
eight regions.
Those three regions were located in the central 1 ./
city and contained schools which were overwhelmingly Negro in
racial composition.

5/

The fourth component, a remedial ~ eading and communications
skills program, was proposed later and was ~ndorsed by the Bradley
respondents in a critique of the Detroit Board's proposed plan.
Seen. 7, infra.
The Board's plan also called for the following
~ 'educational components":
School-community relations, parental
involvement, student rights and responsibilities, accountability,
curriculum design, bilingual education, multi-ethnic curriculum,
and co-curricular activies.
402 F.Supp., at 1118.

I

§_/
In addition to the State Board of Education, the state
defendants include the Governor of Michigan, the Attorney General,
the State Superintendent of Public Instruction, and the State
Treasurer.

critique ofj the Detroit Board's desegregation plan; in its
report, the Department

op~ned

that, although "[i]t is possible

that none of the thirteen 'quality education' components is
essential .•. to correct the constitutional violation ••.• ",
eight of the 13 proposed programs nonetheless deserved special
consideration in the desegregation setting.

Of particular

relevance here, the State Board said:
"Within the context of effectuating a
pupil desegregation plan, the in-service training
[and] guidance and counseling ••. components appear
to deserve special emphasis." Id., at 38-39. 7/

-

8/

-

After receiving the State Board's critique, -the
-~

District Court conducted extensive hearings on the two plans
over a two-month period.

Substantial testimony was adduced

with respect to the proposed educational components,including

9/
testimony by petitioners'expert witnesses.- Based on this

1/

Two months later, the Bradley respondents also submitted a critique of the Board's plan; while criticizing the
_, ./
Board's proposed educational components on several grounds,
'
respondents nonetheless suggested that a remedial reading program
was particularly needed in a desegregation plan. See n.S., supra.
The Bradley respondents claimed more generally that the Board 1 s
plan failed to inform the court of the then-current extent of
such programs or components in the school system and that the
plan failed to assess "the relatedness of the particular component
to desegregation."

8/
- The other state defendants likewise filed objections to
the Detroit Board's plan on April 21, 1975. They contended, in
brief, that the court's remedy was limited to pupil reassignment
to achieve desegregation; hence, the proposed inclusion of
educational components was, under their view, excessive.

2/

For example, Dr. Charles P. Kearney, Associate
Superintendent for Research and School Administration for the
Michigan Department of Education gave the following testimony:
{Footnote ~/ continued)
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evidence and on reports of

experts, the

District Court on

in principle, the

g • 111

Detroit Board's inclusion of remedial and compensatory
10/
educational components in the desegregation plan.-"We find that the majority c:if the educational
components included in the Detroit Board plan are
essential for a school district undergoing desegregation.
While it is true that the delivery of quality desegregated educational services is the obligation of the school
board, nevertheless this court deems it essential to
mandate educational components where they are needed to
~ remedy effects of past segregation, to assure a successful desegregative effort and to minimize the possibility
of resegregation."
402 F.Supp., at 1118.

2./

Continued
"[T]he State Board and the Superintendent
indicated that guidance and counselling appeared
to deserve special emphasis in a desegregation
effort."

*

*

*

*

"We support the notion of a guidance and counselling
effort. We think it certainly does have a relationship in the desegregation effort, we think it
deserves special emphasis."
As to in-service train1ng, Dr. Kearney testified that, in his
opinion, such a program was required to implement effectively a
desegregation plan in Detroit. Transcript Vol. XXX, at 179,
187. Finally, even though the State's critique did not deem
testing as des~rving of "special emphasis" in the desegregation
plan, Dr. Kearney stated as follows:

"Q:

[D]o you see a direct relationship between
testing and desegregation?

"A:

If test results were inappropriately used,
••. I think it would have certainly a discriminatory affect [sic] and it would have a
negative affect, I'm sure on any kind of
desegregation plan being implemented." Id.,
at 184.

10/
-- The District Court did not approve of all aspects of
the Detroit Board's plan. With respect to educational components,
the court said:
"The plan as submitted •.• does not distinguish
between those components that are necessary to the successful
implementation of a desegregation plan and those that are not."

/)-<:.. ~

~a-c-I-ty~
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k_A!..#~~
/J

The District Court expressly found that the two

c:m- ·~
t/6

ponents of testing and counseling, as then administered in

il

\

1

Detroit's schools, were infected with the discriminatory
bias of a segregated school system:
"In a segregated system many techniques deny
equal protection to black students, such as discriminatory testing [and] discriminatory counseling .•.• "
Ibid.
The District Court also found that, to make desegregation work,
it was necessary to include remedial reading programs and in'

service training for teachers and administrators:
"In a system undergoing desegregation, teachers
will require orientation and training for desegregation.
***Additionally, we find that ... comprehensive reading
programs are essential ..• to a successful desegregative
effort." Ibid.
Having established these general principles, the Distric

Court formulated several "remedial guidelines" to govern
Detroit Board's development of a final plan.

th~

Declining "to

substitute its authority for the authority of elected state

~

I

and local officials to decide which educational components are

beneficial to :the school community," id., at 1145, the court
laid down the following guidelines with respect to each of the

-

/

_.., .......---

~

.

lA_)

four educati?nal components at issue here: ~ ~~
(a)

Reading.

Concluding that "It]here is no educational

component more directly associated with the process of desegregation than reading," id., at 1138, the District Court
directed the General Superintendent of Detroit's schools to
institute a remedial reading and communications skills program
"[t]o eradicate the effects of past discrimination .•.• " Ibid.

r

-

9 -

The content of the required program was not

rescribed by

the court; rather, formulation and implement tion of the
program was left to the. Superintendent and

o a committee

to be selected by him.
(b) In-Service Training.
Detroit Board to formulate a

The court
comprehensi~e

training program, an element "essentia
going desegregation."

Id., at 1139.

view, an in-service training

lso directed the
in-service teacher

to a system under-

hn

program~or

the District Court's
teachers and administra-

tors, to train professional and in~fructional personnel to
cope with the desegregation process in Detroit, would tend to
I

ensure that all students in a desegragated system would be
treated equally by teachers and administrators able, by
virtue of special training, to cope with special problems
presented by desegregation, and thereby facilitate Detroit's
conversion to a unitary system.
(c) Testing.

Because it found, based on record evidence,

that Negro children "are lr

pecially affected by biased

testing procedures," the District Court determined that,
frequently, minority students in

Det ~ it

...

-

were adversely
---,;,;,
affected by discriminatory testing procedures. Unless the
school system's tests were administered in a way "free from
racial, ethnic or cultural bias," the District Court concluded
that Negro children in Detroit might thereafter be impeded in
their educational growth.

Id., at 1142.

Accordingly, the

court directed the Detroit Board and the State Department

~~
- 10 of Education to ' institute a testing program along the lines
proposed by the local school board in its original desegregation
plan.

Ibid.
{d)

Counseling and Career Guidance.

Finally, the

District Court addressed what expert witnesses had described
as psychological pressures on Detroit's students in a system
undergoing desegregation.

Counselors were required, the

court concluded, both to solve the numerous problems and
tensions arising in Detroit's .dismantling its dual system,
and, more concretely, to counsel students concerning the
vocational and technical schools created under the plan
11/
through the cooperation of state and local officials.-Nine months later,
entered its final order.

\3
~ ll~ the

District Court

Emphasizing that it had "been careful

to order only what is essential for a school district undergoing
desegregation," Appendix, at 117a, the court ordered the
Detroit Board ~nd the state defendants to institute comprehensive
._____
... --<...~ ~ ..._ )
/
programs as to the four educational components by the start of .--;
-...._ --......_
the September 1976 school term. The cost o these four programs,

------

11/
In contrast to their position before the District
Court with respect to the four educational components at issue
here, the state defendants, through the State Deapartment of
Education, voluntarily entered into a stipulation with the
Detroit Board on Feb. 24, 1976, under which the State agreed
to provide 50% of the construction costs of five vocational
centers which the District Court ordered to be · estab_lished.
Appendix, at 14la.
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the court concluded, was to be equally borne by the Detroit
School Board and the State.

Accordingly, the court directed

the local board to calculate its highest budget allocation
in any prior year for the several educational programs and,
from that base, any excess cost attributable to the desegregation
plan was to be paid equally by the two groups of defendants
responsible for prior constitutional violations, i.e., the
Detroit Board and the state defendants.

c
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
affirmed the District Court's order concerning the implementation
12/
of and payment for the four educational components.-- The
Court of Appeals expressly approved the District Court's
findings as to the necessity for these compensatory programs:
"This finding ... is not clearly erroneous, but
to the contrary is supported by ample evidence.
"The need for in-service training of the
educational staff and development of non-discriminatory
- Ees ing 1s obv1ous
The former is needed to insure
that the teac ~~nd administrators will be able to
work effectively in a desegregated environment. The
--'-1""
latter is needed to insure that students are not
evaluated' unequally because of built-in bias in the
tests adminstered in formerly segregated schools.
"We agree with the District Court that the
reading and counseling programs are essential to
the effort to combat the effects of segregation.***
Without the reading and counseling components, black
students might be deprived of the motivation and
achievement levels which the desegregation remedy
is designed to accomplish." 540 F.2d 229, 241 (CA6 1976).
12/
-- The Court of Appeals disapproved, however, of the
District Court's failure to include three of Detroit's eight
regions in the pupil assignment plan. See n.4, supra. The
Court of Appeals remanded the case to the District Court for
furth e r consideration of the three ommitted regions, but
declined to set forth guidelines, given the practicabilities
(Footnote 12/ continued)

- 12 After reviewing the record, the Court of Appeals
concluded:
"This is not a situation where the District
Court 'appears to have acted solely according to its
own notions of good educational policy unrelated to the
demands of the Constitution.'" Id., at 241-242, quoting
Keyes v. School District, 521 F.2d 465, 483 (CAlO 1975),
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1066 (1976).
After upholding the remedial-components portion of
the plan, the Court of Appeals likewise sustained the District
Court's allocation of costs between the state and local
officials.

Analyzing this Court's decision in Edelman v.

Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974), which reaffirmed the rule that
the Eleventh Amendment provides a bar against an ordinary
suit for money damages against the State without its consent,
the Court of Appeals held that the District Court's order
" ... imposes no money judgment on the State
of Michigan for past de jure segregation
practices.
Rather, the order is directed
toward the State defendants as a part of
a prospective plan to comply with a
constitutional requirement to eradicate
all vestiges of de jure segregation."
540 F.2d, at 245.
(Emphasis supplied.)
The Court of Appeals remanded the case for further consideration
of the three central city regions untouched by the District

12/ (continued) .. .
-- of the situation, for the District Court's benefit.
Further proceedings were deemed appropriate, however, particularly
since the Bradley respondents had previously been granted
leave to file a second amended complaintto allege interdistrict
violations on the part of the state and local defendants.

'·

I

- 13 Court's pupil reassignment plan.

Seen. 12,supra.

The state defendants then sought review in this
Court, challenging only those portions of the District

~~-------------------------------

Court's comprehensive remedial order dealing with the
four educational components providing compensatory educational
programs and with the State's obligation to defray the costs
of those programs.

We granted certiorari, 429 U.S.

and we affirm.

,>· . "
~

(1976)

1
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'

II
This Court has never addressed directly the question
whether federal courts can order remedial education programs
13/
as part of a school desegregation decree.-- However, the
general principles governing our resolution of this issue
are well settled by the prior decisions of tills Court.

In

the first case concerning'· federal courts' remedial powers
in eliminating de jure school segregation,the Court laid
down the basic rule which governs to this day: .

"In fashioning

and effectuating the [desegregation] decrees, the courts will
be guided by equitable principles."

Brown v. Board of Educa-

tion, 349 U.S. 294, 300 (1955) (Brown II)
A

Application of those "equitable principles", we have
held, requires federal

court~
~ :·

to focus upon three factors.

In the first place, like other equitable remedies, the nature

·.·

of the desegregation remedy is to be determined by the
nature and scope of the constitutional violation.

Swann v.

13/
-- In Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education,
402 U.S. 1 (1971), the Court affirmed an order of the District
Court which included a requirement of in-service training
programs.
318 F.Supp. 786, 803 (W.D.N.C. 1970). However,
this Court's opinion did not treat the precise point. In
Keyes v. School District No. 1, Denver, Colorado, 413 u.s.
189 (1973), the Court expressly avoided passing on the District
Court's holding that called for, among other things, "compensatory education in an integrated environment." Id.,
at 214 n.l8.
--

~d:
- 15 Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402
(1971).

~

u.s.

1, 16

The remedy must therefore be related to "the con-

dition alleged to offend the Constitution .•.•• " Milliken v.
14/
Bradley, 418 u.s. 717, 738 (1974) .-- Second, the decree
must indeed be remedial in nature, that is, it must be
designed "to restore the victims of discriminatory conduct

ut i

the position they would have occupied in the absence of
15/
conduct." Id., at 746.- Third, the federal courts in
14/

Thus, the Court has consistently held that the
Constitution is not violated by racial imbalance in the
schools, without more. Pasadena City Board of Educ. v.
Spangler, 427 u.s. 424, 434 (1976); Milliken I, supra, at 763
(White, J., dissenting); Swann, supra, at 26. An order
contemplating the "'substantive right [to a] particular degree
of racial balance or mixing'" is therefore infirm as a
matter of law. Spangler, supra, at 434.
15/
-- Since the purpose of the remedy is to make whole
the victims of unlawful conduct, this Court declared nine
years ago that federal courts are obliged to implement
plans that promise "realistic'ally to work now." Green v.
Count School Board of New Kent Count , 391 U.S. 430, 439
19 6 8) • At the same tJ.me, -the Court has carefully stated that,
to ensure that federal court decrees are characterized by the
flexibility and sensitivity required of equitable decrees,
consideration must be given to burdensome effects resulting
from a decree that could "either risk the health of the children
or si nifica 1 impinge on the educational process."
at 3 Our unct1on, as state by Mr. Justice
White, is "to desegregate an educational system in which the
races have been kept apart without, at the same time,
losing sight of the central educational function of the schools.
Milliken I, supra, at 764 (dissenting opinion) (Emphasis in
original) • In a word, "There are undoubted practical as well
as legal limits to the remedial powers of federal courts in school
desegregation cases." Id., at 763. Compare Austin Independent
School Dist. v. United states,
U.S.
(1976) (Powell,
J. (concurring)) •

- 16 devising a remedy must take into account the interests of
state and local authorities in managing their own affairs,

~~---------------------~,--------~------~,~------------~~

consistent with the Constitution.

In Brown II the Court

squarely held that "[s]chool authorities have the primary
responsibility for elucidating, assessing, and solving these
problems •••• "

349

--

u.s.,

at 299.

It, however, "school author-

ities fail in their affirmative obligations ••• judicial authority
may be invoked."

Swann, supra, at 15.

Once invoked, "the

scope of a district court'· s equitable powers to remedy past
I

wrongs is broad, for breadth and flexibility are inherent in
equitable remedies."

Ibid.
B

In challenging the order before us, petitioners do not
specifically question that the District Court's mandated
programs are designed, at least in part, to restore the

----

schoolchildren of Detroit to the position they would have
enjoyed absent constitutional violations by state and local

,_

officials.

And, petitioners do not contend, nor could they,

,~

at the prerogatives of the Detroit School Board have been
brogated by the decree, since of course the Detroit School

------....---....__ _______,__________ ....
- --

Board itself proposed incorporation of these programs in the

-- -~---

first place.

~

,~--------....----~--~·

Petitioners' sole contention is that, under

Swann's teaching, the District Court's order exceeds the scope
of the constitutional violation.

Invoking our holding in

Milliken I, supra, petitioners claim that, since the constitu- ·
tional violation found by the District Court was the unlawful

~
~~
~ t4/l-pt-4
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segregation of students on the basis of race, the c urt's
decree must be limited to remedying

un1aw~ ~1

assignments.

This contention misconceives the principle they seek to
invoke, and

we reject ther argument.

The well-settled principle that the nature and scope of
the remedy is to be determined by the violation means simply
that federal court decrees must directly address and relate
to the constitutional violation itself.

Because of this inherent

limitation upon federal judicial authority, federal court
decrees exceed appropriate limits if they are aimed at
eliminating a condition that does not violate the Constitution
or does not flow from such a violation, see Pasadena City
Board of Education v. Spangler, supra, or if they are imposed
upon governmental units that were neither involved in nor
affected by the constitutional violation, as in Milliken I,
supra.

Hills v.

Gautreaux ~

425

u.s.

284, 292-296 (1976).

But where, as here, a constitutional violation has been found,
the remedy imposed upon the violators does not "exceed" the
violation, if the remedy is tailored to cure the "condition
that offends the Constitution."
The "condition" offensive to the Constitution is a de
jure segregated school system.

This condition, which the

District Court was obliged to eliminate, Green v. County
School Board of New Kent County, 391 U.S. 430, 438 (1968),
is not, under the holdings of this Court, necessarily or

- 18 invariably cured completely by simply establishing schools
on a nonracial basis, although that is the key step in the
,.

remedial process.

Our cases recognize that the evil is,

more broadly, a dual school system infected with long-standing
inequities.

Twenty-three years ago a unanimous Court speaking

through Chief Justice Warren held in Brown I:
educational facilities are inherently unequal."
Board of Education,

347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954).

"Separate
Brown v.
And in

United States v. Montgomery County Board of Education, 395
U.S. 225 (1969), the Court concerned itself not with pupil
assignment,but with the desegregation of faculty and staff.
In doing so, the Court, there speaking through Mr. Justice
Black, focused on the reason for judicial concerns going beyond
pupil assignment:

"The dispute .•• deals with faculty and staff

desegregation, a goal that we have recognized to be an important aspect of the basic task of achieving a public school
system wholly free from racial discrimination."

395 U.S.,

at 231-232 (Emphasis supplied).
Montgomery County therefore stands firmly for the proposition that ·matters other than pupil assignment must on occasion
by addressed by federal courts to eliminate the effects of
prior segregation.

Similarly, in Swann, we reaffirmed the

principle laid down in Green v. County School Board, supra,
that "existing policy and practice with respect to faculty,
staff, transportation, extracurricular activities, and facilities
were among the most important indicia of a segregated system."

.

- 19 402 U.S., at 18.

In a word, discriminatory student assign-

ment policies can themselves breed and manifest other
inequalities built into a dual system founded on racial discrimination.

Federal courts need not, and cannot, close their

eyes to inequalities, shown by the record, which flow from a
long-standing segregated system.

c
In light of the mandate of Brown I and Brown II,
federal courts have, over the years, often required the
inclusion of compensatory or remedial programs in desegregation plans to overcome the inequalities inherent in dual
school systems.

In 1966, for example, the District Court

for the District of South Carolina directed the inclusion of
remedial courses to overcome the effects of a segregated
system:
"Because the weaknesses of a dual school
system may have already affected many children,
the court would be remiss in its duty if any
desegregation plan were approved which did not
provide for remedial education courses. They shall
be included in the plan." Miller v. School District
Number 2, Clarendon, S.C., 256 F.Supp. 370, 377
(D. S.C. 1966) .
(Emphasis supplied.)
In 1967, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, then engaged in
overseeing the desegregation of numerous school districts in
the South, laid down the following requirement in an

~n

bane

decision:
"The defendants shall provide remedial
education programs which permit students attending
or who have previously attended segregated
schools to overcome past inadequacies in their
education ... United States v. Jefferson County

,,

- 20 Board of Education, 380 F.2d 385, 394
{CA 5), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 840 {1967).
(Emphasis supplied.)
.,

See also Stell v. Board of Public Education for City of
Savannah, 387 F.2d 486, 492, 496-497 (CA 5 1967); Hill v.
LaFourche Parish School Board, 291 F.Supp. 819, 823 (ED La.
1967); Redman v. Terrebone Parish School Board, 293 F.Supp.
376, 379 (ED La. 1967); Lee v. Macon County Board of Education,
267 F.Supp. 458, 489 {MD Ala. 1967); Graves v. Walton
County Board of Education, 300 F.Supp. 188, 200 {MD Ga. 1968),
aff'd, 410 F.2d 1153 {CA 5 1969).

Two years later, the

Fifth Circuit again adhered to the rule that District Courts
could properly seek to overcome the built-in inadequacies
of an unconstitutionally unequal educational system:
"The trial court concluded that the school
board must establish remedial programs to assist
students who previously attended all-Negro schools
when those students transfer to formerly all-white
schools .••• The remedial programs .•• are an integral
part of a program for compensatory education
to be provided Negro students who have long been
disadvantaged by the inequities and discrimination in~
herent in the dual system. The requirement that the ~ 1
School Board institute remedial programs so far as
they are feasible is a proper exercise of the
court's discretion.u Plaquemines Parish School
Bd. v. United States, 415 F.2d 817, 831 {CA 5
1969).
(Emphasis supplied.)
In the same year the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of Louisiana required school authorities
to come forward with a compensatory educational program as
part of a desegregation plan.

"The defendants shall provide

remedial education programs which permit students

* * *

who

have previously attended all-Negro schools to overcome past

/

- 21 inadequacies in their education."

Smith v. St. Tammany Parish

School Board, 302 F.Supp. 106, 110 (ED La. 1969), aff'd,
448 F.2d 415 {CA 5 1971).

See also Moore v. Tangipahoa

Parish School Board, 304 F.Supp. 244, 253 (ED La. 1969);
Moses v. Washington Parish School Board, 302 F.Supp. 362,
367 {ED La. 1969).
In the 1970's, the pattern has been essentially the
same.

The Fifth Circuit has, when the fact situation warranted,

continued to call for remedial education programs in desegregation plans.

In 1971, for example, the Fifth Circuit affirmed

a District Court's order designed, among other things, "to
compensate for the abiding scars of past discrimination."
United States v. State of Texas, 447 F.2d 441, 443 (CA 5
1971), application for stay denied, 404
(Black, J. sitting as Circuit Justice).

u.s.

1205 {1971)

To that end, the

approved plan required the: fbllowing:
"[C]urriculum offerings and programs
shall include specific educational programs designed
to compensate minority group children for unequal
/
educational opportunities resulting from past or
presen·t racial and ethnic isolation •.•. " Id.,
at 448.16/
16/
In denying the stay application, Mr. Justice Black
was untroubled by the underlying order of the District
Court:
"It would be very difficult for me to suspend the order of the District Court that, in my
view, does no more than endeavor to realize the
directive of the Fourteenth Amendment and the
decisions of this Court that racial discrimination
in the public schools must be eliminated root and
branch." 404 U.S., at 1206.

1 /

·.
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'

See also George v. O'Kelly, 448 F.2d 145, 150 (CA 5 1971).
And, as school desegregation litigation emerged in other
regions of the country, federal courts have likewise looked
in part to compensatory programs, when the record supported
an order to that effect.

See,

~'

Morgan v. Kerrigan, 401

F.Supp. 216, 235 (D.Mass. 1975), aff'd, 530 F.2d 401 (CA 1
1976), cert. denied,

u.s.

(1976); Hart v. Community

School Board of Brooklyn, 383 F.Supp. 699, 757 (EDNY 1974),
aff'd, 512 F.2d 37 (CA 2 1975T,c£Booker v. Special School
Dist. Number 1, Minneapolis, Minn., 351 F.Supp. 799 (D.Minn.
17/
1972).Finally, in addition to other remedial programs, which
could, of course, if circumstances warranted, specifically
include programs to remedy deficiencies in reading and communication skills, federal courts have expressly ordered special

--' --- ---

in-service training for teachers, see, e.g., United States v.
State of Missouri, 523 ~
F.2d 885, 887 (CA 8 1975); Smith v. St.
Tammany Parish School Board, supra, at 110; Moore v. Tanigpahoa Parish School Board, supra, at 253, and have altered or

-

even suspended testing programs employed by school systems
17/
We do not, of course, pass upon the correctness of
the particular holdings of cases we did not review. We
simply note that these holdings support the broader proposition that, when the record warrants, remedial or compensatory programs may be, in the exercise of equitable discretion, appropriate remedies to treat the condition that offends
the Constitution. Of course, it must be shown that the
constitutional violation caused the condition for which
remedial programs are mandated.

.'

- 23 undergoing desegregation.

See, e.g., Singleton v. Jackson

Municipal Separate School District, 419 F.2d 1211, 1219
(CA 5 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1032 (1970); Lemon v.
Bossier Parish School Board, 444 F.2d 1400, 1401 (CA 5
1971); Arvizu v. Waco Independent School Dist., 373 F.Supp.
1264 (WD Tex. 1973), rev'd in part on other issues, 495
F. 2d 4 9 9 ( CA 5 19 7 4) .

.

These cases demonstrate that the District Court in the
case before us did not break new ground in approving the
School Board's proposed plan.
~

,--

'?"
.

~n

/l

,,

abundant evidence in this

Quite the contrary, acting
recor~

the District Court approved

a remedial plan going beyond mere pupil assignments, as expressly approved by Swann and Montgomery County, supra.
In so doing, the District Court was adopting specific programs,
proposed by local school authorities who must be presumed to
~~-

.......____

-~

be familiar with the problems and the needs of a system
18/
undergoing desegregation.-We do not, of course, imply that the order here is a
blueprint for other cases.

That cannot be; in school

18/
-- This Court has from the beginning looked to the
District Courts in desegregation cases, familiar as they
are with the local situations coming before them, to appraise
the efforts of local school authorities to carry out their
constitutionally required duties.
"Because of their
proximity to local conditions ... the [federal district] courts
which originally heard these cases can best perform this
judicial appraisal." Brown II, supra, at 299.

-
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desegregation cases, " [ t] •here is no universal answer to
complex problems .•• ; there is obviously no plan that will
do the job in every case."

Green, supra, at 439.

Never-

theless, on this record we are bound to conclude that the

j

remedial decree before us was aptly tailored to fit the
constitutional violation.

Nor do we find any other reason

to believe that the broad and flexible equity powers of the
court were abused in this case.

The established role of

local school authorities was maintained inviolate· and, the
remedy is indeed remedial.

Th~

order does not p nish

anyone, ~

nor does it impair or jeopardize the educational system in
Detroit.

~

The District Court, in short, was
laid down in Brown II:
"In fashioning and effectuati
decrees, the courts will be guid
by equitable
principles. Traditionally, equ· y has been characterized by a practical flexibi ty in shaping its
remedies and by a facility fo adjusting and
reconciling public and priva
needs. These
cases call for the exercise of these traditional
attributes of equity power." 349 U.S., at 300.

19/
-- Indeed, the District Ju e took great pains to devise
a workable plan. For example, e sought carefully to
eliminate burdensome transpo ation of Negro children to
predominantly Negro schools and to prevent the disruption,
by massive pupil reassign nt, of racially mixed schools in
stable neighborhoods whi
had successfully undergone residential and educational c

I

~

"

...

.

;
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Petitioners also contend that the District Court's order,
even if otherwise proper, violates the Eleventh Amendment.
In their view, the requirement that the state defendants pay
one-half the additional costs attributable to the four educational components is, "in practical effect, indistinguishable
from an award of money damages against the state based upon
the asserted prior misconduct of state officials."
at 34.

Brief,

Arguing from this premise, petitioners conclude

that the "award" in this case is barred under this Court's
holding in Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 {1974).
Edelman involved a suit for money damages against the
20/
State,as well as for prospective injunctive relief.-- The
suit was brought by an individual who claimed that Illinois
officials had improperly withheld disability benefit payments
to him and to the members of his class.

Applying traditional

Eleventh Amendment principles, we held that the suit was
barred to the extent the suit sought "the award of an accrued
monetary liability •.. " which represented "retroactive payments."
Id., at 663-664.

(Emphasis supplied.)

Conversely, the Court

20/
-- Although the complaint in Edelman ostensibly sought
only equitable relief, the plaintiff expressly requested "'a
permanent injunction enjoining the defendants to award to
the entire class of plaintiffs all [disability] benefits wrongfully withheld.'" 415 U.S., at 656.

,

..._..

.
- 26 upheld the suit to the extent it sought "payment of state
funds ... as a necessary consequence of compliance in the
'.

future with a substantive federal-question determination •••• "
Id., at 668.

(Emphasis supplied.)

The decree to share the future costs of educational
components in this case fits squarely within the prospectivecompliance exception reaffirmed by Edelman.

That exception,

which had its genesis in Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908),

' J.

permits federal courts to enjoin state officials to conform
their conduct to requirements of federal law, notwithstanding
a direct and substantial impact on the state treasury.
U.S., at 15.
that.

415

The order challenged here does no more than

The decree requires state officials, held responsible

for unconstitutional conduct in findings which are not challenged, to eliminate a de jure segregated school system.

More

precisely, the burden of state officials is that set forth
in .§_wann -- to take the necessary steps "to eliminate from
the public schools all vestiges of state-imposed segregation." ..402 U.S., at 15.

1""

The educational components, which the District

Court ordered into effect prospectively, are plainly designed
to wipe out continuing conditions of inequality produced by
the inherently unequal dual school system long maintained by
21/
Detroit.
21/
No bright line can be drawn for Eleventh Amendment
purposes on the basis that these programs were "compensatory"
in nature. Unlike the award in Edelman, the injunction
entered here could not instantaneously restore the victims of
unlawful conduct to their rightful condition. Thus, the
(footnote continued next page)

,

- ..

- 27 These programs were not, and as a practical matter could
not be, intended by one bold stroke to wipe the slate clean,
22/
as could a retroactive award of money in Edelman.-- Rather,
by the nature of the antecedent violation, the victims of
Detroit 1 s de pre segregated system presently experience
some of the effects of segregation and will continue to do
so until such future time as the remedial programs make
amends to dissipate those continuing effects of past misconduct.

Reading and speech deficiencies cannot be eliminated

by judicial fiat; they will require time, patience, and the
skills of specially trained teachers.

That the programs are

also "compensatory" in nature does not change the fact that they
are part of a plan that operates prospectively to bring about
the benefits of a unitary school system.

Prospective relief
23/
of this nature is not barred by the Eleventh Amendment.-21/ (continued) injunction here looks to the future, not
simply-to presently compensating victims for conduct and
consequences completed in the past.
In contrast to Edelman, there was no money award here
in favor of respondent Bradley or any members of his class.
This case simply does not involve individual citizens 1 conducting a raid on the state treasury for accrued monetary
liability. It is wholly prospective in the same manner that -the
decree mandates vocational schools and assignments, for example.
23/
Because of our conclusion, we do not reach either
of the two alternative arguments in support of the District
Court 1 s judgment, namely that the State of Michigan expressly
waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity by virtue of Mich.
Stat. Annot. § 15.1023(7), and that the Fourteenth Amendment,
ex proprio vigore, works a pro tanto repeal of the Eleventh
Amendment. Cf. Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976).
Neither question was addressed by the Court of Appeals, and
we therefore do not pass on either issue.

- 28 Finally, there is no merit to petitioners' claims that
the relief ordered here violates the Tenth Amendment and
general principles of federalism.

The Tenth Amendment's

reservation of non-delegated powers to the States is not
implicated by a federal court judgment enforcing the express
prohibitions of unlawful state conduct enacted by the Fourteenth Amendment.
(1976).

Cf. Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445

Nor are principles of federalism abrogated by

the decree.

The District Court has neither attempted to

restructure local governmental entities, compare Rizzo v.
Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1972), nor to mandate a particular method
or structure of state or local financing.

Cf. San Antonio

Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
The District Court has, instead, properly enforced the constitutional guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment consistent
with our prior holdings,and in a manner that does not jeopardize the integrity of the structure or functions of state and
local government.

~

'1 /

The judgment of the Court of Appeals is therefore affirmed.
Affirmed.

lfp/ss
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No. 76-447 MILLIKEN v. BRADLEY
MR. JUSTICE POWELL, concurring in the judgment.

,
The Court's opinion addresses this as if it were
conventional desegregation litigation.

The wide-ranging

opinion reiterates the familiar general principles ar. awn
from the li rie .of

~recedents

commencing with

!?~ow~.

One has to read the opinion closely to understand that the
case, as it finally reaches us, is wholly unique.

Indeed,

it is largely a non-case in terms of desegregation
principles.
f\01.~~~~~$
Normally, the/\in this type of litigatjon are

students, parents and supporting organizations who desire
to oesegregate a school system alleged to be the product,
in whole or in part, of

de_j_!:l_£~

segregative action by the

public school ·authorities .
...parents ai"'ttJ sappot t 1ng organ i zai!

i:-eAY

The principal

defendant is the l ocal board of enucation or school
board.

Occasionally, the state board of education and

public officials are joined as defendants.

This

protracted litigation commenced in 1970 in this
conventional mold.

In the interven i ng

2.
years, however,

the posture of the litigation has changed

so drasticall~ as to J.eave it largely a friendly suit

( reseo~ ov-o..elllbf

1

e.+ !:1·)

between the plaintiffs and the original principal
1\.

defendant,

the Detroit School Board.

These

parties~

)

antagonistic for years, have now joined forces apparentJy
for the purpose of extracting funds from the state
treasury.

As between the original principal parties - the

plaintiffs and the Detroit School Board - no case or
controversy remains.

The Board enthusiastically supports

the entire desegregation decree even though the decree
intrudes deeply on the Board's own decisionmaking powers.
The plaintiffs favored a desegregation plan that would
have required more extensive transportation of pupils, but
they did not oppose the remedial educational components
once they were proposed by the School Board.
this

Court~hey,

1/
In
-\..L

J ike the School Board, now support the

decree of the District Court as affirmed by the Court of
Appeals.
The only complaining party here is the State of
Michigan

(acting through state officials), and its basic

3.
compJ

Co"\;\Ct. n\S
aintA~s G¥€~

money,

not~

deseg-regation.

It has

'

been ordered to pay about $5,800,000 to the Detroit School
Board.

This is one half the estimated "excess cost" of

four of the eleven educational components included in the
desegregation decree:

remedial reading, in-service

training of teachers, testing, and counseling
Appendix hereto).

(see

The State, understandably anxious to

preserve the state budget from federal court control or
interference, now contests the decree on two grounds.
First, it is argued that the order to pay state
funds violates the Eleventh Amendment and prjnciples of
federalism.

Ordinarily a federal court's order that a
...,/

•

state pay unappropriated funds to a locality would raise
the gravest constitutional issues.

See generally

San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodgriguez, 411
U.S. 1, 40-42

(1973); National League of Cities v.

426 U.S. 833

(1976).

subjec~o

review, the State has been adjudged a

!]~ery,

But here, in a finding no longer

participant in the constitutional violation, and the State
therefore may be ordered to participate prospectively in a
remedy otherwise appropriate.
The State's second argument is one that normally
would be advanced vigorously by the jchool joard.

Relying

on the established principle that the scope of the remedy
in a desegregation case js determined and limited by the

4.

extent of the constituti6nal violation, Milliken v.
~!_adle_y,

418 U.S. 717, 744

(1974), the State argues that

the District Court erred in ordering the system-wide
expansion of the four educational components mentioned

d.
above.

It contents that there has been no finding of a

constitutional vioJ.ation with respect to the past
operation of any of these programs, and it insists that
without carefully focused findings of this sort, the
3

decree exceeded the court's powe~

~/

This argument is by no means a frivolous one.}/
But the context in which it is presented is so unusual
that it would be appropriate to dismiss the writ as
improvidently granted .

The argument is advanced by the

State and not by the party primarily concerned.

The

educational programs at issue are standard and universally
approved in public education.1/

The State Board

normally would be enthusiastic over enhancement of these
programs so long as the local school board could fund them
without requiring financial aid from the State.

It is

equally evident that the State probably would resist a
federal court order requiring it to pay unappropriated
state funds to the Jocal school board regardless of
whether violations by the local board justified the
remedy.

The State's interest in protecting its own budget

- limited by legislative appropriations - is a genuine

5.

one.

But it js not an interest that arises, or exists,

because the desegregation remedy may have exceeded the
extent of the violations.
The State's reliance on the remedy jssue contains
a further weakness making this case a sport, the decision
of which hardly can have general application. There is no

•

indication that the State objected - certainJy, it does
not object here - to the inclusion in the District Court's
decree of the seven other educational components.~/
Inoeed, the State expressly agreed to one of the most
expensive components, the establishment of vocatjonal
education centers, in a stipulation obligating it to share
the cost of construction equally with the Detroit Board.
Mo'feove.~
See App. 139a-141a. Jince the District Court '.s decree

1\

largely embodies the original recommendation of the
Detroit Board, and since local school boards "have the
primary responsibility for elucidating, assessing, and
solving [the] problems" generated by "[f]ull
Q., ,,

implementation of .

. constitutional principljs in the

local setting, Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U.S. 294,
299

(1955), the State's limited challenge here is

particularly lacking in force.
There are other aspects of this case ignored by
the Court but which,

in my opinion, undercut the relevancy

6.

of most of its opinion.

First, a look at the District

Court's perception of its problem.

It found the structure

of the Detroit school system "chaotic and incapable of
effective administration."

App. 124a.

Its "general

superintendent has little direct authority." Ibid.

Each

of the eight regional boards may be preoccupied

#

wit~'distribut[ing]

local board patronage."

App: J25a.

The "local boards have diverted resources that would
otherwise have been available for educational purposes to
build new offices and other facilities to house this

administrative

overload~

Ibid.

The District Court

continued:
"In addition to the administrative chaos, we
know of no other school system that is so
enmeshed in politics. *** Rather than devoting
themselves to the educational system and the
desegregative process, board members are busily
engaged in politics not only to assure their
own re-election but also to defeat others with
whom they disagree." App. 125a-126a~
(footnote omitted).
~

Referring again to the "political paralysis" and
"inefficient bureaucracy" of the system, the court also
noted - discouragingly - that the election then
approaching "may well [result in] a board of education
consisting of members possessing no experience in
education."

App. 1 26a.

Yet, it was a compliant Board.

The District Court had complimented its
~

:Bozn~ to

rl::.lingness~

"implement any desegregation order the court

may issue." App. 49a.

7.

·,f.
In these quite remarkable

~'Y .M)t- ~

M- k>Hi~

is ~~!.,
i•

circumstances~~~ere

1~7 _ju~-h~c4tle,

.t-it G-L e wonae~Athat the District Court virtuaJly assumed

the role of school superintendent and, with the four
"expert advisers" vJhom .it engaged, preempted major
segments of the School Board's responsibility.

The

Appendix to this opinion summarizes the 11 principal
educational elements in the court's oesegregation plan.
Clearly they constitute a deep intrusion upon the lawful
duties and responsibilities of elected school board
members.

It is

opinions and

the 150 printed pages of
15, 1975, through May Jl,

1976, App. Ja-150a, that the Distrjct Court felt compelled
_..-/

'
to fill the void created by the "political paralysis,"

"inefficient bureaucracy," and "administrative chaos"
found to exist in the Detroit school system at this
critical juncture.

ihe District Court

-

:::::

moved strongly and broadly to rehabilitate what it viewed
as a school system in serious disarray.

In so acting the

-------=--:-:---=-~y

courtE Judge DeMasico ~may well have made a major
contribution to public education in Detroit.
constitutional authority for assuming
administrative functions was dubious.

But the

legisl~tive

and

The court made only

the most generalized and tenuous findings of
constitutional default as to the eleven remedial

8.
programs.

The default, one of Jarge proportions as

outlined by fhe District Court, was politjcal and
bureaucratic.
There is, however, a document in the record
making clear that at one point the Detroit School Board
was conscious of the possible consequences of abdicating
its responsibility.

•

In its brief in the Court of Appeals,

the Board expressed grave concern as to what the District
Court's assumption of the Board's powers would do to the
school system financially:

<

" [ 0] n May 11 , 19 7 6 , . • .
~
the District Court ordered equalization of
all school facilities and buildings preparatory
to the 1976-77 school term; continuance of the
comprehensive construction and renovation
""'
program; the institution of a reading and
'
communication skills program together with the
necessary in-service training therefor0 the
institution of the testing program with the
accompanying in-service training; institution
of the counseling and career guidance program
with the accompanying in-service training; the
application of a formula for equal sharing of
excess cost of implementing the educational
components by the Detroit Board and the State
Defendants; institution of the vocational
education program; institution of a comprehensive program for bi-lingual/multi-ethnic
studies; and institution of the in-service
training program for implementation of the
Uniform Code of Conduct.

"Even without actual dollar figures, the
financial impact of these orilers could easi!X
oestroy the educational program of t~etroit
School system.
The financing of these components by the Detroit school system would only
mean a concomitant elimination of existing
programs.
"It is virtually impossible for the Detroit
Board of Education to re-order its priorities
when it is already operating on a woefully
inadequate budget that cannot provide a minimal
quality educational program.
Any attempt to
redistribute available resources will cause
"fUrther deterioration 1n on-going educational
programs and will merely result in robbing Peter
to pay Paul." App. 189a (emphasis added)()

9.
This is an extraordinary statement as to the
potential consequences of the DistrJct Court ' s actions .
Only one consideration can account for its presence in a
brief filed by a party supporting the decree :

the

financially pressed Detroit Board evidently was willing to
surrender a substantial portion of its decisionmaking

•

authority in return for the prospect of enhanced funding even while recognizing that the decree could endanger the
city's educational program .

The District Court had

exercised its power to do what the state legislature has
chosen not to do - appropriate funds from the state
treasury for these particular programs of the Detroit
~/

~-~·

~

The statement quoted above was par.t of the

;{chools .

Board's effort to persuade the Court of Appeals that it
should sustain that portion of the District Court ' s
order.

Also there was hope for more financial aid .

Only

about $5,800,000 are at issue on this appeal, but the
Distrlct Court retained jurisdiction and the Court of
Appeals specified that its affirmance of the decree was
"without prejudice to the right of the District Court to
require a larger proportionate payment by the State of
Michigan if found to be required by future developments."
App. 180a.

10.
Given all these ususual circumstances, it seems
to me that

th~

proper disposition of this case is to

dismiss the writ of certiorari as improvidently granted.
But being unable to persuade my Brothers to this
prudential view, I join in the judgment as a result less
likely to prolong the disruption of education in Detroit
than a reversal or remand.

In doing so, I emphasize the

irrelevance of much of an opinion that for the most part
addresses a case "that never was."

Milliken footnotes

N-1

~pparentl~e plaintif~did not view~nlil;l
ehe

ca~~~ached-t~~~-€0tt~

the educational components as

necessary or even important elements of a desegregation
plan.

These components were never included in plans

submitted by the plaintiffs, and in briefs filed below
there were indications that the plaintiffs viewed some if not all - of these components as being "wholly

-~

unrelated toAsegregation of students and faculty in
schools."

See plaintiff's brief in the Court of Appeals,

.....
p. 5, 6.
A

2.

The Court's opinion states that the District

Court "expressly found that the two components of testing
and counseling, as then administrered in Detroit's
schools, were infected with the discriminatory bias of a

segregated school system4Y

Ante)at~ But the

statement

of the District Court relied upon did not make such a
finding with respect to this case.

The

Distr~Court

It merely observed:

indulged in similar generalizations as

justification for each of the educational components.

I

have been unable to identify a single, s pecific finding of

N-2
de jure discrimination in the testing, counseling,
guidance or in-service training programs of the Detroit
system.

Certainly none has been identified that would

justify the extent of the remedies ordere~had those
)
remedies been imposed by the court sua sponte, rather than
at the suggestion of the local school board.
3.

There is language in the Court's opinion to

the effect that the general finding, made in the initial
stage of this litigation, of a de jure segregated school
system is sufficient to justify the ordering of the
educational components summarized in the Appendix hereto.
If so read, it would be difficult to limit the authority
~/
f

of a court - once a school system was found to be
segregated - to substitute its judgment for that of the
school authorities as to all aspects of school
operations.

~

In this case, for example, the District

and

has assumed control over the
curriculum of five vocational
schools.

~~~

technical

There was no finding of any specific

constitutional violation with respect to Detroit's
programs in vocational and tehnical education.

Those

programs may have been inadequate, but that does not make
them unconstitutional.

If the Court could assume this

'· '

N-3

educational role with respect to vocational and technical
education, would there be any less justification for
restructuring the entire curriculum?
Once federal courts are allowed to enter the
thicket of educational policy and practice, where can a
principled line be drawn?

The answer, I suggest, may be

found in today's opinion in Dayton Board of Education v.
Brinkman, No. 76-539, ante,at

, which reiterates the

settled doctrine that specific violations must be found,
and that the Court must attempt to determine "how much
incremental segregative effect these violations [have]
had" on the particular school function at issue.

Slip
.,

/

I

op., at 13-14.
- 4.

It is clear that the four educational

components at issue had not been neglected.

The Detroit

Board's budget allocations for the 1975-76 school year
included a total of $75,989,000 for the four programs.
The additional cost of the expanded programs was estimated
to be $11,645,000, an increase of only 15%.

Brief of

Petitioners 12, 13.
5.

The appendix to this opinion identifies the

degree to which the District Court assumed responsibility

N-4
for operating the school system.
the court

req~ired tha~

these programs be "comprehensivef.6/

and that plans for implementation
court.

In almost every case,

~e

reviewed by the

As the court retains continuing jurisdiction,

there is no end

~ight

to judicial - rather than

legislative and administrative - operation of the Detroit
schools.

In my view, this is a denigration and weakening

of the democratic process.
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Appendix to Concurring Opinion of POWELL, J.

This Appendix identifies and

summariz~he

remedial educational and administrative programs ordered
by the District Court in its desegregation decrees of
August 11, 1975, November 4 and 20, 1975, and May 11,
1976. ! /

The order appealed from is that of May 11,

1976, but it specifically provides that "all previous
orders of the court, not inconsistent with this judgment,
shall remain in full force and
effect • .

.

"

App. 148a.

These "educational

components" were ordered in addition to the customary
/JI/
./

elements of a desegregation decree, including pupil
reassignment the transportation of some 22,000 pupils (to
achieve a figure of not less than 30% black students in

each school, with two minor

exception~agnet

schools,

and provisions with respect to faculty.
1.

Reading.

A "comprehensive program of

reading instruction," including "in-service training of
reading instructors, the necessary administrative staff to
supervise a comprehensive reading program, and the
evaluation, monitoring, record-keeping, and reporting

!/rn addition to the reported decisions,
referred to in the Court's opinion, all of the District
Court's opinions and orders discussing and setting forth
~ these ~ emedies® are contained in the Appendix filed with
this case. References herein are to that Appendix.

2.

necessary to ensure the successful functioning of such a
program."

App. 127a.
The foregoing program was supplemented in

accordance with a recommendation from a "Monitoring
Commission" previously appointed by the Court.

As

supplemented, it provided for "means to deal with the
discovery of perceptual difficulties among school
children,

~adequate

professional vision and hearing

screening, and in-service training enabling teachers,
first, to determine, whether such screening is necessary
for students and second, to apply appropriate teaching
strategies to accommodate perceptual difficulties."
Ibid.

The Court further ordered "the Board to specify

how the mass media and community components will be
utilized to reinforce the reading process . • • •
2.

In-service Training.

Ibid.

A "comprehensive

in-service training program" was ordered, requiring "inservice training in such fields as teacher expectations,
human relations, minority culture, testing, the student
code of conduct and the administration of discipline in a
desegregated system for all school personnel," including
staff.

App. 73a, 128a.

3.
3.

Counseling and Career Guidance.

In its

opinion and order of August 15, 1975, the Court ordered
the school board to develop a "comprehensive program" for
counselling and career guidance services "to the junior
and senior high students in the Detroit system."
8la, 95a.

App.

A plan was submitted and, although not fully

described except by reference, was ordered by the decree
of May 11, 1976, to "be implemented by the joint efforts
of the defendants Detroit Board of Education and the State
Board of Education."

4.

App. 128a, 146a.

Testing.

Detroit Board "shall

The Court ordered that the

~hwith

..,

review all tests

~'

curren~ly

in use in the Detroit public schools, shall determine

whether such tests are

'culture~ir,'

and shall eliminate

any racial, ethnic and/or cultural bias inherent in any
testing apparatus used in the Detroit school system."
App. 130a.

In addition, the Board was ordered to

"review and revise all instructions and procedures" to
assure nondiscriminatory testing: to "develop and
institute a program to train teachers and administrators
in test administration procedures designed to ensure

-+o

nondiscriminatory treatment of

,,

students'~tablish

evaluation programs with systemwide

A

4.
performance objectives and the development of objective
testing procedures to measure growth for each performance
objective."

Ibid; see App. 78a-79a.
5.

Vocational Education Centers.

The city

and state Boards were ordered to "create [five] vocational
centers devoted to in-depth occupational preparation in
the construction trades, transportation and health
services."

~/

App. 75a.

In order to hasten

implementation, two existing facilities were ordered to be
App.

converted promptly to use as vocational centers.
75a-78a; 139a; 142a.

6.

Vocational Education.

In connection with

the new centers, the Detroit Board was ordered to
"institute a vocational education program consistent with
all of the memoranda and orders heretofore issued by the
court and pursuant to the stipulations and resolutions

~" ~c.ool.o.~ .._
submitted"
74a,

~.c .

:u•t•~~ ee

75a-7~ With

t.Af '~

ee.,rt

'"fka.

8•1ie ~

C4)

v...rt's o v-rJ.u.s. .

App. 147a.

See App.

respect to the two existing facilities

to be converted to vocational centers, the jourt required

2. The
the creation of four
plans were modified,
construction of five

August 15, 1975, opinion speaks of
vocational centers. Ap rently these
for all later papers
to
such centers. See, ~·~· App. 117a.

u

5.
that the plan "contain detailed curricula": that the two
centers operate on a "city-wide" basis, with a "racial mix
. approach[ing] a ratio of 60% black and 40% white."
App. 76a.

J·

t' ·

Each of the vocational centers was ordered by

the l ourt to add an additional "grade 13 providing
advanced offerings both for those students presently
enrolled and for other students who have left the system
within the past three years."
7.

Ibid.

Technical Schools.

The city and state

Boards also were ordered to "create two new technical high
schools in which business education will be the central
part of the curriculum."

App. 75a.

The Detroit Board was

.
f

/

required to "commission a study of the curricula to be
established at the two technical high schools." App. 77a.
experts, '

Upon

, the Board

App.
77a-78a.
8.

Bilingual/Multi-ethnic Studies.

Finding

that "[m]ulti-ethnic studies are essential elements of the
curriculum of any outstanding school system," the court's

deseg~ion

order provided for the inclusion of such

6.
studies in the school curriculum.

The Board was "directed

to reapply" to the federal government for funds, the
application to "include provisions for in-service training
for teachers involved in such programs."

9.

App. 82a, ]47a.

Uniform Code of Student Conduct.

The

Board was directed in some detail to develop and implement
a "Uniform Code of Conduct" relating to student rights and
responsibilities.

10.

App. 79at;_ 148a.

Co-Curricul

The court's

order required "the Board [to] develop for the court's

approval a specific plan for

co-curricul~ctivities

including an analysis of the costs involved."

..,

_,/

!

It was said

that such a program "can acquaint students with the many
fine institutions available in the Detroit area, which
have indicated their interest in aiding the court in

))
providing quality education to Detroit school

children ~

App. 82a.

11.

School-Community Relations.

Viewed as

an important remedial component of the desegregation
program, the Board was ordered "to submit a detailed

7.
plan for a community relations program."

App. 80a.

In

its May 11, 1976, opinion and decree, the court outlined
in some detail the structure of the community relations
program that it required the Board to implement.

A "local

school community relations committee [must be established]
in each school." App. 132a (emphasis in original). Careful
not to leave

~ortat~matters

to chance, the court

further required that "each committee shall elect a
chairperson and develop procedural rules to govern its
sessions."

Ibid.

In addition to the 20-member committee

in each school, with its racial composition paralleling
that of the school population, the court ordered a
"regional school-community relations committee to
coordinate the efforts of the local committees."

These

committees also must have a chairperson; "[m]eetings shall
be held monthly in a facility selected by the regional
board, and the regional board shall provide a secretary."
App. 133a.

Then, a "city-wide school-community relations

council" was ordered by the court to "oversee the entire
program."

Ibid.

In addition to prescribing the

responsibilities, the court made sure that the citywide
council was appropriately structured.
subcommittees to be created as follows:

It ordered

8.
(i)

Public Information;

Commit tee Liaison;

(ii)

Monitoring;

( i v) Community Liaison;

Involvement; and (vi) Executive Committee.

(iii) Local
(v) Parental
These

subcommittees were ordered to convene twice a month, and
the council must "meet in open session at least once a
month."

App. 13la-135a.
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Apparently the plaintiffs did not view, until

the case reached this Court, the educational components

cy
as necessary or even important elements of a deseregation
A

plan.

These components were never included in plans

submitted by the plaintiffs, and in briefs filed below
'1:'

there were indications that the plaintiff viewed some 1\

if not all - of these components as being "wholly unrelated
to desegr e gation of students and faculty in schoolJ.(}
See plaintiff's brief in the Court of Appeals, p. 5, n. 6.
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The ~ate asserts that the District
Court

ma~~of constitutional violation

•'

•

(i.e., discriminatory de ~action) with respect
tour educational components at

~ssue.

)

My reading of the record comports with the State's
J

position.

1The

Court's

opinion~

states that

the District Court "expressly found that the two
components of testing and counseling, as then
administered in Detroit's schools, were infected
with the discriminatory bias of a segregated school
system"

Ante at

!l._ .

But the statement of the

District Court relied upon did not make such a
finding with respect to this case.

It merely

observed:
"In a segregated system many techdeny equal protection of black
students, such as discriminatory
testing [and] discriminatory counseling ... "

nique~

See ~ a is

==:/ /tr(· 3(.4

1

ezcJofe.,( ~) evf ft.

~

The District Court indulged in similar generalizations
as justification for each of the educational components.

~

have been unable to identify a single, specific

finding of de jure discrimination in the testing,
counseling, guidance or in-service training programs
of the Detroit system.

Certainly none has been

lfp/ss/tap
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[1 ~~ "~e~ ~ ' ""t'"~ b-

identified that would j ustify the extent of the
remedies order

I ~ c.o "'....-{
~

o. _ ,

s'l::l}9-r:-~

I

.

~ ... ~ J fl.-._
of ·tL... ez~ ~e (n,~t
Qf p,f.e.. )

)

..

,.
~

'
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:3 ;
-There is language in the Court's opinion to
the effect that the general finding, made in the initial
stage of this litigation, of a de jure segregated school
·'

system is sufficient to justify the ordering of the
educational components summarized in the Appendix
hereto.

If so read, it would be difficult to limit

the authority of a court--once a school system was
found to be segregated--to substitute its judgment
for that of the school authorities as to all aspects
of school operations.

In this case, for example,

the District Court has assumed control over the
creation, operation, and curriculum of
education and two technical schools.

+-;"~

~~vocational

There was

no finding of any specific constitutional violation

'J)4~,ts
l
.si~
with respect t oA vocat1onal and technical education.

-rt. 0~

f'<"~ ~

~~may hav~ been inadequate, but that does not make

~
~

unconstitutional.

"

If the Court could assume this

educational role with respect to vocational and
technical education, would there be any less justification for restructuring the entire curriculum?

, -1 /
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teaching of the social sciences,
I

be viewed as supportive of

I

regation process.
grad/

And if a thirteenth

is properly added in vocational education (as

the court decreed) , could the court not have
added grades in other courses as well?

The District

Court was dissatisfied with the counseling and ordere
a more comprehensive program.

Educators differ

as to the appropriate ratio of counselors to pupils,
just as they do as to teacher-pupil ratio.

Are

these professional judgments now to be made by
federal courts?
Once federal courts are allowed to enter the

2":::
thicket Yof

.

· eeciSIOii
··
educat1onal policy and pract1ce)

~here

can a principled line be drawn?

The

to~ I'\ )
suggest, ~today's opinion in Dayton Board

\. yN..I kt

answer, I

>--

I

No.7(, .. ~~'J
of Education v. Brinkman, ante at
A- -

, which reiterates

the settled doctrine that specific violations must be
found, and that the Court must attempt to determine
"how much incremental segregative effect these
violations [have] had" on i!:he
s e~eei

~p~JQXjpQ Q~ ~n

Jl c1· e

at iSSUe • ~~ ~

I

C)

r•)cd

i!l8mpQ&i.t.ieR

gf --t!he

the particular school function

11· I&/ V
·~ ~
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§:{ It

is clear that the four educational components
J>~-\-f'oi t

at issue had not been neglected.

The~ Board's

budget

allocations for the 1975-76 school year included a total
of $75,989,000 for the four programs.

The additional
'

cost of the expanded programs was estimated to be

8"<"\e~ ~ Pe.~~~
$11,645,000, an increase of only 15%. A. Pet;, lb;, , . 12, 13.

'·
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~The
~the

appendix to this

11 "educational

opinionJr:dentif~

components"~~icates

the

expansive degree to which the District Court assumed
responsibility for operating the school system.
In addition to the four programs at issue

counseling and

in this

esting) , the Distr ct Court has

assumed eff ctive operational
educatio

~h

of a

(including the

c~

1

riculum and the add'tion

grade); bi-li gual and multi-ethn'c

I

studies;

I

d enters and two

I

vocational education
technical

hool~(o~

notably de ailed instructio s as to schoo

"'1!<:"'---':!l:)...~ In almost"~v:z case, the court required that

these programs be "comprehensivef.lJ and that plans
for implementation be reviewed by the court.

As the

.. -'

---~-
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court retains continuing jurisdiction, there is no
~

end in sight to judicial -- rather than legislative

;~\
No;

"

-~~~

,.

i_·,,

and administrative--operation of the Detroit schools.

'

Yw

..

In my view, this is a denigration and weakening
I·

of the democratic process.
'·

'
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CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST

June 7, 1977

Re:

No. 76-447

Milliken v. Bradley

Dear Potter:
I am sending to you and Lewis herewith a proposed
rough draft of a ~etter to the Chief suggesting fairly
modest changes in his present circulating opinion in
Mjlliken v. Bradley. My main object has been to differentiate the two cases from one another, and to make the
Chief's opinion in Milliken less subject to over-broad
construction by overly eager District Judges.
I shall
be available at almost any time on Wednesday, Thursday,
or Friday to jointly discuss these or any counter proposals you may have.
Sincerely,

Mr. Justice Stewart
Copy to Mr. Justice Powell

WHRoRougho6/7/77

I

Dear Chief:

Although I v ted the other way at Conference in this

case, I am prepared to at least concur in the result of your

opinion in Milliken v. Bradley, and with sufficient· inducement

could perhaps be

consist of

se~ee

from the Dayton

~

changes -.wb..ich would

case~

from one another may cause confusion coming down about the

same time.

I think my purpose could be served by adding a

sentence or two in text or footnote to your present opinion

setting out a little more of the factual background of the

"gory details" as originally found by the District Court,

so as to show that in Detroit we have the "system-wide" vio-

lation which was not proven in Dayton.

I would also like to

- 2 -

see a sentence or two of explicit reference to the actions

taken by the state in perpetuating the discriminatory system
----------~--- ----in Detroit.

You refer briefly to these violations in your footnote

1, on p. 2, and summarize accurately the extent of what was

found.

But I

wo~ld

appreciate seeing you add, either to this

footnote or some other place you deem more appropriate, explicit

reference to the District Court's language describing these

violations:

(1)
Extensive use of racially significant
optional attendance zones. 338 F.Supp at
587, 593;

(2)
The practice of busing black students
past - white schools to a black school further
away, and vice verse.
Id., at 588, 593.
{3)
The various construction decisions which
certainly had the effect, and permitted the
inference of an intent, to maintain the "dual"
school system in Detroit. ~'
SS~-S~q.; ~2.-r;t:tJ ..

a.t

I think it would be helpful if in the same footnote, or

-

3 -

somewhere else, you could expressly say that these findings,

together with those to which you already refer, described by

the District Court as "a de jure segregated public school

system", id., at 594,

w~ere

a classical example of

a "system-wide" violation within a school district, in contrast

to the findings of the District Court in the Dayton case.

With reEpect to the participation of the state in the

maintenance of the segregated system,

I think it would not

only strengthen the opinion, but make it less subject to misuse

by District Judges, if you used a sentence to this effect:

"When the Detroit school board attempted
to voluntarily initiate an intra-district
remedy to a~eliorate the effect of the past
segregative practices, the Michigan legislature
'•
enacted a law forbidding the carrying out of
this remedy." 338 F. Supp. at 589.

Sincerely,

To: Mr.
Mr.
Mr.
Mr.
Mr.

Justice Brennan
JusticE:· St . , \rt
Jmtic"' ','11; t'
Jl'c L" nn ' t

Juc

'

i

I

''

Mr.
'I

..;

r'.

Mr. Ju

.I

J. (.. r ~

'

\,

From: The Chief Jur, teo
v

Circulated:
RN' il'culated: JUN
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 76-447
William G. Milliken, Governor of
On Writ of Certiora• to the
the State of Michigan, et al.,
United States Court of
Petitioners,
Appeals for the Sixth
v.
Circuit.
Ronald Bradley et al.
[June -, 1977]
MR. C:HIE;F JuSTICE BuRGER announced the opinion of the
Court.
We granted certiorari in this case to consider two questions
concerning the remedial powers of federal district courts in
school desegregation cases, namely, whether a District Court
can, as part of a desegregation decree, order compensatory or
remedial educational programs for schoolchildren who have
been subjected to past acts of de jure segregation, and
whether, consistent with the Eleventh Amendment, a federal
c·ourt can require state officials found responsible for constitutional violations to bear part of the costs of those programs.

I

I

This case is before the Court for the second time following
our remand, Mill·i ken v. Bradley, 418 U. S. 717 (1974)
t Millik en I) ; it marks the culmination of seven years of
litigation over de JUre school s0gregation in the Detroit Public

School System. For almost six years, the litigation has
foeusC'd exclusively on the appropriate remedy to correct offiC'ial acts of racial discrimination committed by both the
Dc•troit School Board and the State of Michigan. No chal-f
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lcnge is now made by the State or the local school board to
the prior findings of de jure segregation.1
A
In the first stage of the remedy proceedings, which we reviewed in Milliken I, supra, the District Court, after reviewing
srveral "Detroit-only" desegregation plans, concluded that
an interdistrict plan was required to "'achieve the greatest
degree of actual desegregation ... [so that] no school, grade
(J l' classroom [would be] substantially disproportionate to the
overall pupil racial composition.'" 345 F. Supp. 914, 918 (ED
Mich. 1972), quoted in Milliken I, supra, at 734. On those
premises, the District Court ordered the parties to submit
plans for "metropolitan desegregation" and appointed a ninelllrmber panel to formulate a desegregation plan, which would
encompass a "desegregation area" consisting of 54 school
t I istricts.
In June 1973, a divided Court of Appeals, sitting en ~anc,
upheld the District Court's determination that a metropolitanwide plan was essential to bring about what the District Court
had described as "the greatest degree of actual desegregation ... .'' 345 F. Supp., at 918. We reversed, holding that
the order exceed appropriate limits of federal equitable authority as defined in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board
of Educ., 402 U. S. 1, 24 (1971), by concluding that "as a
1 The violation" of thr Detroit Board of Education, which included
the improprr use of optional attendance zones, racially based transportalion of ~c hoolchildrrn, improprr creation and alteration of attendance
zone~, grade structure~. and feeder school patterns, are described in
tlw Di~trict Court'~ initial "Ruling on Issue of Segregation." 338 F.
~upp. 582, 587-588 (ED Mich. 1971). The District Court further found
t hat , '·rt]he Statr and its agencies . . . have acted directly to control
and rna intain t hr pat trrn of ~(·grcgat ion in the Detroit schools." I d.,
;t( 589. Tho~e conclu~ion::; as to liability were affirmed on appeal, 484
]i 2d 215, 221-241 (CA6 1973) , and were not challenged in this Court.
UH U. S. 717 (1974) (Milfiken 1) .

J
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matter of substantive constitutional right, [a] particular
drgree of racial bala.nce" is required, and by subjecting other
school districts, uninvolved with and unaffected by any constitutional violations, to the court's remedial powers. 418
C ~. 717 ( 1974). Proceedillg from the Swann standard
''that the scope of the remedy is determined by the
nu.ture and extent of tlw constitutional violation," we held
that, on the record before us, there was no interdistrict violation calling for an interclistrict remedy. Because the District
( 'ourt's "metropolitan remedy" went beyond the constitutional
violation, we remanded the case for further proceedings "leading to prompt formulation of a decree directed to eliminating
the segregation found to exist in the Detroit city schools, a
r<>medy whirh has been delayed since 1970." Id., at 753.~

B
DuP to the intervening death of Judge Stephen J. Roth,
\\'ho had prcsic!Pd over the litigation from the outset, the case on
rc'maud was rf'assigned to Judge Robert E. DeMascio. Judge
DeMascio promptly ordered respondent Bradley and the
Detroit Board to submit desegregation plans limited to the
DPtroit school system. On April 1, 1975, both parties subtnitted their proposed plans. Respondent Bradley's plan was
limited solely to pupil reassignment; the proposal called for
l'Xtensive tra11sportation of students to achieve the plan's
~ SC'par:t1<' opinion,; wrn' fii<'CI in Milliken 1. MR. JusTICE STEWART,
<'oncurring. ~tittC'd that thr metropolitan-wide rrmedy contemplated
IJy thr Di~t rict C'ourt wa~ ··in rrror for the simple reason that the
n•mrd.1· . . . was not rommemmrat<:> with the constitutional violation
l<>lllld." !d., at 7.54. Di~><rnt ing opinions were filed by Mr. Justice
Dungln><, :VIR ..lu"Trc~> \YH ITt•:, nne! Mu. JusTICE MARSHALL. The dis.-<C'nl ing opinion" took the posit ion, in brid, that the remedy was appropriatr, giwn thl' i:'taH· '~ umli~putrd constitutional violations, the control
or local rduration by ~tatr authorities, and the manageability of any
tt<'''''>Ntr.l· :l<linim~tmtiYl' modifications to effectuate a mc1ropolitan-wido
ro•mt•d,·.
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ultimate goal ·of assuring that every school within the district
reflected, within 15 percentage points, the racial ratio of the
school district as a whole. 3 In contrast to respondent Bradley's proposa1, the Detroit Board's plan provided for sufficient
pupil reassignment to eliminate "racially identifiable white
schools," while ensuring that "every child will spend at least a
portion of his education in either a neighborhood elementary
school or a neighborhood junior and senior high school." !d.,
at 1116. By eschewing racial ratios for each school, the
Board's plan contemplated transportation of fewer students
for shorter distances than respondent Bradley's proposal.4
In addition to student reassignments, the Board's plan
called for implementation of 13 remedial or compensatory
programs, referred to in the record as "educational components." These compensatory programs, which were proposed
in addition to the> plan's provisions for magnet schools and
vocational high schools, included three of the four components
at issue in this case-in-service training for teachers and
administrators, guidance and counseling programs, and revised testing procedures. 5 Pursuant to the District Court's
:J ArC'ording to the then most rerent statistical data, as of September 27,
1974, 257 ,;~96 studrnts were enrolled in the Detroit public schools, a
rignrr which rcHectrd a decrease of 28,116 students in the system since
thr 1960- 1961 tithool year. 402 F. Supp. 1096, 1106-1107. Of this total
~ turlrnl population, 71.5% wrrr Negro and 26.4% were white. The remaining; 2.1% was eomprised of studentti of other ethnic groups. !d.,
af 1106.
' l' ndrr rc·~]l(ll1dC'nt Brndley'H proposrd plan in the remand proceedings,
71,;349 ~fudrnts would havr rrquired transportation; the Detroit Board's
plnn, howewr, proYidrd for tnlll~portation of 51,000 students, 20,000 less
than thr Bradle~· pla11. Thr Board's plan, which the District Court found
1nfirm brratN' of an irnprrmii:'i:iible usr of '':lrbitrary" racial quotas, contrmplatrd arlurving; a 40C;{-60% repr<'.-;Pnlation of Negro students in the
1drntifiahl~· while school~ . whil e• !PaYing untouched in terms of pupil re. ,,~ignnH'nt . srhoob in t h rec• of f hr DPt roit systrm 's eight regions. Those
till'!'(' n•gion:-; , which wrr<' locat!'d in the central city, were overwhelmingly
'-'<'gro in rnf'ial compo~ilion
r. Tlw fourth ('omporwnf , n rrnwdial reading and communciations skills

I
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direction, the State Department of Education on April 21,
1975, submitted a critique of the Detroit Board's desegregation
plan; in its report, the Department opined that, although
"[i] t is possible that none of the thirteen 'quality education'
components is essential ... to correct the constitutional violation . . . . ", eight of the 13 proposed programs nonetheless
deserved special consideration in the desegregation setting.
Of particular relevance here, the State Board said:
"Within the context of effectuating a pupil desegregation plan, the in-service training [and] guidance and
counseling ... components appear to deserve special
emphasis." Id., at 38-39. 7
1)

AftC'r receiving the State Board's critique, 8 the District
Court conducted extensive hearings on the two plans over a
program, \,·as proposed later and was endorsed by the Bradley respondents
in :t critique of the Detroit Board's proposed plan. See n. 7, infra.
The Board's plan also called for the following "educational components":
ti<'hool-communit~· relations, parental involvement, student rights and
responsibilities, accountability, curriculum design, bilingual education,
multicthuic curriculum, and cocurricular activities. 402 F . Supp., at
1118.
n I11 addition to the State Board of Education, the state defendants
mclude the Governor of Michigan, the Attorney General, the State Superintendent of Public Instruction, and the State Treasurer.
'Two months later, the Bradley respondents also submitted a critique
of the Board's plan ; while criticizing the Board's proposed educational
components on several grounds, respondents nonetheless suggested that
a remedial reading program was particularly needed in a desegregation
plan. See n. 5, sup1·a. The Bradley respondents claimed more generally
that the Board'~:> phm failed to inform the court of the then current extent
of such programs or components in the school system and that the
plan failed to assess "the relatedness of the particular component to
desegregation ."
s The other ::;tate defendants likewise filed objections to the Detroit
Board's plan on April 21, 1975. They contended, in brief, that the
court's remrd~· was limited to pupil reassignment to achieve desegregation;
hence, the proposed inclusion of educational components was, under their
VJ<'W, rxces,:;ive.

'•.
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two-month period. Substantial testimony was adduced with
respect to the proposed educational components, including
testimony by petitioners' expert witnesses. 9 Based on this
evidence and on reports of court-appointed experts, the District Court on August 11, 1975, approved, in principle, the
Detroit Board's inclusion of remedial and compensatory educational components in the desegregation plan. 10
"We find that the majority of the educational components included in the Detroit Board plan are essentia]
for a school district undergoing desegregation. While it is
true that the delivery of quality desegregated educational
u For example, Dr. Charles P. Kearney, Associate Superintendent for
Research and School Administration for the Michigan Department of
Educ;ilion, gavE> the following; te~timony:
.. [T]he State Board and the Superintendent indicated that guidance
and counselling nppeared to deserve special emphasis in a desegregation
dl'ort."

" We support the notion of a guidance and counselling effort. We think
it certainly does have a relationship in the desegregation effort, we
\hink it de~Prves special emphasis."
As to in-srrvice trnining, Dr. Kearney testified that, in his opinion,
>'11Ch a program was required to implement effectively a desegregation
plan iu Detroit. Trnn~cript, Vol. XXX, at 179, 187. Finally, even
I hough thr State's critiqtH' did not deem testing as deserving of "special
empha;;is" in the cleHrgrrgation plan, Dr. Kearney stated as follows:
"Q: . . . LD]o you sec a direct relationship between testing and
drsrgrcgation '?
''A: If te::;t result;; wrre inappropriatdy used, . . . I think it would
havr rertainly a discriminatory affect [sic] and it would have a negative
affect , I'm sure on any kind of desegregation plan being implemented."
/d., at 184.
1 (}The DiHtrict Comt did not approve of all aspects of the Detroit
Board's plan. With re,.:prct to rducational components, the court said:
'' The plan a~ :oulnnitted ... dors not distinguish between those eomponrnt~ that are neri'Nsary lo the successful implementation of a desegregation plan and thn:Je ore not." 402 F . Supp., at 1118. (Emphasis
.-.upplird.)

76-447-0PINION
MILLIKEN v. BRADLEY '

•'

•

7

services is the obliga.tion of the school board, nevertheless
this court deems it essential to mandate educational components where they are needed to remedy effects of past
segregation, to assure a successful desegregative effort and
to minimize the possibility of resegregation." 402 F.
Supp., at 1118.
The District Court expressly found that the two components
t>f testing and counseling, as then administered in Detroit's
schools, were infected with the discriminatory bias of a segregated school system:
"In a segregated system many techniques deny equal
protection to black students, such as discriminatory testing [and I discriminatory counseling ... ." Ibid.
The District Court also found that, to make desegregation
\\'Ork, it was necessary to include remedial reading programs
and in-service training for teachers and administrators:
"In a system undergoing desegrega.tion, teachers will
require orientation and training for desegregation. . ..
Additioually, we find that ... comprehensive reading
programs are essential ... to a successful desegregative
effort." Ibid.
Having established these general principles, the District
Court formulated several "remedial guidelines" to govern the
Detroit Board's development of a final plan. Declining "to
substitute its authority for the authority of elected state and
local officials to decide which educational components are
beneficial to the school community," id., at 1145, the District
Judge laid down the following guidelines with respect to each
of the four educational components at issue here :
(a) Reading. Concluding that "[t]here is no educational
component more directly associated with the process of desegregation than reading," id., at 1138, the District Court directed
the General Superintendent of Detroit's schools to institute-

.•.
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remedial reading and commuuications skills program "[t]o
the effects of past discrimination ...." Ibid. Th~
content of the required program was not prescribed by
the court; rather, formulation and implementation of the
program was left to the Superintendent and to a committee
to be selected by him.
(b) In-Service Training. . The court also directed the
Detroit Board to formulate a comprehensive in-service teacher
training program, an element "essential to a system undergoing desegregation." I d., at 1139. In the District Court's
view, an in-service training program for teachers and administrators, to train professional and instructional personnel to
cope with the desegregation process in Detroit, would tend to
ensure that all students in a desegregated system would be
treated equally by teachers and administrators able, by virtue
of special training, to cope with special problems presented by
rlesegregation, and thereby facilitate Detroit's conversion to a
unitary system.
(c) Testing. Because it found, based on record evidence,
that Negro children "are especially affected by biased testing
procedures," the District Court determined that, frequently,
minority students in Detroit were adversely affected by discriminatory testing procedures. Unless the school system's
tests were administered in a way "free from racial, ethnic or
cultural bias," the District Court concluded that Negro children in Detroit migh't thereafter be impeded in their educational growth. !d., at 1142. Accordingly, the court directed
the Detroit Board and the State Department of Education to
institute a testing program along the lines proposed by the
local school board in its original desegregation plan. Ibid.
(d) Counseling and Career Guidance. Finally, the District Court addressed what expert witnesses had described as
psychological pressures on Detroit's students in a system
undergoing desegregation. Counselors were required, the
court concluded, both to deal with the numerous problems and
It
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tensions arising in the change from Detroit's dual system, and,
more concretely, to counsel students concerning the new voca•
tional and technical school programs available under the plan
through the cooperation of state and local officials. 11
Nine months later, on May 11, 1976, the District Court
entered its final order. Emphasizing that it had "been careful to order only what is essential for a school district undergoing desegregation," Appendix, at 117a, the court ordered the
Detroit Board and the state defendants to institute comprehensive programs as to the four educational components by
the start of the September 1976 school term. The cost of
these four programs, the court concluded, was to be equally
borne by the Detroit School Board and the State. To carry )
out this cost-sharing, the court directed the local board to
calculate its highest budget allocation in any prior year for
the several educational programs and, from that base, any
excess cost attributable to the desegregation plan was to be
paid equally by the two groups of defendants responsible for
prior constitutional violations, i. e., the Detroit Board and the
·tate defendants.

c

On appeal, the Court of Appeais for the Sixth Circuit
affirmed the District Court's order concerning the implementation of and cost-sharing for the four educational components. 12 The Court of Appeals expressly approved the
11 In contrast to their position before the District Court with respect
Lo the four educational components at issue here, the state defendants,
I hrough the State Department of Education, voluntarily entered into
<l stipulation with the Detroit Board on February 24, 1976, under which
th<' Stat(' agreed to provide 50% of the construction costs of five vocational
centers which the District Court ordered to be established. Appendix,
at 14la.
12 The Court of Appeals disapproved, however, of the District Court's
failure to include three of Detroit's eight regions in the pupil assignment
plan . Ser n. 4, supra. The Court of Appeals remanded the case to
the Di~trirt Court for further consideration of the three ommitted regions,

l
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District Court's findings as to the necessity for these compensatory programs: ·
"This finding . . . is not clearly erroneous, but to the
contrary is supported by ample evidence.
"The need for in-service training of the educational
staff and development of non-discriminatory testing is
obvious. The former is needed to insure that the teachers and administrators will be able to work effectively in
a desegregated environment. The latter is needed to
insure that students are not evaluated unequally because
of built-in bias in the tests administered in formerly
segregated schools.
"We agree with the District Court that the reading and
counseling programs are essential to the effort to combat
the effects of segregation. . . . Without the reading and
counseling components, black students might be deprived
of the motivation and a.chievement levels which the
desegregation remedy is designed to accomplish." 540 F.
2d 229, 241 (CA6 1976).
After reviewing the record. the Court of Appeals confirmed
that the District Court relied largely on the Detroit School
Board in formulatillg the decree:
"This is not a situation where the District Court
'appears to have acted solely according to its own notions
of good educational policy unrelated to the demands of
the Constitution.'" !d., at 241-242, quoting Keyes v.
School District, 521 F. 2d 465, 483 (CAlO 1975), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 1066 (1976).
After upholding the remedial-components portion of the
IJUt clcclinPd to ~E't fori h guid<:>lines, given the practicabilities of the
s it un t.ion, for the Dis I rict Court's benefit. Further proceedings were
dt·emed appropriate, however, particularly since the Bradley respondents
hnd pr(•viou~l~· lJpcn g;nwt eel leave to file a 8econd amended complaint to
ullcge intPrdi~trirt viol:tfions on the part of the st.o'tte and local defendants.
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p1an, the Court of Appeals went on to affirm the District/
Court's allocation of costs between the state and local officials.
Analyzing this Court's decision in Edelman v. Jordan, 415
F. S. 651 ( 1974), which reaffirmed the rule that the Eleventh
Amendment bars an ordinary suit for money damages against
thr State without its consent, the Court of Appeals held that
the District Court's order

I

11

imposes no money judgment on the State of
Michigan for past de jure segregation pra.ctices. Rather,
the order is directed toward the State defendants as a
part of a prospective plan to comply with a constitutional
requirement to eradicate all vestiges of de jure segregation." 540 F. 2d, at 245. (Emphasis supplied.)
•••

The Court of Appeals remanded the case for further consideration of the three central city regions untouched by the
District Court's pupil reassignment plan. See n. 12, supra.
The state defendants then sought review in this Court,
challenging only those portions of the District Court's comprehensive remedial order dealing with the four educational
components and with the State's obligation to defray the costs
of those programs. We granted certiorari, 429 U. S. (1976), and wr affirm.
II
This Court has not previously addressed directly the ques-1
tion whether federal courts can order remedial education programs as part of a school desegregation decree. 13 However,
B In Swann Y. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U. S.
1 ( 1971), the Court affirmed an order of the District Court which
includrd a rrquirrment of in-;;rrvice training programs. 318 F. Supp.
7R6, 800 (WDNC 1970) . Howevrr, this Court's opinion did not treat the
prrcisr point . In Keyes Y. Sr·hool District No. 1, Denver, Colorado,
.J-1:3 U.S. 189 (1973), the Court expressly avoided passing on the
, District C'oun ';; holding that callrd for, among other things, "compensat ory education in an integrated environment." ld., at 214 n. 18.
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the general principles governing our resolution of this issue
are well settled by the prior decisions of this Court. In the
first case concerning federal courts' remedial powers in eliminating de jure school segregation, the Court laid down the
basic rule which governs to this day : "In fashioning and
effectuating the [desegregation] decrees, the courts will be
guided by equitable principles." Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U. S. 294, 300 (1955) (Brown II) .

A
Application of those "equitable principles," we have held,
requires federal courts to focus upon three factors. In the
first place, like other equitable remedies, the nature of the
desegregation remedy is to be determined by the nature and
scope of the constitutional violation. Swann v. CharlotteMecklenburg Board of Education, supra, at 16. The remedy
must therefore be related to "the condition alleged to offend
the Constitution . . . . " Milliken I, supra, at 738. 14 Second,
~he decree must indeed be remedial in nature, that is, it
must be designed as nearly as possible "to restore
the victims of discriminatory conduct to the position they
would have occupied in the absence of such conduct." !d., at
746. 1 " Third, the federal courts in devising a remedy must
t4

Thus, the Court has con::;i:;l ently held that the Constitution is not
,·tolntrcl br racial imbalancr in thr schools, without more. Pasadena City
/Jvard of Educ. v. 0pangler, 427 U. S. 424, 434 (1976) ; Milliken I,
~upra, at 76:3 (Wn t•n;, .T., di::;::;enting) ; Swann, supra, at 26. An order
9ontrmplatinp; thr "·~ ub:;tantive right [to a] particular drgree of racial
l>:tlancr or mixing'" is therefore infirm as a matter of law. Spangler
.;npra, at 4:3-t
'r. Since tlw ultimat e objectivr of the remedy is to make whole the

1·ictimti of tmlawful conduct, fedrral court;:; are authorized to implement
plan~
that
promi ~e
"rPali,;tically
to
work now."
Green v.
Count.IJ 8rhool Board of New K ent County, 391 U. S. 430,
l:lg (196H) At th<' ~nnw timr, the Comt has carefully stated
1hat. to r n ~urp t hal frderal eo111'1 decrees are characterized by the flexibility
·11 td sr n ~itivi t y rrqlllred of rquilable decrers, considrration must be given

I
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take into account the interests of state and local authorities
in managing their own affairs, consistent with the Constitution. In Brown II the Court squarely held that " [s] chool
authorities have the primary responsibility for elucidating,
assessing. and solving these problems ... .'' 349 U. S., at 299.
(Emphasis supplied.) If, however, "school authorities fail in
their affirmative obligations ... judicial authority may be
invoked." Swa·nn, supra, at 15. Once invoked, "the scope of
a district court's equitable powers to remedy past wrongs is
broad. for breadth and flexibility are inherent in equitable
rf'J'nedies. '' Ibid.
B

Ill challenging the order before us, petitioners do not specifically question that the District Court's mandated programs
are designed, as nearly as practicable, to restore the schoolchildren of Detroit to the position they would have enjoyed
absent constitutional violations by state and local officials.
And, petitioners do not contend, nor could they, that the
prerogatives of the Detroit School Board ha.ve been abrogated
by the decree, since of course the Detroit School Board itself
proposed incorporation of these programs in the first place.
Petitioners' sole contention is that, under Swann, the
District Court's ord0r exceeds the scope of the constitutional violation. Invoking our holding in Milliken I, supra,
petitioners claim that, since the constitutional violation found
to bnrd('ll~om r dTrct;; rrsulting from a decree that could "either risk
thP health of the children or significantly impinge on the educational
proceHH... 8wann , suwa. at 30-31. Our function, as stated by MR.
Jr:-;'I'ICE vVH T'l'E , i~ ·•to dr~eg regate an educational system in which the
races havr !wen kept apart without, at the sa,me time, losing sight of
til<• crntral educational fun('(ion of the schools ' ' Milliken I, supra, at
;ti I (di~.-TJJ I ing opmion) . (Fmph:-t~is in original.) In a word, "There
·1r<' undoubt<·d prart irn l a~ well as legal limits to the remedial powers
<lf fc>drr:ll ro urt~ in ~rhool de~eg regation cases." Id., at 763. Cf. Austin
Independent Schoof Dist . v. United States, U. S. (1976)
, l'n~n:1.1 .. .I C'OIH'!l!Ting)

I

..
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by the District Court was the unlawful segregation of students
on the basis of race. the court's decree must be limited to
remedying unlawful pupil assignments. This contention
misconceives the principle petitioners seek to invoke, and we
reject their argument.
The well-settled principle that the nature and scope of
the remedy is to be determined by the violation means simply
that federal court decrees must directly address and relate to
the constitutional violation itself. Because of this inherent
limitation upon federal judicial authority, federal court
decrees exceed appropriate limits if they are aimed at eliminating a condition that does not violate the Constitution or
does not flow from such a violation, see Pasadena City Board
of Educat·ion v. Spangler, supra, or if they are imposed upon
governmental units that were neither involved in nor affected
by the constitutional violation, as in Milliken I, supra. Hills
\'. Gautreaux, 425 U. S. 284, 292-296 (1976). But where, as
here, a constitutional violation has been found, the remedy
does not "exceed" the violation, if the remedy is tailored to
cure the "condition that offends the Constitution." Milliken I,
supra, at 738. (Emphasis supplied.)
The "condition" offending the Constitution is Detroit's de
i'u.re segregate-d school system. This condition, which the
District Court was obliged to correct, is not, under our hold- f
ings, necessarily or invariably cured completely by simply
establishing schools on a nonracial basis, although that is the
key step in the remedial process. Our cases recognize that the
evil is, more broadly, a dual school system with all its attending \
mequities. A unanimous Court speaking through Chief Justice
Warren held in Bratvn I: "Separate educational facilities are
inherently unequal." Brow·n v. Board of Education, 347 U.S.
483, 495 (1954). And in United States v. Montgomery
County Board of Educatiun, 395 U. S. 225 (1969), the Court
concerned itself not with pupil assignment, but with the
riesegregation of faculty and staff. In doing so, the Court,

I
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there speaking through Mr. Justice Black, focused on the
reason for judicial concerns going beyond pupil assignment:
"The dispute ... deals with faculty and staff desegregation, a
goal that we have recognized to be an important aspect of
the basic task of achieving a public school system wholly free
from racial discrimination." 395 U . S., at 231-232. (EmphaSIS supplied.)
Montgomery County therefore stands firmly for the proposition that matters other than pupil assignment must on occasion be addressed by federal courts to eliminate the effects of
prior segregation. Similarly, in Swann, we reaffirmed the
principle laid down in Green v. County School Board, supra,
that "existing policy and practice with respect to faculty,
taff, transportation, extracurricular activities, and facilities
were among the most important indicia of a segregated system." 402 U. S., at 18. In a word, discriminatory student
assignment policies can themselves breed and manifest other
inequalities built into a dual system founded on racial discrimination. Federal courts need not, and cannot, close their
eyes to inequalities, shown by the record, which flow from a
longstanding segregated system.

c
In light of the mandate of Brown I and Brown II, federal
courts have, over the years, often required the inclusion of
remedial programs in desegregation plans to overcome the
inequalities inherent in dual school systems. In 1966, for
example, the District Court for the District of South Carolina
directed the inclusion of remedial courses to overcome the
effects of a segregated system :
"Because the weaknC'sses of a dual school system may
have already affected many children, the court would be
remiss in its rluty if any desegregation plan were approved
which did not provide for remedial education courses.
They shall be included in the plan " Miller v. School
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District Number 2, Clarendon, S. C., 256 F. Supp. 370,
377 (D. S.C. 1966). (Emphasis supplied.)

In 1967, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, then engaged in
overseeing the desegregation of numerous school districts in
the South, laid down the following requirement in an en bane
decision:
"The defendants shall provide remedial education programs which permit students attending or who have
previously attended segregated schools to overcome past
inadequacies in their education." United States v. Jefferson County Board of Education, 380 F. 2d 385, 394
(CA5), cert. denied, 389 U. S. 840 (1967). (Emphasis
supplied.)
• ee also Stell v. Board of Public Education for City of Savannah, 387 F. 2d 486, 492, 496-497 (CA5 1967); Hill v.
LaFourche Parish School Board, 291 . F. Supp. 819, 823 (ED
Ln. H)67); Redman v. Terrebone Parish School Board, 293 F.
Supp. 376, 379 (ED La. 1967); Lee v. Macon County Board
nf Education, 267 F. Supp. 458, 489 (MD Ala. 1967); Graves
v. Walton County Board of Education, 300 F. Supp. 188, 200
(MD Ga. 1968), aff'd, 410 F. 2d 1153 (CA5 1969). Two years
Iuter. the Fifth Circuit again adhered to the rule that District
C'ourts could properly seek to overcome the built-in ina.deq uneies of a past segregated educational system:
"The trial court concluded that the school board must
establish remedial programs to assist students who previously attended all-Negro schools when those students
transfer to formerly all-white schools . . . . The remedial
j)rograms . . . are an integral part of a program for
CO?npensatory education to be provided Negro students
who have long been disadvantaged by the inequities and
discrimination inhere11t in the dua.l system. The requirement that the School Board institute remedial programs
so far as they are feasible is a proper exercise of the
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court's discretion." Plaquemines Parish School Bd. v.
United States, 415 F. 2d 817, 831 (CA5 1969). (Emphasis supplied.)
In the same year the United States District Court for the
Rastern District of Louisiana required school authorities to
eome forward with a remedial educational program as
part of a desegregation plan. "The defendants shall provide
!"('medial education programs which permit students ... who
have previously attended a.ll-Negro schools to overcome past
inadequacies in their education." Smith v. St. Tammany
1-'arish School Board, 302 F. Supp. 106, 110 (ED La. 1969),
aff'd. 448 F. 2d 415 (CA5 1971). See also Moore v. Tangipahoa Parish School Boa.rd, 304 F. Supp. 244, 253 (ED La.
1969); Moses v. Washington Parish School Board, 302 F.
:-lupp. 362, 367 (ED La. 1969).
In the 1970's, the pattern has been essentially the same.
The Fifth Circuit has, when the fact situation warranted,
continued to call for remedial education programs in desegregation plans. E. g., United States v. State of Texas, 447 F. 2d
441, 443 ( CA5 1971), application for stay denied, 404 U. S.
1205 ( 1971) (Black, J .. sitting as Circuit Justice). To that
l'ml. the approved plan in United States v. Texas required:
"[Cl urriculum offerings and programs shall include
specific educational programs designed to compensate
minority group children for unequal educational opportunities resulting from past or present racial and ethnic
isolation . . . . " I d., at 448. 16
. ee also George v. O'Kelly, 448 F. 2d 145, 150 (CA5 1971).
tn In denying the :;lay application, Mr. Justice Black was untroubled
by the underlying order of the District Court:
"It would be very difficult for me to suspend the order of the District
Conrt that, in m)· view, does no more than endeavor to realize the
directive of the Fourteen1h Amendment and the decisions of this Court
that rncial di:;crimination in the public schools must be eliminated root
;tnd branch." 404 U . S., at 120(i.

·.
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And, as school desegregation litigatiOu emerged in other
regions of the country, federal courts have likewise looked in
part to remedial programs, when the record supported
an order to that effect. See, e. g., Morgan v. Kerrigan, 401
F. Supp. 216, 235 (Mass. 1975), aff'd, 530 F. 2d 401 (CAl
1976), cert. denied,- U.S.- (1976); Hart v. Community
School Board of Brooklyn, 383 F. Supp. 699, 757 (EDNY
1974), aff'd, 512 F. 2d 37 (CA2 1975); cf. Booker v. Special
School Dist. Nurnbe1· 1, Minneapolis, Minn., 351 F. Supp. 799
(Minn. 1972). 17
Finally, in addition to other remedial programs, which
could, if circumstances warranted, include programs to
rrmedy deficiencies particularly in reading and communication skills, federal courts have expressly ordered special
m-service training for teachers, see, e. g., United States v.
tate of Missouri, 523 F. 2d 885, 887 (CA8 1975); Smith v.
&t. Tamn1-any Parish School Board, supra, at 110; Moore v.
'fanigpahoa Parish School Board, supra, at 253, and have
altered or even suspended testing programs employed by
school systems undergoing desegregation. See, e. g., Singleton v. Jackson Municipal Separate School District, 419 F. 2d
1211, 1219 (CA5 1969), cert. denied, 396 U. S. 1032 (1970);
lJemon v. Bossier Parish School Board, 444 F. 2d 1400, 1401
(CA5 1971); Arvizu v. Waco Independent School Dist., 373
F. Supp. 1264 (WD Tex. 1973), rev'd in part on other issues,
495 F. 2d 499 (C'A5 1974) .
These cases demonstrate that the District Court in the case
before us did not break new ground in approving the School
Board's proposed plan. Quite the contrary, acting on abunWr do not, oi' cour::;e, pa:<s upon the corrrctness of the particular
of cn~e::; we did not rrvirw. We ·imply note that these holdings
-<npport. i he IJroadN proposition that , when the record warrants, remedial
pro~l':lm!:i ma~ · hr, in t.hr rxNriHr of equitable discretion, appropriate
n ·mPdir::; to t rrat I he ronrlition that offrnds the Constitution. Of course,
11 mu~t br ~hown that thr cou~titutional violation caused the condition
lor whi ch rrmrdinl programs nrr mandatrd ,
H
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dant evidence in this record, the District Court approved a
remedial plan going beyond mere pupil assignments, as
expressly approved by Swann and Montgomery County, supra.
In so doing, the District Court was adopting specific programs
proposed by local school authorities, who must be pres~ to \lm -t.
be familiar with the problems and the needs of a system
undergoing desegregation. 18
We do not, of course, imply that the order here is a blueprint for other cases. That cannot be; in school desegregation cases, "[t]here is no universal answer to complex
problems . . . ; there is obviously no plan that will do the
job in every case." Green, supra, at 439. Nevertheless, on
this record, we are bound to conclude that the degree before us
was apt1y tailored to remedy the consequences of the constitu- \
tional violation. Nor do we find any othet reason to believe
that the broad and flexible equity powets of the court were
abused in this case. The established role of local school
authorities was maintained inviolate, and the remedy is indeed
remedial. The order does not punish anyone, nor does it
impair or jeopardize the educational system in Dettoit. 19 The
District Court, in short, was true to the principles laid down
in Brown II:
"In fashioning a.nd effectuating the decrees, the courts
will be guided by equitable principles. Traditionally,
'" Thts Court hm; from the beginning looked to the District Courts
in de~rgregation cases, familiar as they are with the local situations
('Oming brfore them, to appraise the efforts of local school authorities
to eaJT~· out their constitutionally required duties. "Because of their
proximity to local conditions . . . the [federal district] courts which
original!~· heard these cases can best perform this judicial appraisal."
Hrowu ll , supra, at 299.
111 Indeed, the District Jud~e took great pains to devise a workable
plan. For example, he l'iought ('arefully to eliminate burdensome transportal ton of Negro children to predominantly Negro schools and to
Jlrevent the disruption, by massive pupil reasHignment, of racially mixed
-r·hooJs in ~tn ble neighborhoodH which had successfully undergone restrkntial and edurattonal rbange

J
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equity has been characterized by a practical flexibility in
shaping its remedies and by a facility for adjusting and
reconciling public and private needs. These cases call
for the exercise of these traditional attributes of equity
power." 349 U. S., at 300.

III
Petitioners also contend that the District Court's order,
even if otherwise proper, violates the Eleventh Amendment.
1n their view, the requirement that the state defendants pay
one-half the additional costs attributable to the four educational components is, "in practical effect, indistinguishable
from an award of money damages against the state based upon
the asserted prior misconduct of state officials." Brief, at 34.
Arguing from this premise, petitioners conclude that the
·'award" in this case is barred under this Court's holding in
Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974).
Edelman involved a suit for money damages against the
'tate, as well as for prospective injunctive relie£.2° The suit
was brought by an individual who claimed that Illinois officials
had improperly withheld disability benefit payments to him
and to the members of his class. Applying traditional
fi;levcnth Amendment principles, we held that the suit was
barred to the extent the suit sought "the award of an accrued
monetary liability . . . " which represented "retroactive payments." ld., a.t 663- 664. (Emphasis supplied.) Conversely,
the C'ourt held that the suit was proper to the extent it sought
11
paymeut of state funds ... as a necessary consequence of
compliance in the future with a substantive federal-question
cl0tcrmination . . . . " ld., at 668. (Emphasis supplied.)
The decree to share the future costs of educational comAl1 hough 11H' complaint 111 Edelman o~:;trm;ibly ~:;o ught only equitable
rPiirf, thC' plaintiff C'XJH'C'si:il~· rPque~:;ted "'a permanent injunction enjoining
lhr ddenclan1~ to award to thr rntire cia ~" of plaintiffs all [disability]
hr n Pfit ~ wrongfull y wit hhf'ld '" 415 U. S ., at 656
20
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ponents in this case fits squarely within the prospective·
compliance exception rea.ffirmed by Edelman. That exception, which had its genesis in Ex pa.rte Young, 209 U. S. 123
(1908), permits federal courts to enjoin state officials to conform their conduct to requirements of federal law, notwithstanding a direct and substantial impact on the state treasury.
4:15 U. S., at 15. The order challenged here does no more
than that. The decree requires state officials, held responsibl(' for unconstitutional conduct, in findings which are not
challenged, to eliminate a de jure segregated school system.
:VIore precisely. the burden of state officials is that set forth
in Swarm-to take the necessary steps "to eliminate from the
public schools all vestiges of state-imposed segregation." 402
r. S., at 15. The educational components, which the District
C'ourt ordered into effect prospectively, are plainly designed to
w1pr out continuing conditions of inequality produced by the
tnherently unequal dual school system long maintained by
Drtroit. 21
These programs were not, and as a practical matter could
not he, intended to wipe the slate clean by one bold stroke,
as could a retroactive award of money in Edelman. 22 Rather,
by the nature of the antecedent violation, which on this record
caused sig11ificant deficiencies in communications skillsreading and speaking-the victims of Detroit's de jure segregated system will continue to experience the effects of segrega"' Unlikr the award in Edelman, the injunction entered here could not
in;;tanlnneou;;ly re~torr the victims of unlawful conduct to their rightful
rondition. Thu~ , tllC' mjunction here looks to the future, not simply
1o prr~r nt I~ · comprnsating victims for conduct and consequences compkt<'d in th<' pa~t .
22 In contra,;t to Edelman, there was no money award here in favor
of l'<'Hpondent Bradley or any mrmbers of his class. Thi~ case ~imply
do<";; not involvr individual citiz('n::;' conducting a raid on the state
1 rra~ur~· for :wcru<"d mon<"tary liability.
It is wholly prospective in the
o;:trn<" mamwr that the decree mandate:; vocational schools and assignllli.!lllt>, for rxample.

..
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tion until such future time as the remedial programs can help
dissipate the continuing effects of past misconduct. Reading and speech deficiencies cannot be eliminated by judicial
fia.t; they will require time, patience, and the skills of specially
trained teachers. That the programs are also "compensatory"
in nature does not change the fact that they are part of a
plan that operates prospectively to bring about the delayed
benefits of a unitary school system. We therefore hold that f
. uch prospective relief is not barred by the Eleventh
.t\mendment. 2 3
Finally, there is no merit to petitioners' claims that the
relief ordered here violates the Tenth Amendment and general principles of federalism. The Tenth Amendment's reservation of nond0legated powers to the States is not implicated
by a federal court judgment enforcing the express prohibitions
of unlawful state conduct enacted by the Fourteenth Amendment. Cf. Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U. S. 445 (1976). Nor
are principles of federalism abrogated by the decree. The
District Court has neither attempted to restructure local gov<'rnmental entities, nor to mandate a particular method or \
structure of state or local financing. Cf. San Antonio Inde/) endent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U. S. 1 (1973). The
District C'ourt has, rather, properly enforced the guarantees
of the Fourteenth Amendment consistent with our prior holdlllgs. aud in a manner that does not jeopardize the integrity
of tlw structure or functions of state and local government.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is therefore affirmed.
Affirmed.
"" H<·enu:s<· of our conrhtHion , we do not reach either of the two
altrrn<~tii'C•

arg;umrnts in support of the Di·trict Court's judgment, namely
the Statr of Mirhigau rxpre~Kiy waived its Eleventh Amendment
nnmnnit~· b~· virtur of Mirh. Stat. Annot. § 15.1023 (7), and that the
Fourtrenth Amenrlnwnt, ex pmpio vigore, works a pro tanto repeal of
the· Elrvrnth Amendment. Cf. Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U. S. 445
( 107G) . Nc•ith rr qurRtion was addressed by the Court of Appeals, and
\\'(• t h1·rPfon• <lo no I pa~~ on Pitlwr i ~~ n c.
t hn t
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announced the opinion of the

Court.
We ~ranted certiorari in this case to consider two questions
concerning the remedial powers of federal district courts in
school desegregation cases, namely, whether a District Court
cttn, as part of a desegregation decree, order compensatory or
remedial educational programs for schoolchildren who have
been subjected to past acts of de jure segregation, and
whether, consistent with the Eleventh Amendment, a federal
court can require state officials found responsible for constitutional violations to bear part of the costs of those programs.
I
This case is before the Court for the second time following
our remand, Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U. S. 717 (1974)
(Milliken I); it marks the culmination of seven years of
litigation over de jure school segregation in the Detroit Public
School System. For almost six years, the litigation has
focused exclusively on the appropriate remedy to correct official acts of racial discrimination committed by both the
Detroit School Board and the State of Michigan. No chal-
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lenge is now made by the State or the local .school. board to,
the prior findings of de jure segr~gation. 1

A
In the first stage of the remedy proceedings, which we r~.
viewed in Milliken I, supra, the District Court, after reviewing
several "Detroit-only" desegregation plans, concluded that
an interdistrict plan was required to "'achieve the greatest
degree of actual desegregation ... [so that} no school, grade
or classroom [would be] substantially disproportionate to the
overall pupil racial composition.'" 345 F. Supp. 914, 918 (ED
Mich. 1972), quoted in Milliken I, supra, at 734. On those
premises, the District Court ordered the parties to submit
pla.ns for "metropolitan desegregation" and appointed a ninemember panel to formulate a desegregation plan, which would
encompass a "desegregation area" consisting of 54 school
districts.
In June 1973, a divided Court of Appeals, sitting en bane,
upheld the District Court's determination that a metropolitanwide plan was essential to bring about what the District Court
had described as "the greatest degree of actual desegregation .... " 345 F. Supp., at 918. We reversed, holding that
1 The violations of the Detroit Board of Education, which included
the improper use of optional attendance zones, racially based transportation of schfolchildren, improper creation and alteration of attendance
zones, grad structures, and feeder school patterns, are described in
the District Court's initial "Ruling on Issue of Segregation." 338 F.
Supp. 582, ~87-588 (ED Mich. 1971). The District Court further found
that "[t]he State and its agencies . . . have acted directly to control
and maintain the pattern of segregation in the Detroit schools." ld.,
at 589. ImJeed, the court expressly found: "When the Detroit school
board attem,Pted to voluntarily initiate an intra-district remedy to ameliorate the effect of the past segregation practices, the Michigan legislature
enacted a law forbidding the carrying out of this remedy." Ibid. Those
conclusion~ n~ to liability were affirmed on appeal, 484 F. 2d 215, 221~
241 (CA6 1973), and were not challenged in this Court. 418 U. S, 717
(1974) (Milliken l).

l
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the order exceeded appropriate limits of federal equitable authority as defined in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board
of Educ., 402 U. S. 1, 24 (1971), by concluding that "as a
matter of substantive constitutional right, [a] particular
degree of racial balance" is required, and by subjecting other
school districts, uninvolved with and unaffected by any constitutional violations, to the court's remedial powers. 418
U. S. 717 (1974). Proceeding from the Swann standard
"that the scope of the remedy is determined by the
nature and extent of the constitutional violation," we held
that, on the record before us, there was no interdistrict violation calling for an interdistrict remedy. Because the District
Court's "metropolitan remedy" went beyond the constitutional
violation, we remanded the case for further proceedings "leading to prompt formulation of a decree directed to eliminating
the segregation found to exist in the Detroit city schools, a
remedy which has been delayed since 1970." Id., at 753. 2

B
Due to the intervening death of Judge Stephen J. Roth,
who had presided over the litigation from the outset, the case on
remand was reassigned to Judge Robert E. DeMascio. Judge
DeMascio promptly ordered respondent Bradley and the
Detroit Board to submit desegregation plans limited to the
Detroit school system. On April 1, 1975, both parties submitted their proposed plans. Respondent Bradley's plan was
2 Separate opinions were filed in Milliken I .
MR. JusTICE STEWART,
concurring, stated that the metropolitan-wide remedy contemplated
by the District Court was "in error for the simple reason that the
remedy . . . was not commensurate with the constitutional violation
found." Jd ., at 754. Dissenting opinions were filed by Mr. Justice
Douglas, MR. Jus·ricE WHITE, and MR. JusTICE MARSHALL. The dissenting opinions took the position, in brief, that the remedy was appropriate, given the State's undisputed constitutional violations, the control
of local education by state authorities, and the manageability of any
necessary a1ministrative modifications to effectuate a metropolitan-wide
remedy.
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limited solely to pupil reassignment; the proposal called for
extensive transportation of students to achieve the plan's
ultimate goal of assuring that every school within the district
reflected, within 15 percentage points, the racial ratio of the
school district as a whole. 3 In contrast to respondent Bradley's proposal, the Detroit Board's plan provided for sufficient
pupil reassignment to eliminate "racially identifiable white
schools," while ensuring that "every child will spend at least a
portion of his education in either a neighborhood elementary
school or a neighborhood junior and senior high school." Id.,
at 1116. By eschewing racial ratios for each school, the
Board's plan contemplated transportation of fewer students
for shorter distances than respondent Bradley's proposaP
In addition to student reassignments, the Board's plan
called for implementation of 13 remedial or compensatory
programs, referred to in the record as "educational components." These compensatory programs, which were proposed
in addition to the plan's provisions for magnet schools and
vocational high schools, included three of the four components
at issue in this case-in-service training for teachers and
8 According to the then most recent statistical data, as of September 27,
1974, 257 ,396 students were enrolled in the Detroit public schools, a
figure which reflected a decrease of 28,116 students in the system since
t he 1960-1961 school year. 402 F . Supp. 1096, 1106-1107. Of this total
student population, 71.5% were Negro and 26.4% were white. The remaining 2.1 % was comprised of students of other ethnic groups. !d.,
at 1106.

4

Under respondent Bradley's proposed plan in the remand proceedings,

71 ,349 students would have required transportation; the Detroit Board's
plan, however, provided for transportation of 51 ,000 students, 20,000 less

than the Bradley plan. The Board's plan, which the District Court found
infirm because of an impermissible use of "arbitrary" racial quotas, contemplated achieving a 40%-60% representation of Negro students in the
Identifiably white schools, while leaving untouched in terms of pupil re..
assignment schoob in three of the Detroit system's eight regions. Those
t hree regions, whi ch were located in the cent ral oity, were overwhelmingly
Negro in racial composition.

,,
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administrators, guidance and counseling programs, and revised testing procedures. 5 Pursuant to the District Court's
direction, the State Department of Education 6 on April 21,
1975, submitted a critique of the Detroit Board's desegregation
plan; in its report, the Department opined that, although
"[i] t is possible that none of the thirteen 'quality education'
components is essential ... to correct the constitutional violation . . . .", eight of the 13 proposed programs nonetheless
deserved special consideration in the desegregation setting.
Of particular relevance here, the State Board said:
"Within the context of effectuating a pupil desegregation plan, the in-service training [and] guidance and
counseling ... components appear to deserve special
emphasis." !d., at 38--39. 7
After receiving the State Board's critique, 8 the District
5 The fourth component, a remedial reading and communciations skills
program, was proposed later and was endorsed by the Bradley respondents
in a critique of the Detroit Board's proposed plan. See n. 7, infra.
The Board's plan also called for the following "educational components":
school-community relations, parental involvement, student rights and
responsibilities, accountability, curriculum design, bilingual education,
multiethnic curriculum, and cocurricular activities. 402 F. Supp., at

1118.

In addition to the State Board of Education, the state defendants
include the Governor of Michigan, the Attorney General, the State Superintendent of Public Instruction, and the State Treasurer.
7 Two months later, the Bradley respondents also submitted a critique
of the Board's plan; while criticizing the Board's proposed educational
components on several grounds, respondents nonetheless suggested that
a remedial reading program was particularly needed in a desegregation
plan. See n. 5, supra. The Bradley respondents claimed more generally
that the Board's plan failed to inform the court of the then current extent
of such programs or components in the school system and that the
plan failed to assess "the relatedness of the particular component to
desegregation."
8 The other state defendants likewise filed objections to the Detroit
Board's plan on April 21, 1975. They contended, in brief, that the
court's remedy was limited to pupil reassignment to achieve desegregation;
6
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Court conducted extensive hearings on the two plans over a
two-month period. Substantial testimony was adduced with
respect to the proposed educational components, including
testimony by petitioners' expert witnesses. 9 Based on this
evidence and on reports of court-appointed experts, the District Court on August 11, 1975, approved, in principle, the
Detroit Board's inclusion of remedial and compensatory educational components in the desegregation plan. 10
"We find that the majority of the educational components included in the Detroit Board plan are essential
hence, the proposed inclusion of educational components was, under their
view, excessive.
9 For example, Dr. Charles P. Kearney, Associate Superintendent for
Research and School Administration for the Michigan Department of
Education, gave the following testimony:
"[T] he State Board and the Superintendent indicated that guidance
and counselling appeared to deserve special emphasis in a desegregation
effort."
"We support the notion of a guidance and counselling effort. We think
it certainly does have a relationship in the desegregation effort, we
~hink it deserves special emphasis.''
As to in-service training, Dr. Kearney testified that, in his opinion,
~:~uch a program was required to implement effectively a desegregation
plan ln Detroit. Transcript, Vol. XXX, at 179, 187. Finally, even
though the State's critique did not deem testing as deserving of "special
emphasis" in the desegregation plan, Dr. Kearney stated as follows:
"Q: . . . [D]o you see a direct relationship between testing and
desegregation?
"A: If test results were inappropriately used, . . . I think it would
have certainly a discriminatory affect [sic] and it would have a negative
affect, I'm sure on any kind of desegregation plan being implemented."
!d., at 184.
10 The District Court did not approve of all aspects of the Detroit
Board's plan. With respect to C'ducational components, the court said:
"The plan as submitted .. . does not distinguish between those components that are necessary to the successful implementation of a desegregation plan and those are not ." 402 F. Supp., at 1118, (Emphasis
supplied.}
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for a school district undergoing desegregation. While it is
true that the delivery of quality desegregated educational
services is the obligation of the school board, nevertheless
this court deems it essential to mandate educational components where they are needed to remedy effects of past
segregation, to assure a successful desegregative effort and
to minimize the possibility of resegregation." 402 F.
Supp., at 1118.
The District Court expressly found that the two components
of testing and counseling, as then administered in Detroit's
schools, were infected with the discriminatory bias of a segregated school system:
"In a segregated system many techniques deny equal
protection to black students, such as discriminatory testing [and] discriminatory counseling. . . . " Ibid.
The District Court also found that, to make desegregation
work, it was necessary to include remedial reading programs
and in-service training for teachers and administrators:
"In a system undergoing desegregation, teachers will
require orientation and training for desegregation. . ..
Additionally, we find that . . . comprehensive reading
programs are essential . .. to a successful desegregative
effort." Ibid.
Having established these general principles, the District
Court formulated several "remedial guidelines" to govern the
Detroit Board's development of a final plan. Declining "to
substitute its authority for the authority of elected state and
local officials to decide which educational components are
beneficial to the school community," id., at 1145, the District
Judge laid down the following guidelines with respect to each
of the four educational components at issue here:
(a) Reading. Concluding that "[t]here is no educational
component more directly associated with the process of desegregation than reading," id. , at 1138, the District Court directed

·.
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the General Superintendent of Detroit's schools to institute
a remedial reading and communications skills program "[t]o
eradicate the effects of past discrimination .... " Ibid. The
~ontent of the required program was not prescribed by
the court; rather, formulation and implementation of the
program was left to the Superintendent and to a committee
to be selected by him.
(b) In-Service Training, The court also directed the
Detroit Board to formulate a comprehensive in-service teacher
training program, an element "essential to a 'system under~oing desegregation." I d., at 1139. In the District Court's
view, an in-service training program for teachers and administrators, to train professional and instructional personnel to
cope with the desegregation process in Detroit, would tend to
ensure that all students in a desegregated system would be
treated equally by teachers and administrators able, by virtue
of special training, to cope with special problems presented by
desegregation, and thereby facilitate Detroit's conversion to a
unitary ~ystem.
(c) Testing. Because it found, based on record evidence,
that Negro children "are especially affected by biased testing
procedures," the District Court determined that, frequently,
minority students in Detroit were adversely affected by discriminatory testing procedures. Unless the school system's
tests were administered in a way "free from racial, ethnic or
cultural bias," the District Court concluded that Negro children in Detroit might thereafter be impeded in their educational growth. !d., at 1142. Accordingly, the court directed
the Detroit Board and the State Department of Education to
institute · a testing program along the lines proposed by the
locaJ school board in its original desegregation plan. Ibid.
( ci) Counseling and Career Guidance. Finally, the District Court addressed what expert witnesses had described as
psychological pressures on Detroit's students in a system
undergoing desegregation. Counselors were required, the
court concluded, both to deal with the numerous problems and

'.
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tensions arising in the change from Detroit's dual srstem, and,
more concretely, to counsel students concerning the new voca..
tional and technical school programs available under the plan
through the cooperation of state and local officials. 11
Nine months later, on May 11, 1976, the District Court .
entered its final order. Emphasizing that it had "been careful to order only what is essential for a school district undergoing desegregation," Appendix, at 117a, the court ordered the
Detroit Board and the state defendants to institute comprehensive programs as to the four educational components by
the start of the September 1976 school term. The cost of
these four programs, the court concluded, was to be equally
borne by the Detroit School Board and the State. To carry
out this cost-sharing, the court directed the local board to
calculate its highest budget allocation in any prior year for
the several educational programs and, from that base, any
excess cost attributable to the desegregation plan was to be
paid equally by the two groups of defendants responsible for
prior constitutional violations, i. e., the Detroit Board and the
state defendants.

c

On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
affirmed the District Court's order concerning the implementation of and cost-sharing for the four educational components.12 The Court of Appeals expressly approved the
In contrast to their position before the District Court with respect
to the four educational components at issue here, the state defendants,
through the State Department of Education, voluntarily entered into
a stipulation with the Detroit Board on February 24, 1976, under which
the State agreed to provide 50% of the construction costs of five vocational
centers which the District Court ordered to be established. Appendix,
at 141a.
12 The Court of Appeals disapproved, however, of the District Court's
failure to inch1de three of Detroit's eight regions in the pupil assignment
plan. See n. 4, supra. The Court of Appeals remanded the case to
the District Court for further consideration of the three ommitted regions,
11

!<

76-447-0PINION
10

MILLIKEN v. BRADLEY

District Court's findings as to the necessity for these com~
pensatory programs:
"This finding . . . is not clearly erroneous, but to the
contrary is supported by ample evidence.
"The need for in-service training of the educational
staff and development of non-discriminatory testing is
obvious. The former is needed to insure that the teachers and administrators will be able to work effectively in
a desegregated environment. The latter is needed to
insure that students are not evaluated unequally because
of built-in bias in the tests administered in formerly
segregated schools.
"We agree with the District Court that the reading and
counseling programs are essential to the effort to combat
the effects of segregation. . . . Without the reading and
counseling components, black students might be deprived
of the motivation and achievement levels which the
desegregation remedy is designed to accomplish." 540 F.
2d 229, 241 (CA61976).
After reviewing the record, the Court of Appeals confirmed
that the District Court relied largely on the Detroit School
Board in formulating the decree:
"This is not a situation where the District Court
'appears to have acted solely according to its own notions
of good educational policy unrelated to the demands of
the Constitution.'" ld., at 241-242, quoting Keyes v.
School District, 521 F. 2d 465, 483 (CAlO 1975), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 1066 (1976).
After upholding the remedial-components portion of the
but declined to set forth guidelines, given the practicabilities of the
situation, for the District Court's benefit. Further proceedings were
deemed appropriate, however, particularly since the Bradley respondents
had previously been granted le:tve to file a second amended complaint to
allege interdistrict violations on the part of the state and local defendants.

'.

.'
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plan, the Court of Appeals went on to affirm the District
Court's allocation of costs between the state and local officials.
Analyzing this Court's decision in Edelman v. Jordan, 415
U. S. 651 (1974), which reaffirmed the rule that the Eleventh
Amendment bars an ordinary suit for money da:mages against
the State without its consent, the Court of Appeals held that
the District Court's order
" ... imposes no money judgment on the State of
Michigan for past de jure segregation practices. Rather,
the order is directed toward the State defendants as a
part of a prospective plan to comply with a constitutional
requirement to eradicate all vestiges of de jure segregation." 540 F. 2d, at 245. (Emphasis supplied.)

'

I

The Court of Appeals remanded the case for further consideration of the three central city regions untouched by the
District Court's pupil reassignment plan. See n. 12, supra.
The state defendants then sought review in this Court,
challenging only those portions of the District Court's comprehensive remedial order dealing with the four educational
components and with the State's obligation to defray the costs
of those programs. We granted certiorari, 429 U. S. ( 1976), and we affirm.
II
This Court has not previously addressed directly the question whether federal courts can order remedial education progra:ms as part of a school desegregation decree. 13 However,
In Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U. S.
1 (1971), the Court affirmed an order of the District Court which
included a requirement of in-:service training programs. 318 F. Supp.
786, 803 (WDNC 1970). However, this Court's opinion did not treat the
precise point. In Keyes v. School District No. 1, Denver, Colorado,
413 U. S. 189 (1973), the Court expressly avoided passing on the
District Court's holding that called for, among other things, "compensatory education in an integrated environment." /d., at 214 n. 18.
18

•'
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the general principles governing our resolution of this issue
are well settled by the prior decisions of this Court. In the
first case concerning federal courts' remedial powers in eliminating de jure school segregation, the Court laid down the
basic rule which governs to this day: "In fashioning and
effectuating the [desegregation] decrees, the courts will be
guided by equitable principles." Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U. S. 294, 300 (1955) (Brown II).
A
Application of those "equitable principles," we have held,
requires federal courts to focus upon three factors. In the
first place, like other equitable remedies, the nature of the
desegregation remedy is to be determined by the nature and
scope of the constitutional violation. Swann v. CharlotteMecklenburg Board of Education, supra, at 16. The remedy
must therefore be related to "the condition alleged to offend
the Constitution . . . . " Milliken I, supra, at 738. 14 Second,
the de-cree must indeed be remedial in nature, that is, it
must be designed as nearly as possible "to restore
the victims of discriminatory conduct to the position they
would have occupied in the absence of such conduct." !d., at
746. 15 Third, the federal courts in devising a remedy must
14
Thus, the Court has consistently held that the Constitution is not
violated by racial imbalance in the schools, without more. Pasadena City
Board of Educ. v. Spangler, 427 U. S. 424, 434 (1976); Milliken I,
su]Jra, at 763 (WHrrE, J., dissenting); Swann, supra, at 26. An order
contemplating the "'substantive right [to a] particular degree of racial
balance or mixing'" is therefore infirm as a matter of law. Spangler
supra, at 434.
15 Since t.he ultimate objective of the remedy is to make whole the
victims of unlawful conduct, federal courts are authorized to implement
plans that promise "rralistically to work now." Green v.
County School Board of New Kent County, 391 U. S. 430,
139 (1968). At the samE' time, the Court has carefully stated
that, to ensure that federal court decrees are characterized by the flexibility
and sensitivity required of equitable decrees, con&ideration must be given

•'
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take into account the interests of state and local authorities
in managing their own affairs, consistent with the Constitution. In Brown II the Court squarely held that "[s]chool
authorities have the primary responsibility for elucidating,
assessing, and solving these problems.... " 349 U. S., at 299.
(Emphasis supplied.) If, however, "school authorities fail in
their affirmative obligations ... judicial authority may be
invoked." Swann, supra, at 15. Once invoked, "the scope of
a district court's equitable powers to remedy past wrongs is
broad, for breadth and flexibility are inherent in equitable
remedies." Ibid.
B
In challenging the order before us, petitioners do not specifically question that the District Court's mandated programs
are designed, as nearly as practicable, to restore the schoolchildren of Detroit to the position they would have enjoyed
absent constitutiona-l violations by state and local officials.
And, petitioners do not contend, nor could they, that the
prerogatives of the Detroit School Board have been abrogated
by the decree, since of course the Detroit School Board itself
proposed incorporation of these programs in the first place.
Petitioners' sole contention is that, under Swann, the
District Court's order exceeds the scope of the constitutional violation. Invoking our holding in Milliken I, supra,
petitioners claim that, since the constitutional violation found
to burdensome effects resulting from a decree that could "either risk
the health of the children or significantly impinge on the educational
process." Swann, supra, at 30-31. Our function, as stated by Mn.
JusTICE WHITE, is "to desegregate an educational system in which the
races have been kept apart without, at the same time, losing sight of
the central educational function of the schools." Milliken I, supra, at
764 (dissenting opinion) . (Emph~sis in original.) In a word, "There
are undoubted practical as well as legal limits to the remedial powers
of federal courts in school desegregation cases." /d., at 763. Cf. Austin
Independent School Dist. v. United States, U . S. (1976.)
('PoWELL, J ., concurring).
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by the District Court was the unlawful segregation of students
en the basis of race, the court's decree must be limited to
Pemedying unlawful pupil assignments. This contention
misconceives the principle petitioners seek to invoke, and we
reject their argument.
The well-settled principle that the nature and scope of
the remedy is to be determined by the violation means simply
that federal court decrees must directly address and relate to
the constitutional violation itself. Because of this inherent
limitation upon federal judicial authority, federal court
decrees exceed appropriate limits if they are aimed at eliminating a condition that does not violate the Constitution or
does not flow from such a violation , see Pasadena City Board
of Education v. Spangler, supra, or if they are imposed upon
governmental units that were neither involved in nor affected
by the constitutional violation, as in Milliken I, supra. Hills
v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284, 292-296 (1976). But where, as
here, a constitutional violation has been found, the remedy
does not "exceed" the violation, if the remedy is tailored to
cure the "condition that offends the Constitution." Milliken I,
supra, at 738. (Emphasis supplied.)
The "condition" offending the Constitution is Detroit's de
jure segregated school system, which was so peiTVasively and
persistently segregated that the District Court found that the
need for the educational components flowed directly from
constitutional violations by bath state and local officials.
These specific educational remedies, although normally left
to the discretion of the elected school board and professional
educators, were deemed necessary to restore the victims of
discriminatory conduct to the position they would have en.
joyed in terms of education had these four components been
provided in a nondiscriminatory manner in a school system
f ee from pervasive de jure racial segre ation
n e rs case mvalidating a e JUre system, a unanimous
Court, SJ?eaking through Chief Ju~tice Warren, held in Brown

------.::...--
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I: "Separate educational facilities are inherently unequal."
Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U. S. 483, 495 ( 1954).
And in United States v. Montgomery County Board of
Education, 395 U. S. 225 (1969), the Court concerned itself
not with pupil assignment, but with the desegregation of
faculty and staff as part of the process of dismantling a dual
system. In doing so, the Court, there speaking through Mr.
Justice Black, focused on the reason for judicial concerns
going beyond pupil assignment : "The dispute ... deals with
faculty and staff desegregation , a goal that we have recognized
to be an important aspect of the basic task of achieving a
public school system wholly free from racial discrimination."
395 U. S., at 231-232. (Emphasis supplied.)
Montgomery County therefore stands firmly for the proposition that matters other than pupil assignment must on occasion be addressed by federal courts to eliminate the effects of
prior segregation. Similarly, in Swann we reaffirmed the
principle laid down in Green v. County School Board, supra,
that "existing policy and practice with respect to faculty,
staff, transportation, extracurricular activities, and facilities
were among the most important indicia of a segregated system." 402 U. S., at 18. In a word, discriminatory student
assignment policies can themselves breed and manifest other
inequalities built into a dual system founded on racial discrimination. Federal courts need not, and cannot, close their
eyes to inequalities, shown by the record, which flow from a
longstanding segregated system.

c
In light of the mandate of Brown I and Brown II, federal
courts have, over the years, often required the inclusion of
remedial programs in desegregation plans to overcome the
inequalities inherent in dual school systems. In 1966, for
example, the District Court for the District of South Carolina

•
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directed the inclusion of remedial courses to overcome the
effects of a segregated sysU:m: .
"Because the weaknesses of a dual school system may
have already affected many children, the court would be
remiss in its duty if any desegregation plan were approved
which did not provide for remedial education courses.
They shall be included in the plan." Miller v. School
District Number 2, Clarendon, S. C., 256 F. Supp. 370,
377 (D. S.C. 1966). (Emphasis supplied.)
In 1967, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appea.ls, then engaged in
overseeing the desegregation of numerous school districts in
the South, laid do~n. the following requirement in an en bane
decision:
"The defendants shall provide remedia.l education programs which permit students attending or who have
previously attended segregated schools to overcome past
inadequacies in their education." United States v. Jefferson County Board of Education, 380 F. 2d 385, 394
(CA5), cert. denied, 389 U. S. 840 (1967). (Emphasis
supplied.)
See also Stell v. Board of Public Education for City of Savannah, 387 F. 2d 486, 492, 496-497 (CA5 1967); Hill v.
LaFourche Parish School Board, 291 F. Supp. 819, 823 (ED
La. 1967); Redman v. Terrebone Parish School Board, 293 F.
Supp. 376, 379 (ED La. 1967); Lee v. Macon County Board
of Education, 267 F. Supp. 458, 489 (MD Ala. 1967); Graves
v. Walton County Board of Education, 300 F. Supp. 188, 200
(MD Ga. 1968), aff'd, 410 F. 2d 1153 (CAS 1969). Two years
later, the Fifth Circuit again adhered to the rule that District
Courts could properly seek to overcome the built-in inadequacies of segregated educational system:
"The trial court concluded that the school board must
establish remedial programs to assist students who previ-
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ously attended all-Negro schools when those students
transfer to formerly all-white schools . . . . The remedial
programs . . . are an integral part of a program for
compensatory education to be provided Negro students
who have long been disadvantaged by the inequities and
discrimination inherent in the dual system. The requirement that the School Board institute remedial programs
so far as they are feasible is a proper exercise of the
court's discretion." Plaquemines Parish School Bd. v.
United States, 415 F. 2d 817, 831 (CA5 1969). (Empha~
sis supplied.)
In the same year the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Louisiana required school authorities to
come forward with a remedial educational program as
part of a desegregation plan. "The defendants shall provide
remedial education programs which permit students . . . who
have previously attended all-Negro schools to overcome past
inadequacies in their education." Smith v. St. Tammany
Parish School Board, 302 F. Supp. 106, 110 (ED La. 1969),
aff'd, 448 F. 2d 415 (CA5 1971). See also Moore v. Tan(Ji~
pahoa Parish School Board, 304 F. Supp. 244, 253 (ED La.
1969); Moses v. Washin(fton Parish School Board, 302 F.
Supp. 362, 367 (ED La. 1969).
In the 1970's, the pattern has been essentially the same.
The Fifth Circuit has, when the fact situation warranted,
continued to call for remedial education programs in desegregation plans. E. (f., United States v. State of Texas, 447 F. 2d
441, 443 (CA5 1971) , application for stay denied, 404 U. S.
1205 (1971) (Black, J. , sitting as Circuit Justice). To that
end, the approved plan in United States v. Texas required:
"[C]urriculum offerings and programs shall include
specific educational programs designed to compensate
minority group children for unequal educational oppor-
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tunities resulting from past or present racial and ethnic
isolation . . . ." I d., at 448.Hl
See also George v. O'Kelly, 448 F. 2d 145, 150 (CA5 1971).
And, as school desegregation litigation emerged in other
regions of the country, federal courts have likewise looked in
p,a rt to remedial programs, when the record supported
an order to that effect. See, e. g., Morgan v. Kerrigan, 401
F. Supp. 216, 235 (Mass. 1975), aff'd, 530 F. 2d 401 (CAl
1976), cert. denied,- U.S.- (1976); Hart v. Community
School Board of Brooklyn, 383 F. Supp. 699, 757 (EDNY
1974), aff'd, 512 F. 2d 37 (CA2 1975); cf. Booker v. Special
School Dist. Number 1, Minneapolis, Minn., 351 F. Supp. 799
(Minn. 1972). 17
Finally, in addition to other remedial programs, which
could, if circumstances warranted, include programs to
remedy deficiencies, particularly in reading and communication skills, federal courts have expressly ordered special
in-service training for teachers, see, e. g., United States v.
State of Missouri, 523 F. 2d 885, 887 (CA8 1975); Smith v.
St. Tammany Parish School Board, supra, a.t 110; Moore v.
Tanigpahoa Parish School Board, supra, at 253, and have
altered or even suspended testing programs employed by
school systems undergoing desegregation. See, e. g., Single16 In denying the stay application, Mr. Justice Black was untroubled
by the underlying order of the District Court:
"It would be very difficult for me to suspend the order of the District
Court that, in my view, does no more than endeavor to realize the
directive of the Fourteenth Amendment and the decisions of this Court
that racial discrimination in the public schools must be eliminated root
and branch." 404 U. S., at 1206.
17 We do not, of course, pass upon the correctness of the particular
holdings of cases we did not review. We simply note that these holdings
.s upport the broader proposition that, when the record warrants, remedial
programs may be, in the exercise of equitable discretion, appropriate
remedies to treat the condition that offends the Constitution. Of course,
it must be shown that the const.itutional violation caused the condition
for which remedial programs are mandated.
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ton v. Jackson Municipal Separate School District, 419 F. 2d
1211, 1219 (CA5 1969), cert. denied, 396 U. S. 1032 (1970);
Lemon v. Bossier Parish School Board, 444 F. 2d 1400, 1401
(CA5 1971); Arvizu v. Waco Independent School Dist., 373
F. Supp. 1264 (WD Tex. 1973), rev'd in part on other issues,
495 F. 2d 499 (CA5 1974).
These cases demonstrate that the District Court in the case
before us did not break new ground in approving the School /
Board's proposed plan. Quite the contrary, acting on abundant evidence in this record, the District Court approved a
remedial plan going beyond mere pupil assignments, as
expressly approved by Swann and Montgomery County, supra.
In so doing, the District Court was adopting specific programs
proposed by local school authorities, ~e presumed to
be fami 1ar wi - the problems and the needs of a system
undergoing desegregation. 18
We do not, of course, imply that the order here is a blueprint for other cases. That .cannot be; in school desegregation cases, "[t]here is no universal answer to complex
problems . . . ; there is obviously no plan that will do the
job in every case." Green, supra, at 439. On this record,
however, we are bound to conclude that the decree before us
was aptly tailored to remedy the consequences of the constitutional viola.tion. Cfiildren who have been thus educationally
and culturally set apart from the larger community will inevitably acquire habits of speech, conduct, and attitudes
reflecting their isolated environment. They are likely to acquire speech habits, for example, which vary from the environmeii't1n which tliey must ultimately function and compete,
18 This Court has from the beginning looked to the District Courts
in desegregation cases, familiar as they are with the local situations
coming before them, to appraise the efforts of local school authorities
to carry out their constitutionally required duties. "Because of their
proximity to local conditions . . . the [federal district] courts which
originally heard these cases can best perform this judicial appraisal."
Brown Il, supra, at 299.
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if they are to enter and be a part of that community. Thie
is not peculiar to race; it can affect any children who, as
a group, are isolated by force of law from the mainstream.
Cf. Lau v. Nichols, 414 U. S. 563 (1974).
Pupil assignment alone does not automatically remedy
the impact of previous, unlawful educational isolation; the
consequences linger and can be dealt with only by independ.
ent measures. In short, the speech habits acquired in a
segregated system do not banish simply by moving the child
to a desegregated school. The root condition shown by this
record must be treated directly by special training at the
hands of teachers prepared for that task. This is what the
District Judge in the case drew from the record before him
as to the consequences of Detroit's de jure system, and we
cannot conclude tha t tlu~ remedies decreed exceeded the sc®e
of the violations found .
...Nor do we find any other reason to believe that the
broad and flexible equity powers of the court were abused
in this case. The established role of local school authorities
was ma.i ntained inviolate, and the remedy is indeed remedial.
The order does not punish anyop.e, nor does it impair or
jeopardize the educational system in Detroit. 10 The District
Court, in short, was true to the principle laid down in
Brown II :
"In fashioning and effectuating the decrees, the courts
will be guided by equitable principles. Traditionally,
equity has been characterized by a practical flexibility in
shaping its remedies and by a facility for adjusting and
reconciling public and private needs. These cases call
19 Indeed, the District Judge took great pains to devise a workable
plan. For example, he sought carefully to eliminate burdensome transportation of Negro children to predominantly Negro schools and to
prevent the disruption, by massive pupil reassignment, of racially mixed
schools in stable neighborhoods which had successfully undergone reaid.ential and educational change.
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for the exercise of these traditional attributes of equity
power." 349 U. S., at 300.

III
Petitioners also contend that the District Court's order,
even if otherwise proper, violates the Eleventh Amendment.
In their view, the requirement that the state defendants pay
one-half the additional costs attributable to the four educational components is, "in practical effect, indistingq.ishable
from an award of money damages against the state based upon
the asserted prior misconduct of state officials." Brief, at 34.
Arguing from this premise, petitioners conclude that the
"award" in this case is ba.rred under this Court's holding in
Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974).
Edelman involved a suit for money damages a.g ainst the
State, as well as for prospective injunctive relief. 20 The suit
was brought by an individual who claimed that Illinois officials
had improperly withheld disability benefit payments to him
and to the members of his class. Applying traditional
Eleventh Amendment principles, we held that the suit was
barred to the extent the suit sought "the award of an accrued
monetary liability .. ." which represented "retroactive payments." !d. , at 663-664. (Emphasis supplied.) Conversely,
the Court held that the suit was proper to the extent it sought
"payment of state funds .. . as a necessary consequence of
compliance in the future with a substantive federal-question
determination . ..." !d., at 668. (Emphasis supplied.)
The decree to share the future costs of educational components in this case fits squarely within the prospectivecompliance exception reaffirmed by Edelman. That exception, which had its genesis in Ex parte Young, 209 U. S. 123
2 0 Although the complaint in Edelman ostensibly sought only equitable
relief, the plaintiff expressly requested "'a permanent injunction enjoining
the defendants to award to the entire class of plaintiffs all [disability]
benefits wrongfully withheld.' " 415 U. S., at 656.
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( 1908), permits federal courts to enjoin state officials to conform their conduct to requirements of federal law, notwithstanding a direct and substantial impact on the state treasury.
415 U. S., at 15. The order challenged here does no more
than that. The decree requires state officials, held responsible for unconstitutional conduct, in findings which a.re not
challenged, to eliminate a de jure segregated school system.
More precisely, the burden of state officials is that set forth
in Swann-to take the necessary steps "to eliminate from the
public schools all vestiges of state-imposed segregation." 402
U.S., at 15. The educational components, which the District
Court ordered into effect prospectively, are plainly designed to
wipe out continuing conditions of inequality produced by the
inherently unequal dual school system long maintained by
Detroit. 21
These programs were not, and as a practical matter could
not be, intended to wipe the slate clean by one bold stroke,
as could a retroactive award of money in Edelman. 22 Rather,
by the nature of the antecedent violation, which on this record
caused significant deficiencies in communications skills-reading and speaking-the victims of Detroit's de jure segregated system will continue to experience the effects of segregation until such future time as the remedial programs can help
dissipate the continuing effects of past misconduct. Reading and speech deficiencies cannot be eliminated by judicial
21 Unlike the award in Edelman, the injunction entered here could not
instantaneously restore the victims of unlawful conduct to their rightful
condition. Thus, the injunct-ion here looks to the future, not simply
to presently compensating victims for conduct and consequences completed in the past.
22 In contrast to Edelman, there was no money award here in favor
of respondent Bradley or any members of his class. This case simply
does not involve individual citizens' conducting a raid on the state
treasury for accrued monetary liability. It is wholly prospective in the
same manner that the decree mandates vocational school:;; and assignments, for example.
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fiat; they will require time, patience, and the skills of specialiy
trained teachers. That the programs are also "compensatory''
in nature does not change the fact that they ara part of a
plan that operates prospectively to bring about the delayed
benefits of a unitary school system. We therefore hold that
such prospective relief is not barred by the Eleventh
Amendment. 28
Finally, there is no merit to petitioners' claims that the
relief ordered here violates the Tenth Amendment and general principles of federalism. The Tenth Amendment's reservation of nondelegated powers to the States is not implicated
by a federal court judgment enforcing the express prohibition$
of unlawful state conduct enacted by the Fourteenth Amendment. Cf. Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U. S. 445 (1976). Nor
are principles of federalism abrogated by the decree. The
District Court has neither attempted to restructure local governmental entities, nor to mandate a particular method or·
structure of state or local financing. Cf. San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U. S. 1 ( 1973). The
District Court has, rather, properly enforced the guarantees
of the Fourteenth Amendment consistent with our prior holdings, and in a manner that does not jeopardize the integrity
·of the structure or functions of state and local government.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is therefore affirmed.
Affirmed.

Because of our conclusion, we do not reach either of the two
alternative arguments in support of the District Court's judgment, namely
that the State of Michigan expressly waived its Eleventh Amendment
immunity by virtue of Mich. Stat. Annot. § 15.1023 (7), and that the
Fourteenth Amendment , ex propio vigore, works a pro tanto repeal of
the Eleventh Amendment. Cf. Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U. S. 445
(1976) . Neither question was addressed by the Court of Appeals, and
we therefore do not pass on either issue.
28
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Defendants; institution of the vocational
education program; institution of a comprehensive program for bi-lingual/multi - ethnic
studies; and institution of the in-service
training program for implementation of the
Uniform Code of Conduct.

<

"Ev e n without actual dollar figures, the
financial impact of these or~ers could easilf
aestroy the educat1onal program of the Detro1t
School system.
The financing of these components by the Detroit school system would only
mean a concomitant elimination of existing
programs.
"It is virtually impossible for the Detroit

/

onsequences

u....

~~"JCOJ . ,

of~a~reeing

to sucJt' extensive
In its brief in the

Court of Appeals, the Board expressed grave concern
as to what the District Court's assumption of the
Board's powers could do to the school system
financially:
,. ,
v,
"[O]n May 11, 1976, .
.
~
the District Court ordered equalization of
all school facilities and buildings preparatory
to the 1976-77 school term; continuance of the
com rehensiv
nstruction and renovation
program;
e instit
commun1cation skills p ro gram together with th
necessary in-service training therefor@ the
institution of the testing program with the
accompanying in -se rvice training; institution
of the coun se ling and career guidance program
with the accompanying in - service training; the
application of a formula for equal sharing of
excess cost of implementing the educational
components by the Detroit Board and the State
Defendants ; institution of the vocational
education program; institution of a comprehensive program for bi - lingual/multi-ethnic
studies; and institution of the in-service
training program for implementation of the
Uniform Code of Conduct.

<

"Ev e n without actual dollar figures, the
financial impact of these orrlers co~IC3eaSJI¥
oestroy the educat1onal program of the Detro1t
School system.
The financing of these components by the Detroit school system would only
mean a concomitant elimination of exjsting
programs.
"It is virtually impossible for the Detroit
Board of Education to re-order its priorities
when it is already operating on a woefully
inadequate budget that cannot provide a minimal
quality educational program.
Any attempt to
redistrjbute available resources will cause
Ilirther oeterioraTion 1n on-go1ng educational
programs and will merely result in robbing Peter
to pay Paul." App. l89a (empha s1s added)()
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No. 76-447 MILLIKEN v. BRADLEY
MR. JUSTICE POWELL, concurring in the judgment.
The Court's opinion addresses this case as if it
were conventional desegregation litigation.

The

wide-ranging opinion reiterates the familiar general
pr-inciples drawn from the line of precedents commencing
with Brown v. Board of Education, 347

u.s.

483 (1954), and

including today's decision in Dayton Board of Education v.
Brinkman, post, at

One has to read the opinion \

closely to understand that the case, as it finally reaches
us, is wholly different from any prior case.

I write to

emphasize its uniqueness, and the consequent limited
precedential effect of much of the Court's opinion.
Normally, the plaintiffs in this type of
litigation are

students, parents and supporting

organizations who desire to desegregate a school system
alleged to be the product, in whole or in part, of de jure
segregative action by the public school authorities.
The principal defendant is usually the local board of
education or school board.

Occasionally, the state board

·;~

2•

of education and public officials are joined as
defendants.
in this

This protracted litigation commenced in 1970

conventional mold.

In the intervening years,

however, the posture of the litigation has changed so
drastically as to leave it largely a friendly suit between
the plaintiffs (respondents Bradley, et al.) and the
original principal defendant, the Detroit School Board.
These parties, antagonistic for years, have now joined
forces apparently for the purpose of extracting funds from
the state treasury.

As between the original principal

parties - the plaintiffs and the Detroit School Board - no
case or controversy remains on the issues now before us.
The Board enthusiastically supports the entire
desegregation decree even though the decree intrudes
deeply on the Board's own decisionmaking powers.

Indeed,

the present School Board proposed most of the educational
components included in the District Court's decree.

The

plaintiffs originally favored a desegregation plan that
would have required more extensive transportation of
pupils, and they did not initially propose or endorse the
educational components. In this Court, however, the
plaintiffs also support the decree of the District Court
1

as affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
Thus the only complaining party is the State of
Michigan (acting through state officials), and its basic

3•

complaint concerns money, not desegregation.

It has been

ordered to pay about $5,800,000 to the Detroit School
Board.

This is one-half the estimated "excess cost" of
j~
four of the ~&Jell educational components included in the

desegregation decree:

remedial reading, in-service
2
training of teachers, testing, and counseling. The

State, understandably anxious to preserve the state budget
from federal court control or interference, now contests
the decree on two grounds.
Fir st, it is argued that the order to pay state
funds violates the Eleventh Amendment and principles of
federalism.

Ordinarily a federal court's order that a

state pay unappropriated funds to a locality would raise
the gravest constitutional issues.

See generally

San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodgriguez, 411
U.S. 1, 40-42 (1973); National League of Cities v. Usery,
426

u.s.

833 (1976).

But here, in a finding no longer

subject to review, the State has been adjudged a
participant in the constitutional violations, and the
State therefore may be ordered to participate
prospectively in a remedy otherwise appropriate.
The State's second argument is one that normally
would be advanced vigorously by the school board.

Relying

on the established principle that the scope of the remedy
in a desegregation case is determined and limited by the

4.

extent of the identified constitutional violations, Dayton
Board of Education, supra, at

u.s.

; Hills v. Gautreaux, 425

284, 293-294 (1976); Milliken v. Bradley, 418

u.s.

717, 744 (1974); Austin Independent School Dist. v. United
States, 97 S. Ct. 517 (1976)

(Powell, J., concurring), the

State argues that the District Court erred in ordering the
system-wide expansion of the four educational components
mentioned above.

It contends that there has been no

finding of a constitutional violation with respect to the
past operation of any of these programs, and it insists
that without more specifically focused findings of this
sort, the decree exceeded the court's powers.
This argument is by no means a frivolous one.
But the context in which it is presented is so unusual
that it would be appropriate to dismiss the writ as
improvidently granted.

The argument is advanced by the

State and not by the party primarify concerned.

The

educational programs at issue are standard and widely
approved in public education. The State Board normally
would be enthusiastic over enhancement of these programs
so long as the local school board could fund them without
requiring financial aid from the State.

It is equally

evident that the State probably would resist a federal
court order requiring it to pay unappropriated state funds
to the local school board regardless of whether violations
by the local board justified the remedy.

The State's

5.
interest in protecting its own budget - limited by
legislative appropriations - is a genuine one.

But it is

not an interest that is related, except fortuitously, to a
claim that the desegregation remedy may have exceeded the
extent of the violations.
The State's reliance on the remedy issue contains
a further weakness, emphasizing the unusual character of
this case. There is no indication that the State objected
- certainly, it does not object here - to the inclusion in
the District Court's decree of the seven other educational
components.

See n. 2, supra.

Indeed, the State expressly

agreed to one of the most expensive components, the
establishment of vocational education centers, in a
stipulation obligating it to share the cost of
construction equally with the Detroit Board.
139a-14la.

See App.

Furthermore, the District Court's decree

largely embodies the original recommendation of the
Detroit Board.

Since local school boards "have the

primary responsibility for elucidating, assessing, and
solving [the] problems" generated by "[f]ull
implementation of . • . constitutional principles' in the
local setting, Brown v. Board of Education, 349

u.s.

294,

299 (1955), the State's limited challenge here is
particularly lacking in force.
Moreover, the District Court was faced with a
school district in exceptional disarray.

It found the

~~ /

6.

structure of the Detroit school system "chaotic and
incapable of effective administration."

App. 124a.

The

"general superintendent has little direct authority."
Ibid.

Each of the eight regional boards may be

preoccupied with "distribut[ing] local board patronage."
App. 125a.

The "local boards have diverted resources that

would otherwise have been available for educational
purposes to build new offices and other facilities to
house this administrative overload."

Ibid.

The District

Court continued:

-

"In addition to the administrative chaos, we
know of no other school system that is so
enmeshed in politics . . . . Rather than devoting
themselves to the educational system and the
desegregative process, board members are busily
engaged in politics not only to assure their
own re-election but also to defeat others with
whom they disagree." App. 125a-126a
(footnote omitted).
Referring again to the "political paralysis" and
"inefficient bureaucracy" of the system, the court also

I

noted - discouragingly - that the election then
approaching "may well [result in] a board of education
consisting of members possessing no experience in
education."

App. 126a.

In this quite remarkable

situation, it is perhaps not surprising that the District
Court virtually assumed the role of school superintendent
3

and school board.
Given the foregoing unique circumstances, it
seems to me that the proper disposition of this case is to

7.

dismiss the writ of certiorari as improvidently granted.
But being unable to persuade my Brothers to this
prudential view, I join in the judgment as a result less
likely to prolong the disruption of education in Detroit
than a reversal or remand.

The District Court did, after

all, make findings relating the educational remedies
directly to specific constituational violations.

In my

view, it is at least arguable that the findings in this
respect were too generalized to meet the standards
prescribed by this Court.
supra.

See Dayton Board of Education,

But the majority views the record as justifying a

finding that "the need for the educational components
flowed directly from the constitutional violations by both
4

state and local officials."

Ante, at 14.

On that

view of the record, our settled doctrine requiring that
the remedy be carefully tailored to fit identified
constitutional violations is not disturbed by today's
result.

I therefore concur in the judgment.

Milliken footnotes
N-1

~

Until the case reached this court the

plaintiffs apparently did not view the educational
components as necessary or even important elements of a
desegregation plan.

These components were not included in

plans submitted by the plaintiffs, and in briefs filed
below there were indications that the plaintiffs viewed

1

some - if not all - of these components as being "wholly
unrelated to desegregation of students and faculty in
schools."

See plaintiff's brief in the Court of Appeals,

at 5~ n. 6.

~In

addition to these four components, there

were some seven other educational directives that are not
contested here.

Perhaps the most expansive was the

District Court's order that the City and State Boards
create five vocational centers "devoted to in-depth
occupational preparation in the construction trades,
transportation and health services."

App. 75a.

As noted

in the text infra, a compromise was reached as to these
centers and the State entered into a stipulation
obligating it to share the cost of providing them. See
App. 139a-142a.

The other · educational components ordered

by the District Court included:

(i) "two new technical

high schools in which business education will be the
central part of the curriculum"

(App. 75a);

(ii) a new

curriculum prescribed by the court in some detail for the
vocational education courses in the Detroit schools,

N-2
including the requirement that an additional "grade 13" be
added to afford expanded educational opportunities (App.
76a); (iii) the inclusion of "multi-ethnic studies" in the
curriculum, with a request for federal funds to support
"in-service training for teachers involved in such
programs" (App. 82a, 147a); (iv) a "Uniform Code of
Conduct," which the Board was ordered to develop pursuant
to guidelines established by the court (App. 79a, 148a);
(v) a specific plan for "co-curricular activities" with
other artistic and educational institutions in the area,
to be developed by the Board and submitted for court
approval (App. 82a); and (vi) a "community relations
program" prescribed in remarkable detail by the court.
(App. 80a, 132a).
Jn most, if not all, instances the court ordered
that each of these programs be "comprehensive," and that
reports be made to the court.

The details of the

foregoing are set forth in the

opinio~and

decrees of

August 1, 1975, November 4 and 20, 1975, and May 11,
1976.

One may doubt whether there is any precedent for a

federal court exercising such extensive control over the
purely educational responsibilities of a school board.
3.

It merits emphasizing that the School Board

invited this assumption of power.

Indeed, the District

Court had complimented the Board on its willingness to
"implement any desegregation order the Court may issue!

N-3

App. 49a.

But at one point there were serious second

thoughts.

In its brief in the Court of Appeals, the Board

expressed grave concern as to what the District Court's
assumption of the Board's powers could do to the school
system financially:
[O]n May 11, 1976 • . . the District Court
rdered equalization of all school facilities
nd buildings preparatory to the 1976-77 school
term; continuance of the comprehensive
construction and renovation program; [and
implementation of the educational components
summarized in n. 2, supra] • . • •
"Even without actual dollar figures, the
financrai 1mpact of these orders could easii¥
destroy the educat1onal program of the Detro1t
School system. The financing of these components by the Detroit school system would only
mean a concomittant elimination of existing
programs.

I

"----

-

It is virtually impossible for the Detroit
Board of Education to re-order its priorities
when it is already operating on a woefully
inadequate budget that cannot provide a minimal
quality educational program. Any attempt to
redistribute available resources will cause
further deterioration in on-going educational
programs and will merely result in robbing Peter
to pay Paur.-" App. 189a (emphasis added).
_,..~,_

the least, the financial impact of the court's
decree was profoundly disturbing.

But apparently the

financially pressed Board was willing to surrender a
substantial portion of its decisionmaking authority in
return for the prospect of enhanced state funding.

For by

the time it made this statement to the Court of Appeals,
the Board knew that the District Court had exercised its

N-4
power to do what the state legislature had chosen not to
do:

appropriate funds from the state treasury for these

particular programs of the Detroit schools.
4.

The Court's opinion states, for example, that

the District Court "expressly found that the two
components of testing and counseling, as then administered
in Detroit's schools, were infected with the
discriminatory bias of a segregated school system."
at 7.

Ante,

-

lfp/ss

. +

0
,flo: The Chio;f ~us _. · 0~
.

6/17/77

llr. Jus.:t 1.co
"
Hr. Juotice · ow

Mr. Ju otico Yh .a
Ur. Juet tqe
Wr. Jus t l eo
Mr. Justic e
Yr. Jus tice

}lar~hall
;!):1~)?1lun
:R~l'...nfH.Lis t

St av,ans

From: llr. Just ice P owe}~l
Circulated:

JUN l? YJ?L.

No. 76-447 MILLIKEN v. BRADLEY
MR. JUSTICE POWELL, concurring in th e judgme nt .
The Court's opinion addresse s this case a s if it
were conventional desegregation litigation.

The

wide-ranging opinion reiterates the familiar gene ra l
principles drawn from the line of precedents commencing
with Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), and
including today's decision in Dayton
Brinkman, post, at

B oar~

o f_EClucatio n v .

One has to read the opini o n \

closely to understand that the case, as it finally r e aches
us, is wholly diff e rent from any prior case.

I wr it e t o

emphasize its uniqueness, and the con s equent lim i te d
precedential effe c t of much of the Court's opinion.
Normally, the plaintiffs in this type o f
lir.i. gat i o~

a re

students, pa r e nts and suppnrti ng

organizations who desire to desegr e gate a school sys tem
alleged to be the product, in whole or in part, of de jur e
segregative action by the public school authorities.
The principal de fe ndant is usually the local board of
education or school boQrd.

Occasionally, the state board

2•

...
of education and public officials are joined as
defendants.
in this

This protracted litigation commenced in 1970

conventional mold.

In the intervening ye a rs,

however, the posture of the litigation has changed so
drastically as . to leave it largely a friendly suit between
the plaintiffs (respondents Bradl e y, et al.) and the
original principal defendant, the Detroit School Board.
These parties, antagonistic for years, have now joined
forces apparently for the purpose of extracting funds from
the state treasury.

As between the original principal

parties - the plaintiffs and the Detroit School Bo a rd - no
case or controversy remains on the issues now before us.
The Board enthusiastically supports the entire
desegregation decree even though the decree intrudes
deeply on the Board's own decisionmaking powers.

Indeed,

the present School Board proposed most of the educational
components included in the District Court's decree.

The

plaintiffs originally favored a desegregation plan that
would have required more extensive transportation of
pupils, and they did not initially propose or endorse the
educational components. In this Court, however, the
plaintiffs also support the decree of the District Court
1

as affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
Thus the only complaining party is the State of
Michigan (acting through state officials), and its basic

3•

complaint concerns money, not desegregation.

...
It has been

ordered to pay about $5,800,000 to the Detroit School
Board.

This is one-half the estimated "excess cost" of

four of the eleven educational components included in the
desegregation decree:

remedial reading, in-service
2

training of teachers, testing, and counseling. The
State, understandably anxious to preserve the state budget
from federal court control or interference, now contests
the decree on two grounds.
First, it is argued that the order to pay state
funds violates the Eleventh Amendment and principles of
federalism.

Ordinarily a federal court's order that a

state pay unappropriated funds to a locality would raise
the gravest constitutional issues.

See generally

San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodgriguez, 411
U.S. 1, 40-42 (1973); National League of Cities v. Usery,
426 U .·s. 833

(1976) .

But here, in a finding no longer

subject to review, the State has been adjudged a
participant in the constitutional violations, and the
State therefore may be ordered to participate
prospect~vely in a remedy otherwise appropriate.

The State's second argument is one that normally
would be advanced vigorously by the school board.

Relying

o n the established principle that the scope of the remedy
i n a desegregation case is determined and limited by the

4.
extent of the identified constitutional violations, Dayton
Board of Education, supra, at

u.s.

284, 293-294

Hills v. Gautreaux, 425

(1976); Milliken v. Bradley, 418

u.s.

717, 744 (1974); Austin Independent School Dist. v. United
States, 97 S. Ct. 517

(1976)

(Powell, J., concurring), the

State argues that the District Court erred in ordering the
system-wide expansion of the four educational components
mentioned above.

It contends that there has been no

finding of a constitutional violation with respect to the
past operation of any of these programs, and it insists
that without more specifically focused findings of this
sort, the decree exceeded the court's powers.
This argument is by no means a frivolous one.
But the context in which it is presented is so unusual
that it would be appropriate to dismiss the writ as
improvidently granted.

The argument is advanced by the

State and not by the party primarily concerned.

The

educational programs at issue are standard and widely
approved in public education. The State Board normally
would be enthusiastic over enhancement of these programs
so long as the local school board could fund them without
requiring financial aid from the State.

It is equally

evident that the State probably would resist a federal
court order requiring it to pay unappropriated state funds
to the local school board regardless of whether violations
by the local board justified the remedy.

The State's

..,

5

interest in protecting its own budget - limited by
legislative appropriations - is a genuine one.

~.

But it is

not an interest that is related, except fortuitously, to a
claim that the desegregation remedy may have exceeded the
extent of the violations.
The State's reliance on the remedy issue contains
a further weakness, emphasizing the unusual character of
this case. There is no indication that the State objected
-certainly, it does not object here - to the inclusion in
the District Court's decree of the seven other educational
components.

See n. 2, supra.

Indeed, the State expressly

agreed to one of the most expensive components, the
establishment of vocational education centers, in a
stipulation obligating it to share the cost of
construction equally with the Detroit Board.
139a-14la.

See App.

Furthermore, the District Court's decree

largely embodies the original recommendation of the
Detroit Board.

Since local school boards "have the

primary responsibility for elucidating, assessing, and
solving [the] problems" generated by "[f]ull
implementation of . . . constitutional principles' in the
local setting, Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U.S. 294,
299 (1955), the State's limited challenge here is
particularly lacking in force.
Moreover, the District Court was faced with a
school district in exceptional disarray.

It found the

0

structure of the Detroit school· system "chaotic and
incapable of effective administration."

6•

..

App. 124a.

The

"general superintendent has little direct authority."
Ibid.

Each of the eight regional boards may be

preoccupied with "distribut[ing] local board patronage."
App. 125a.

The "local boards have diverted resources that

would otherwise have been available for educational
purposes to build new offices and other facilities to
house this administrative overload."

Ibid.

The District

Court continued:
"In addition to the administrative chaos, we
know of no other school system that is so
enmeshed in politics . . . . Rather than devoting
themselves to the educational system and the
desegregative process, board members are busily
engaged in politics not only to assure their
own re-election but also to defeat others with
whom they disagree." App. 125a-l26a
(footnote omitted).
Referring again to the "political paralysis" and

ilf

'
&£ system, the court also
'1nef f'1c1ent
bureaucracy" of the

I'

noted - discouragingly - that the election then

,/
I

approaching "may well [result in] a board of education
consisting of members possessing no experience in
education."

App. 126a.

In this quite remarkable

situation, it is perhaps not surprising that the District
Court virtually assumed the role of school superintendent
3

and school board.
Given the foregoing unique circumstances, it
seems to me that the proper disposition of this case is to
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of certiorari as improvidently granted.

!*'W.~M-rl-~4 ew,

I join in the judgment as a result less

likely to prolong the disruption of education in Detroit
than a reversal or

remand. ~ 'PAe 1H:~t"t
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i &e CO'\.W?t dw ,

a€~ er

~~ es

In my

view, it is at least arguable that the findings in this
respect were too generalized to meet the standards
prescribed by this Court.
supra.

See Dayton Board of Education,

But the majority views the record as

~~
~
~lib l~ l\ that "the

justifying ~

.
need for the educat 1onal
components

flowed directly from the constitutional violations by both
4

state and local officials."

Ante, at 14.

On that

view of the record, our settled doctrine requiring that
the remedy be carefully tailored to fit identified
constitutional violations
result.

is ~

,.

by today's

I therefore concur in the judgment.

Milliken footnotes
N-1

1.

Until the case reached this Court the

plaintiffs apparently did not view the educational
components as necessary or even important elements of a
desegregation plan.

These components were not included in

plans submitted by the plaintiffs, and in briefs filed
below there were indications that the plaintiffs viewed
some - if not all - of these components as being "wholly
unrelated to desegregation of students and faculty in
schools."

See plaintiff's brief in the Court of Appeals,

at 5, n. 6.
2.

In addition to these four components, there

were some seven other educational directives that are not
contested here.

Perhaps the most expansive was the

District Court's order that the City and State Boards
create five vocational centers "devoted to in-depth
occupational preparation in the construction trades,
transportation and health services."

App. 75a.

As noted

in the text infra, a compromise was reached as to these
centers and the State entered into a stipulation
obligating it to share the cost of providing them. See
App. 139a-142a.

The other educational components ordered

by the District Court included:

(i) "two new technical

high schools in which business education will be the
central part of the curriculum" (App. 75a);

(ii) a new

curriculum prescribed by the court in some detail for the
vocational education courses in the Detroit schools,

, ~/
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including the requirement that an additional "grade 13" be
added to afford

expand~d

educational opportunities (App.

76a); (iii) the inclusion of "multi-ethnic studies" in the
curriculum, with a request for federal funds to support
"in-service training for teachers involved in such
programs" (App. 82a, 147a);

(iv) a "Uniform Code of

Conduct," which the Board was ordered to develop pursuant
to guidelines established by the court (App. 79a, 148a);
(v) a specific plan for "co-curricular activities" with
other artistic and educational institutions in the area,
to be developed by the Board and submitted for court
approval (App. 82a); and (vi) a "community relations
program" prescribed in remarkable detail by the court.
(App. 80a, 132a).
In most, if not all, instances the court ordered
that each of these programs be "comprehensive," and that
reports be made to the court.

The details of the

foregoing are set forth in the opiniornand decrees of
August 1, 1975, November 4 and 20, 1975, and May 11,
1976.

One may doubt whether there is any precedent for a

federal court exercising such extensive control over the
purely educational responsibilities of a school board.
3.

It merits emphasizing that the School Board

invited this assumption of power.

Indeed, the District

Court had complimented the Board on its willingness to
"implement any desegregation order the Court may issue".

N-3
App. 49a.

But at one point there were serious second

thoughts.

In its brief in the Court of Appeals, the Board

expressed grave concern as to what the District Court's
assumption of the Board's powers could do to the school
system financially:
"[O]n May 11, 1976 . . • the District Court
ordered equalization of all school facilities
and buildings preparatory to the 1976-77 school
term; continuance of the comprehensive
construction and renovation program; [and
implementation of the educational components
summarized inn. 2, supra] . . . •
"Even without actual dollar figures, the
financial Impact of these orders could easily
destroy the educational program of the Detroit
School system. The financing of these components by the Detroit school system would only
mean a concomittant elimination of existing
programs.
"It is virtually impossible for the Detroit
Board of Education to re-order its priorities
when it is already operating on a woefully
inadequate budget that cannot provide a minimal
quali ty educational program. Any attempt to
redistribute available resources will cause
further deterioration in on-going educational
programs and will merely result in robbing Peter
topayPaul. 11 App. l89a (emphasis added).
?/
To say the least, the financial impact of the court's
decree was profoundly disturbing.

But apparently the

financially pressed Board was willing to surrender a
substantial portion of its decisionmaking authority in
return for the prospect of enhanced state funding.

For by

the time it made this statement to the Court of Appeals,
the Board knew that the District Court had exercised its

N-4
power to do what the state legislature had chosen not to
do:

appropriate funds from the state treasury for these

particular programs of the Detroit schools.
4.

The Court's opinion states, for example, that

the District Court "expressly found that the two
components of testing and counseling, as then administered
in Detroit's schools, were infected with the
discriminatory bias of a segregated school system."
at 7.

Ante,
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tunities resulting from past or present racial and ethnic
isolation. . . ." Id., at 448. 16
See also George v. O'Kelly, 448 F. 2d 145, 150 (CA5 1971).
And, as school desegregation litigation emerged in other
regions of the country, federal courts have likewise looked in
part to remedial programs, when the record supported
an order to that effect. See, e. g., Morgan v. Kerrigan, 401
F. Supp. 216, 235. (Mass. 1975), aff'd, 530 F. 2d 401 (CAl
1976), cert. denied,- U.S.- (1976); Hart v. Community
School Board of Brooklyn, 383 F. Supp. 699, 757 (EDNY
1974), aff'd, 512 F. 2d 37 (CA2 1975); cf. Booker v. Special
School Dist. Number 1, Minneapolis, Minn., 351 F. Supp. 799
(Minn. 1972).17
Finally, in addition to other remedial programs, which
could, if circumstances warranted, include programs to
remedy deficiencies, particularly in reading and com·
munication skills, federal courts have expressly ordered special
in-service training for teachers, see, e. g., United States v.
State of Missouri, 523 F. 2d 885, 887 (CA8 1975); Smith v.
St. Tammany Parish School Board, supra, at 110; Moore v.
Tanigpahoa Parish School Board, supra, at 253, and have
altered or even suspended testing programs employed by
school systems undergoing desegregation. See, e. g., Single·
16 In denying the stay application, Mr. Justice Black was untroubled
by the underlying order of the District Court:
"It would be very difficult fol' me to suspend the order of the District
Court that, in my view, does no more than endeavor to realize the
directive of the Fourteenth Amendment and the decisions of this Court
~hat racial discrimination in the public schoois must be eliminated root
and branch." 404 U. S., at 1206.
17 We do not, of course, pass upon the correctness of the particular
holdings of cases we did not review. We simply note that these holdings
,support the broader proposition that, when the record warrants, remedial
programs may
m e exercise o eqm a e 1scre
, appropriate
remedies to treat the condition that offends the Constitutio . Of course,
+---=It must be shown that the const.itutional violation caused the condition
for which remedial programs are mandated,

.
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ton v. Jackson Municipal Separate School District, 419 F. 2d
1211, 1219 (CA5 1969), cert. denied, 396 U. S. 1032 (1970);
Lemon v. Bossier Parish School Board, 444 F. 2d 1400, 1401
(CA5 1971); Arvizu v. Waco Independent School Dist., 373
F. Supp. 1264 (WD Tex. 1973!, rev'd in _part on oth.er i~~ues,
495 F. 2d 499 (CA5 1974) a~ ('a. i-C~.-t1«.. ~ ~c.

.
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they demonstrate that the District
Court in the case now before us did not break new ground in
approving the School Board's proposed plan. Quite the contrary, acting on abundant evidence in this record, the District
Court approved a remedial plan going beyond mere pupil
assignments, as expressly approved by Swann and Montgomery, County, supra. In so doing, the District Court was
adopting specific programs proposed by local school authorities, who must be presumed to be familiar with the problems
and the needs of a system undergoing desegregation. 1 8
We do not, of course, imply that the order here is a blueprint for other cases. That cannot be; in school desegregation cases, "[t]here is no universal answer to complex
problems . . . ; there is obviously no plan that will do the
job in every case." Green, supra, at 439. On this record,
however, we are bound to conclude that the decree before us
was aptly tailored to remedy the consequences of the constitutional violation. Children who have been thus educationally
and culturally set apart from the larger community will inevitably acquire habits of speech, conduct, and attitudes
reflecting their cultural isolation. They are likely to acquire speech habits, for example, which vary from the environment in which they must ultimately function and compete,
18 This Court has from the beginning looked to the District Courts
in desegregation cases, familiar as they are with the local situations
coming before them, to appraise the efforts of local school authorities
to carry out their constitutionally required duties. "Because of their
proximity to local conditions . . . the [federal district] courts which
originally heard these cases can best perform this judicial appraisal."
Brown II, supra, at 299.
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